

MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

March, 1961

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Edited by

EDWARD GODFREY COX
Managing Editor

EMILY E. JOHNSON
Associate Editor

DAVID C. FOWLER

CARROLL E. REED

OSCAR BÜDEL

Direct Contributions and Business Correspondence to
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THE CULTURAL STATUS OF SCOTTISH GAELIC A HUMANISTIC INTERPRETATION

By CHARLES W. DUNN¹

For at least four centuries the Gaelic spoken in the Highlands and Western Islands of Scotland has faced determined opposition. In 1609, to cite a celebrated example, a commission appointed by King James VI decreed that every gentleman of the Isles send his eldest son or daughter to the Lowlands to learn English in order to eradicate "ignorance and incivilitie," and that the gentry be forbidden to encourage "bards and other idlers of that class."² At the present time, when the relation of native languages to nationalism throughout the world seems to be as critical as it has ever been, an appraisal of the status of Scottish Gaelic is of considerable interest. Since 1609, various political and educational opponents have in one way or another attempted to exterminate Gaelic culture. Concealed historical forces have affected the language, and its future is now being determined by personal attitudes of those who speak the language and of their neighbors who do not. Consequently, the present status of the language is not revealed by mere statistics alone.

The difficulty of its survival has been intensified by the fact that Scottish Gaelic has never been the language of an entire nation, as Irish Gaelic or Welsh have been. By the sixteenth century, it was spoken by probably no more than half of the total population of Scotland, which then amounted to an estimated 300,000. Today, in a population which has grown to more than four million, fewer than two per cent are Gaelic speakers.³

In Wales, by comparison, where there are some 700,000 speakers of Welsh, it is often asserted that the only real Welsh are those who speak Welsh. Though ethnologically debatable, this sentiment is warmly held, even by some Welshmen who do not speak the language. When Lord Raglan recently suggested that Welsh should be allowed to die, Jimmy Jones dismissed the opinion as "mawn o'r henwlad" (peat from the old land), and Thomas Llowen exclaimed, "Nid yw'n llwyr Gymro" (he's not a true Welshman).⁴ In Ireland,

¹ This paper was prepared at the request of the Chairman of the Celtic Group of the Modern Language Association and was read at the meeting at New York, December 29, 1958. It has been slightly expanded. See also Kenneth Jackson, "The Situation of the Scottish Gaelic Language," *Lochlann*, I (1958), 229-34.

² Donald Gregory, *History of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotland*, 2nd ed. (London, 1881), pp. 330 ff.

³ John Lorne Campbell, *Gaelic in Scottish Education and Life*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1950), p. 37.

⁴ United Press International dispatch, October 16, 1958.

where it is claimed (with perhaps some exaggeration) that there are some 500,000 speakers of Irish, the historic struggle to form a national government has been directly connected with an attempt to restore Gaelic as the language of the entire nation.

In Scotland, on the other hand, the present role of Gaelic in the development of nationalism is slight. Some Gaelic poets, it is true, are nationalistic; and some Lowland nationalists have supported the teaching of Gaelic in Gaelic-speaking areas or have praised and translated Gaelic poetry; but no one has seriously suggested introducing Gaelic as a national language which must be learned by both Highland and Lowland school children.

Rather, political and educational forces have consistently tended to operate in the reverse direction. For an incisive account of the details, reference may be made to John Lorne Campbell's *Gaelic in Scottish Education and Life* (second edition, 1950). As he points out, during the Reformation attempts were made to teach Gaelic-speaking children English so that they might in the process receive religious instruction; later, during the great depopulations of the nineteenth century, children were taught English so that they could conveniently find work in the cities or settle abroad.

Today, the decreasing population of children who remain in the Gàidhealtachd (Gaelic area)—a much smaller number than before the depopulations—are only gradually acquiring the opportunity to study their native language and literature as a school subject and to use it as their medium of instruction. Permission was reluctantly granted by the Scottish Education Department as long ago as 1875, but the actual implementation of this goal has had to be secured largely through pressure from such bodies as the Comunn Gàidhealach (Highland Association). The results achieved so far may be quoted from John Lorne Campbell's summary:

Gaelic is tolerated (not enjoined) in giving explanations orally to infant classes; English is then taught to the children, and everything thereafter is taught through the medium of English. Gaelic is reintroduced as a special subject in senior classes (and then usually taught through the medium of English, as if it were a dead language).⁸

Such a half-hearted scheme of bilingual education is scarcely adequate to preserve Gaelic in the Gàidhealtachd, and it provides no external, authoritative support to the maintenance of the cultural level of the language. As Campbell's comparisons show, bilingual education is today much more effectively conducted among the natives of Malaya than among the natives of the Highlands and Western Islands. Consequently, though elsewhere throughout the world native populations are reasserting their own culture, Gaelic is rapidly losing native speakers. The appended tables show the process (Appendix I, pp. 10-11). According to the Scottish Census of 1891, there were

⁸ Campbell, *Gaelic*, p. 70.

254,000 speakers of Gaelic (three years old and over); in 1951 there were 95,000; and even those rural areas which were in recent times dominantly Gaelic-speaking have now fallen below the 50 per cent level. Inverness-shire in 1891 was approximately 73 per cent; in 1951 it was 30 per cent. Ross and Cromarty were 77 per cent and are now 46 per cent; Sutherland-shire was also 77 per cent and is now 25 per cent.

A similar decline is apparent in Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, where belated efforts to teach Gaelic in districts which a century ago were homogeneously Gaelic-speaking have failed to offset generations of opposition to the language. Gaelic, which has been enumerated in only the last three Canadian censuses, declined from 21,000 in 1931 in the four counties of Cape Breton Island to 10,000 in 1941 and to 6,000 in 1951. It is, of course, difficult in the Old World for any minority language to compete today against English, and still more so in the New World; but French, which is the language of an isolated rural minority in Cape Breton remote from the French-Canadian majority in the Province of Quebec, has been taught in the schools of Nova Scotia and has declined much less rapidly than Gaelic. In 1931 there were 13,000 French speakers in Cape Breton, and in 1951 there were still 12,000. Schooling may not be the sole cause for this discrepancy between the two groups, but it is certainly an important one, for Gaelic is taught in only a very few schools in Nova Scotia, though permissive legislation has been in force in the province since 1921.*

Among many educators and laymen in Scotland, the tacit opinion is that a decrease in the number of Gaelic speakers is immaterial or even that it is a sign of progress. The ordinary Lowland businessman quiets such conscience as he may have in the matter by arguing that Gaelic has no practical value. Yet John Lorne Campbell, at the other extreme, suggests that the United Nations Organization's Pact on Genocide should be invoked against those who deliberately obstruct Gaelic education. The issue at conflict is important.

Arguments against the use of Gaelic on the grounds of its impracticality were amusingly reversed by a Gaelic informant recently interviewed by the School of Scottish Studies. By profession a cattle dealer in Oban who traded entirely with Gaelic speakers, he re-

* During the term of Calum I. N. MacLeod's service as Gaelic Adviser to the Nova Scotia Department of Education (1950-58), Gaelic was taught at eleven schools: Saint Rose, Hillsborough, Stewartdale, St. Peters High School, Mabou Convent School, West Mabou School, Dunvegan, Broad Cove, Glenville, and South Lake Ainslie, all in Cape Breton Island, and at St. Andrew High School, Halifax. Adult classes were held at Inverness, Dunvegan, Brook Village, Creignish, Christmas Island, Iona, and Broad Cove, in Cape Breton, and at Antigonish, Halifax, and Yarmouth on the mainland. MacLeod conducted a Gaelic course in Dalhousie University for the Nova Scotia Summer School for Teachers. Gaelic has also been included in the summer curriculum of the School of Community Arts, Tatamagouche, at the Gaelic Summer Schools of Pugwash, N.S., and Charlottetown, P.E.I., and at the Gaelic College, St. Anns, Cape Breton. (Information supplied by C. I. N. MacLeod.)

marked, when questioned about his rather halting use of English, "Och, I neffer pother to speak English. It's of no practical value."

From a more positive point of view, the arguments in favor of preserving the language transcend mere expediency. The fundamental fact is that the language preserves and transmits the distinctive culture of the people; hence, in earlier days, the understandable opposition to the language. The bardic system spread inflammatory songs among the clans whom the central authorities were attempting to control. The traditional storytellers kept alive strange and supernatural tales offensive to the clergy and the schoolmasters. But such objections are now of little moment. What is important is that the people have retained through the medium of their language a vast repertoire of legends, folk tales, folk history, folk songs, proverbs, riddles, games, and sayings which still play an integral part in their culture. To lose the language entails the loss of all these.

The humanist should not, of course, indulge in sentimental regret for the disappearance of things past, though he is perhaps to be excused if he does. But there are sound and unsentimental reasons for avoiding the useless destruction of a vital folk culture through mere indifference or active antipathy. Culture is cumulative, not only in cities and seats of learning, but also in remote and distant islands. The only difference is that it is much more vulnerable in the latter. Education imposed by an alien and external authority may all too readily destroy what is native without supplying any new substitute. John Lorne Campbell reports the sad example of an area in the Hebrides which preserves "probably the richest storehouse of folk-song in Western Europe"; here the music teacher, who knew no Gaelic, limited her class to one text—the *English Community Song Book*.⁷

The situation of a culture so exposed to devitalization recalls the Indian's comment to Ruth Benedict: "God gave to every people . . . a cup of clay, and from this cup they drank their life. . . . They all dipped in the water, but their cups were different. Our cup is broken now."⁸ If the cup were broken throughout the Gàidhealtachd, if the folk culture were an archaic and fossilized remnant, educational authorities might be justified in ignoring the Gaelic language. But it is not. Naturally, those who do not understand the language may be misled by the fact that the culture is largely oral rather than written and cannot therefore be measured by the number of books on a family's shelf. Even Dr. Johnson, for all his good sense, entirely underestimated the range of the Gaelic tradition in the Hebrides. But today there is no longer any excuse for misunderstanding the importance of an orally transmitted culture in the life of a rural community. Gaelic traditions provide the members with an understanding of their past and a sense of their corporate identity. Their customs provide

⁷ Campbell, *Gaelic*, p. 85.

⁸ Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (New York, 1946), p. 19.

a means of adaptation to change. And their cultural leader, the folk poet, who in some areas may even now be more influential than clergyman or schoolteacher, serves not only as a perpetuator of the past; he also interprets the present.

The folklore collectors of the previous century, such as John Francis Campbell in his *Popular Tales of the West Highlands* or Alexander Carmichael in his *Carmina Gadelica*, undertook almost exclusively to record archaic survivals, or, to use the folklorists' own terms, "flotsam and jetsam" and "waifs and strays." Their preoccupation with traditional materials should not obscure the fact that the Gaelic way of life has also always produced poets willing and able to comment upon the present, particularly through extempore verse. When Dr. Johnson castigated Highland culture in the eighteenth century, many bards provided pointed answers, some of which are still extant.⁹ And their twentieth-century descendants are equally eloquent, as Margaret Shaw's recent *Folksongs and Folklore of South Uist* (1955) demonstrates.

The principal threat to the survival of the language is not its archaism or impracticality. The Highlands and Islands are being transformed by electrification and improved means of communication. The farmer, fisherman, and weaver are now able to lead a comfortable, productive, and self-sustaining life in their own native setting, as Arthur Geddes' recent study of Lewis and Harris shows,¹⁰ and there is no need for them to abandon their native language. The chief threat, apart from depopulation, lies in the feeling, inculcated through the centuries by opponents of the language, in the minds of those who speak it that the use of Gaelic is a sign of inferiority. This sentiment perhaps more than any other single factor explains the statistical decline. It appears as early as the middle of the eighteenth century. In 1751 Alexander MacDonald (Alasdair mac Mhaighstir Alasdair) composed a poem in praise of the Gaelic language, in which he made the famous boast that Adam spoke Gaelic in Paradise, "and Gaelic flowed from the fair lips of Eve."¹¹ This claim may at first glance seem merely like fine poetic hyperbole, but viewed in perspective against the defeat of the Highlanders at Culloden in 1746, it certainly seems to foreshadow an inferiority complex about the language which has increased among Gaelic speakers in more recent times. The present rallying song of the Comunn Gàidhealach, "Suas leis a' Ghàidh-

⁹ E. G. Cox, "The Case of Scotland vs. Dr. Samuel Johnson," *Transactions of the Gaelic Society of Inverness*, XXXIII (1925-27), 49-79; C. W. Dunn, "Highland Song and Lowland Ballad," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XVIII (1948), 1-19.

¹⁰ Geddes, *The Isle of Lewis and Harris*, Edinburgh University Publications in Geography and Sociology, No. 2 (Edinburgh, 1955). Not all of the Gàidhealtachd is, of course, equally promising. F. Fraser Darling describes the mainland area as "largely a devastated terrain." *West Highland Survey: An Essay in Human Ecology* (Oxford, 1955), p. viii.

¹¹ Alastair Donullach mac Mhaighistir Alastair, *Eiseirigh na Seann Chanain Albannaich* (Edinburgh, 1874), p. 3.

lig" (Up with the Gaelic), reveals the kind of pathological anxiety often associated with a minority language:

O clans of the Gaels! Be firm and united,
Shoulders together to win every praise;
O valiantly support the tongue you love,
And don't desert Gaelic, now or for ever.¹²

With this verse compare, for instance, the equally impassioned song in praise of Roumanian—another tongue threatened by engulfment:

Sweet and soft the tongue we're speaking,
No more harmonious tongue shall we find....
The Roumanian loves it like his own soul.
O speak and write Roumanian for love of Our Lord!¹³

Nonetheless, many Gaelic-speaking communities in Scotland still perpetuate a vigorous and un-selfconscious folk culture, particularly when they are supported by a sympathetic educational board; and they are now receiving a new kind of support at the literary and academic level. Since 1915, when Donald MacLean published his bibliography of printed Gaelic,¹⁴ there has been a vigorous increase of publication of literary texts. A representative list of Gaelic publications for the period 1915-58 has been here appended (Appendix II, p. 11).

Though selected on a rather arbitrary basis of literary significance, the list contains some two dozen titles, of which a quarter have appeared in the present decade despite the declining census figures of Gaelic. The list shows the appearance of two scholarly journals, *Scottish Gaelic Studies*, edited by the Aberdeen University Celtic Department, and *Scottish Studies*, edited by the Edinburgh University School of Scottish Studies, and one popular journal *Gairm*, edited by Derrick S. Thomson, now of the Aberdeen Celtic Department, and Finlay Macdonald. It also shows a preponderance of editions of earlier Gaelic poetry rather than recent work. A complete bibliography would show many smaller volumes of Gaelic folklore and some shorter collections of original Gaelic poetry and prose;¹⁵ and, to reflect the true measure of academic interest in Gaelic culture, numerous historical and linguistic studies would have to be included. But the selected list suffices to suggest a vigorous and increasing literary productivity.

Thus Gaelic, which in the nineteenth century seemed doomed to

¹² This song appears in numerous Mod songbooks. I translate here from the copy in Alphonse MacDonald, *Cape Breton Songster* (Sydney, N.S., n.d.), p. 61.

¹³ Annie Hughes, *Roumanian Conversation Grammar* (Heidelberg, 1920), pp. 5-7 (G. Sion's original with translation).

¹⁴ *Typographia Scoto-Gadelica* (Edinburgh, 1915).

¹⁵ Robert O. Dougan, *Catalogue of an Exhibition of 20th-Century Scottish Books* (Glasgow: Committee of Festival of Britain, 1951), pp. 77-82, provides only an incomplete sampling of Gaelic publications, and does not include all of those listed in the present Appendix II.

eradication, has in the mid-twentieth century come to share in the general cultural life of the country. Sorley Maclean, whose Gaelic poetry today ranks with that of the finest of the Lowland Scots poets, is a writer of international stature. Popular literature has been re-animated by the Gaelic broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Corporation; and the universities have provided new scholars and a new audience. The first Scottish Chair of Celtic was instituted in 1882 at Edinburgh.¹⁶ Now three of the four universities, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, offer Celtic courses; and largely as a result of their activity, the collection of Gaelic oral literature and of traditional music and of dialects is being carried out on the same large scale as that of the Irish Folklore Commission's work in Ireland.

Similarly, in Nova Scotia, St. Francis Xavier University at Antigonish appointed (in 1958-59) Calum I. N. MacLeod as Professor of Celtic. A former Provincial Director of Gaelic Education, he is eminently able to offer courses on the Scottish heritage of Nova Scotia and to train students as collectors of the considerable unrecorded folklore of the area.

Largely as a legacy of earlier opposition to the language, however, many problems still beset Gaelic culture in Scotland. It is difficult to maintain an effective system of bilingual education in a small country; yet, without it, the native Gaelic speaker, no matter how fluent, is likely to remain illiterate in his own language. The small size of the reading audience discourages creative writers, who up to now have not been able to enjoy any stimulus like that offered by the book clubs in Ireland and Wales.

There is, moreover, an obvious gap between a writer like Sorley Maclean and the ordinary audience, and such a cultural cleavage within the speech community ultimately weakens the language. It is sometimes suggested that Gaelic suffers through borrowing the vocabulary of modern life from English, but that is hardly the problem. A neologism may be adapted as readily to one language as to another. The real damage occurs when the speakers of a language lose their feeling for the fine linguistic shades of meaning of their own native vocabulary, for the special and appropriate words used by their forefathers, and for the significance of the more obscure expressions which they used to learn by listening to storytellers and poets reciting their repertoire of oral literature. Gradually they become incapable of following the subtlety of expression of a speaker of literary Gaelic who uses the language with care and precision.

These problems are such as are faced by every minority language and perhaps deserve more attention from humanists than they have hitherto received. During the recent arguments over the establishment of a rocket base in the island of South Uist, it was curious to

¹⁶ A detailed account of this important move will be found in H. A. Kennedy, *Professor Blackie* (London, 1895), pp. 185-204.

notice that the most indignant letters to the newspapers came not so much from humanists objecting to the destruction of an integral way of life among the people, as from ornithologists deploring the displacement of rare birds. Scholars dedicated to the study of language and literature should surely be just as ready to foster a human culture as bird-watchers are anxious to provide for the comforts of the stonechat and twite.

New York University, Washington Square

APPENDIX I

STATISTICS OF GAELIC AS MOTHER TONGUE

(1a) SCOTLAND (3 years old and over)

YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION	PER CENT OF POPULATION
1891	254,415	6.84
1901	230,806
1911	202,398
1921	158,779
1931	136,135
1941	110,000 (estimate)
1951	95,447	1.98

(1b) Chief Gaelic-Speaking Counties

YEAR	COUNTY	TOTAL POPULATION	PER CENT OF POPULATION
1891	Inverness	61,360	73.24
1951		24,672	30.57
1891	Ross, Cromarty	56,014	76.92
1951		26,401	46.05
1891	Sutherland	15,901	77.10
1951		3,286	25.26

(Census, 1951, Scotland, III: General Volume [Edinburgh, 1954], xlvii-xlviii, 64, 65. The estimate for the war year 1941 is my own.)

(2) CANADA (infants under family's mother tongue)

YEAR	CANADA	CAPE BRETON ISLAND (4 COUNTIES)	
		Gaelic	French
1931	32,008	21,976	13,861
1941	21,000 (estimate)	10,922	13,972
1951	13,974	6,101	12,702

(*Seventh Census of Canada, 1931*, I [Ottawa, 1936], 618, 782, 984, 1198, 1258; II [Ottawa, 1933], Table 57; Bulletin XLII, Table 2. *Eighth Census of Canada, 1941* [Bulletin], Population, No. A-9. *Ninth Census of Canada, 1951*, I [Ottawa, 1953], Tables 53-55; X [Ottawa, 1956], 198, 199. Several tables give 32,708 as the total number of Gaelic speakers in 1941, but the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, in response [August 12, 1959] to my query of this figure, report that it is in error caused by misinterpretation in processing of Census schedules. The estimate is my own.)

APPENDIX II

REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF GAELIC LITERARY PUBLICATIONS, 1915-58

- 1915, 1929 W. J. Watson, *Rosg Gàidhlig* [prose anthology]
 1918, 1932 W. J. Watson, *Bardachd Gàidhlig* [poetry]
 1924 Revs. Angus and Archibald MacDonald, *Poems of Alexander MacDonald*
 1926 ff. *Scottish Gaelic Studies*, ed. Aberdeen University Celtic Department
 1932 H. Cameron, *Three Bards*
 1933 J. L. Campbell, *Highland Songs of the Forty-Five*
 1934 J. C. Watson, *Gaelic Songs of Mary MacLeod*
 1937 W. J. Watson, *Scottish Verse from the Book of the Dean of Lismore*
 1938 W. Matheson, *The Songs of John MacCodrum*
 1939 N. Ross, *Heroic Verse from the Book of the Dean*
 B. Gillis and Rev. P. J. Nicholson, *Smeorach nan Cnoc 's nan Gleann* [Cape Breton poets]
 1940 J. G. MacKay, *More West Highland Tales*
 A. Carmichael, *Carmina Gadelica*, III, ed. J. C. Watson
 1941 *Carmina*, IV, ed. Watson
 1943 S. Maclean, *Dain do Eimhir* [original poetry]
 1947 D. C. Hay, *Fuaran Sléibh* [original poetry]
 1951 D. S. Thomson, *The Gaelic Sources of Macpherson's "Ossian"*
 1952 A. Macleod, *Songs of Duncan Ban MacIntyre*
 1952 ff. *Gairm*, ed. D. S. Thomson and F. Macdonald [popular magazine]
 1954 *Carmina*, V, ed. A. Matheson
 1955 M. Shaw, *Folksongs and Folklore of South Uist*
 1956 Lachlan MacKinnon, *Prose Writings of Donald MacKinnon*
 1957 ff. *Scottish Studies*, ed. Edinburgh University School of Scottish Studies

NARRATIVE IRONY IN ROBERT BURNS'S *TAM O' SHANTER*

By RICHARD MORTON

The critical problems presented by Robert Burns's *Tam o' Shanter* generally arise from the narrator's digressions and the variations of style apparent in the tale. The complexity of the poem is simplified when we turn our attention from the story to the storyteller, from the movement of the action to the technique of narration. The narrator, with his tendency to digress and interrupt the action, is a character part, one of Burns's poetic masks.¹ The poet is imitating a simple and voluble man who tells his story in an unusual and idiosyncratic way.

From the tension between the basic story and the narrative style of the storyteller, we find a definite ironic effect which pervades the whole poem. This tension can best be studied from two points of view: first, the narrator's understanding of the moral significance of the tale; and, secondly, the narrator's skill in rhetoric.

It cannot be doubted that the narrator of *Tam o' Shanter* thinks of the tale as having moral significance. But the exact nature of this significance neither he nor the reader quite grasps. The narrator gives a variety of suggestions about what may be learned from the tale. It is a story about drunkenness and about the dire effects of lascivious thoughts:

Ilk man, and mother's son, take heed:
Whene'er to Drink you are inclin'd,
Or Cutty-sarks rin in your mind. . . .²

It is a demonstration against heedlessness of distance and weather, the thoughtlessness of the irresponsible man:

We think na on the lang Scots miles,
The mosses, waters, slaps and stiles,
That lie between us and our hame.
The storm without might rair and rustle,
Tam did na mind the storm a whistle.

It is a sermon against neglecting the advice of one's wife:

O Tam! had'st thou but been sae wise,
As taen thy ain wife Kate's advice!

But the narrator does not develop these moral points. When the

¹ In Thomas Crawford's *Burns: A Study of the Poems and Songs* (London, 1960), which appeared after the completion of the present paper, the concept of a "crony narrator" in *Tam o' Shanter* is ably developed. Crawford's thesis, however, differs from that here presented.

² The text of *Tam o' Shanter* is taken from Robert Burns, *Poems and Songs*, intro. James Kinsley, Everyman's Library (London, 1958).

witches swoop on Tam, he is told, "thou'll get thy fairin!" The reader, however, is not sure what his deserts are, or if he is guilty of any vice except muddleheadedness. The basic story shows no more than the imprudence of going out at night and of losing one's head at a witches' party; and yet the narrator is constantly feeding the reader with suggestions of didactic implications. Meanwhile, the pervasive irony is at work.

The story is morally neutral, but the imagined narrator is concerned to give it moral significance. He does this by casting round for causes—and those he finds are present, certainly, but not central. The comment against the forgetfulness of time is well applied to the drunken roistering at the inn, and the note on conjugal duty is perhaps stimulated by the attentions Tam pays to the landlady:

The Landlady and Tam grew gracious,
Wi' favours secret, sweet and precious. . . .

But the basic story has little to do with these elements. Critics who accept too literally the narrator's moral suggestions may be misled.

A distinguished Continental student of Burns, accepting the moral asides as vital, naturally sees the poem as incomplete:

A la vérité, l'histoire ressemble à la jument de Tam. Elle a aussi perdu sa queue . . . involontairement, on accompagne Tam jusqu'à sa ferme; on s'attend à le voir paraître devant sa femme Kate. . . . La morale aurait été mieux à cet endroit, car la punition aurait été plus complète. . . . Le moment pénible était l'explication à Kate. C'est cela vraiment qui peut garder les gredins comme Tam de boire, et leur purger la cervelle de chemises courtes pour le reste de leur jours.³

Most readers will not feel this dissatisfaction with the tale. A more convincing suggestion about the significance of the drunken scene and the moral asides is made by David Daiches in his account of the poem: "This interruption ['Inspiring bold John Barleycorn!'] etc.] effectively keeps the reader in suspense and gives him an excuse to dismiss, if he so wishes, all that Tam saw as the product of the man's drunken imagination."⁴

What Tam sees, the narrator may imply, is the sort of hallucination conjured up by alcohol and lecherous thoughts. If that is so, there remains then "a living evidence of the truth of the story": Maggie's lack of a tail. That this possibility is indeed inherent in the narrative is suggested by the analogous story of a Carrick farmer whose horse's tail was stolen, hair by hair, for fishing lines, while he spent a night in a public house. "When he comprehended the amount of the disaster, [he] was, it seems, so much bewildered as to its cause, that he could only attribute it to the agency of witches."⁵

³ Auguste Angellier, *Robert Burns* (Paris, 1893), II, 136-37.

⁴ David Daiches, *Robert Burns* (London, 1952), p. 288.

⁵ The story is told in *Complete Works of Robert Burns*, Gebbie self-interpreting edition (New York, 1909), IV, 11.

This reading of the poem sees a basic ambiguity—if the story, as Tam imagined it, is true, then the moral comment is irrelevant; if the story is a hallucination, the moral is clear and well-chosen. But what did happen to Maggie's tail? In stage tradition, the retranslated Bottom (awakened, as he thinks, from a strange dream) finds hay in his knapsack.

These problems which confront the reader of *Tam o' Shanter* are present only if attention is focused on the narrative element. With such focus, critics have sometimes found it necessary to apologize, in some ingenious way or other, for the very presence of the narrator's asides. A clearer total picture of the poem is obtained if we realize that the narrative is not the sole interest, but that the character of the storyteller is vigorously presented and is essential for the overall effect of the poem. His garrulous illogicality and his inability to tell a straightforward tale in a direct and simple manner may be clearly perceived. The result of this lively portrayal is that *Tam o' Shanter* is not a straightforward tale: the qualities of simple and direct narrative must not be sought for in it. This is a simple story as told by a man who is constantly led astray into pious exclamations or learned diversions (as, for example, when he tells the affecting but irrelevant history of Nannie's sark). He will even interrupt the story at a vital point to draw our attention to the state of his breeches:

Thir brecks o' mine, my only pair,
That aince were plush, o' guid blue hair,
I wad hae gien them off my hurdies. . . .

Such concentration of interest is not unique in Burns's poetry. To suggest that *Tam o' Shanter* is a dramatic monologue like *Holy Willie's Prayer* would certainly imply attention directed too particularly toward the speaker; but a close parallel is provided by *Death and Doctor Hornbook*. In this piece the vigorous portrayal of the personality of the speaker (who has in him more than a little of Tam) is essential to the success of the poem.

The general atmosphere of *Tam o' Shanter* is that of the tale told round the inn fire, and the narrator instantly cuts both himself and the reader off from the rest of society. The dichotomy—

And folk begin to tak the gate,
While we sit bousing at the nappy

—though quickly shown, is vital and not to be ignored. This is not society's story of Tam, but his tale told by a fellow reveler. The speaker, with didactic gleam in his eye, punctuates the recounted action with static generalizations, not always of obvious relevance. In an early digression the narrator establishes his skill at missing the point:

Ah, gentle dames! it gars me greet,
To think how many counsels sweet,
How many lengthen'd, sage advices,
The husband frae the wife despises!

The irony is obvious—perhaps even too obvious, although we must allow that at the beginning of the tale the reader may safely be given a strong hint of what is to come. The “advices” given by Kate are shown as no more than powerful abuse:

She tauld thee weel thou was a skellum,
A blethering, blustering, drunken blellum. . . .

Only someone with the character of our narrator would be able to imagine constructive suggestion in such a tirade, and consequently the reader is not surprised to find that he can see moral lessons in Tam's meaningless adventure.

Early in the poem the narrator's understanding comes under question. We next begin to doubt his rhetorical skill. The digression on the rapid fading of pleasures puts this doubt into our minds:

But pleasures are like poppies spread,
You seize the flow'r, its bloom is shed;
Or like the snow falls in the river,
A moment white—then melts for ever;
Or like the Boreal' race,
That flit ere you can point their place;
Or like the Rainbow's lovely form
Evanishing amid the storm.—
Nae man can tether Time nor Tide,
The hour approaches Tam maun ride. . . .

The passage is in English, and in its careful balance and lack of forward motion is unique in the poem. But more striking than these elements is the fact that its rhetoric is top-heavy. The great illustrates the small; the mutability of the world demonstrates that it is time to go home. The images, beautiful in themselves, are piled up in a way foreign to the idiom of the poem and are used to adorn a concept mundane and insignificant. Propriety, so vital for a successful use of rhetoric, is missing, and a dichotomy appears between the golden chain of images and the murky night in the homely inn. The irony in *Tam o' Shanter* is not provided only by the incongruous moral, but by a stylistic incongruity that is also apparent.

The stylistic differences between the moral passages and the narrative parts of the poem have frequently been noted. The images of the moral asides are formal and traditional, whereas those of the narrative are freshly observed and vigorous. No clearer example could be found than in the contrast between two lines with a similar subject: “As bees flee hame wi' lades o' treasure” and “As bees bizz out wi' angry fyke.” The distinction is natural enough—morality may well become overloaded with conventionalities—but the aesthetic effect is in *Tam o' Shanter* more particular.

A close parallel may be found in another Burns poem similarly abounding in irony, *The Death and Dying Words of Poor Mailie*. Here the expiring sheep leaves instructions for the upbringing of her children and successors. Vague, general, moral guidance is expressed in familiarly vague pastoral bleatings:

But ca' them out to park or hill,
 An' let them wander at their will:
 So may his flock increase, an' grow
 To scores o' lambs, an' packs o' woo'!

or:

My poor toop-lamb, my son an' heir,
 O, bid him breed him up wi' care!
 An' if he live to be a beast,
 To pit some havins in his breast!

The more particular (and more earthy) instructions are precise, vigorous, and idiomatic:

O, bid him save their harmless lives,
 Frae dogs, an' tods, an' butchers' knives!
 But gie them guid cow-milk their fill,
 Till they be fit to fend themsel';
 An' tent them duly, e'en an' morn,
 Wi' taets o' hay an' rippis o' corn.

In *Tam o' Shanter* we have lively descriptions of the storm and the adventures placed in a framework of old-fashioned and drab cliché. The narrator speaks sometimes with startling clarity of visualization and sometimes in the outworn terms of a post-Augustan poet. He is most persuasive when the style is clear.

When the narrator speaks as the moralist, we have generalities in such phrases as:

(Auld Ayr, wham ne'er a town surpasses,
 For honest men and bonie lasses.)

In vain thy Kate awaits thy comin!
 Kate soon will be a woefu' woman!

There, at them thou thy tail may toss,
 A running stream they dare na cross.

Now, wha this tale o' truth shall read,
 Ilk man, and mother's son, take heed.

Also falling into this category are some of the comments on the significance of the tale already quoted. The narrator as moralist also tends to use images which are far from precise in visual effect:

Gathering her brows like gathering storm,
 Nursing her wrath to keep it warm.

Care, mad to see a man sae happy,
 E'en drown'd himsel among the nappy.

Inspiring bold John Barleycorn!
 What dangers thou canst make us scorn!

In contrast, the parts of the poem actually telling the story and advancing the action are filled with vividly realized pictures:

The night drave on wi' sangs an' clatter;
And aye the ale was growing better.

Whiles holding fast his gude blue bonnet,
Whiles crooning o'er some auld Scots sonnet,
Whiles glow'rin round wi' prudent cares,
Lest bogles catch him unawares. . . .

And (by some devilish cantraip sleight)
Each in its cauld hand held a light.

A thief, new-cutt'd frae a rape,
Wi' his last gasp his gab did gape.

The grey hairs yet stack to the heft. . . .

And there are many more. Such passages make us intimate witnesses of the adventure. The driving force and speed of the action of the poem is brought home by the vivid use of verbs of violent motion: "Tam skelpit on thro' dub and mire." (The Scots reader would be aware of the ambiguity here: "Dub-skelper" means "one who travels rapidly regardless of the state of the road; used contemptuously for a rambling fellow."⁶)

He screw'd the pipes and gart them skirl,
Till roof and rafters a' did dirl.—

The dancers quick and quicker flew,
They reel'd, they set, they cross'd, they cleekit,
Till ilka carlin swat and reekit.

Even Satan glow'r'd, and fidg'd fu' fain,
And hotch'd and blew wi' might and main.

For Nannie, far before the rest,
Hard upon noble Maggie prest,
And flew at Tam wi' furious ettle. . . .

From about line 73 of the poem, from the time when Tam rides off alone and becomes, consequently, the sole authority for his adventure, we can see an ever-widening breach between narrative and moral aside. The effect is of having Tam's story given to us decked with editorial comments. The culmination of this tendency is found in the passages where the narrator addresses Tam directly, pretending ignorance of the ending to the story:

Now Tam, O Tam! had they been queans. . . .

Ah, Tam! Ah, Tam! thou'll get thy fairin!

The distinction between Tam and the narrator here is made clearer by the obvious stylistic differences between the two passages of Gothic horror: the first describing the environs of Kirk-Alloway; the second describing the grisly remains on the altar. If the first tends toward

⁶ See *Scottish National Dictionary*, ed. W. Grant and D. D. Murison (Edinburgh: S.N.D., 1931 *et seq.*), article on *dub-skelper*.

the farcical,⁷ the second manifests an even greater tendency toward the ridiculous, and in its lively exaggeration, leads up to a broadsword, if rather off-hand, bit of satire:

Three lawyers' tongues, turned inside out,
Wi' lies seamed like a beggar's clout;
Three Priests' hearts, rotten, black as muck,
Lay stinking, vile, in every neuk.⁸

It is a fine example of the exuberance of the poem. The first description is comic; the second is riotously overzealous, as the use of feminine endings (a sure sign of Burns's lighthearted mood) and the introduction of the very un-Scottish tomahawks and scimitars suggest:

Five tomahawks, wi' blude red-rusted;
Five scimitars, wi' murder crusted . . .
Wi' mair of horrible and awfu',
Which even to name wad be unlawfu'.

It is not surprising, then, that the first and comparatively quiet description should be part of the general knowledge of the surroundings and hence within the province of the narrator:

Where in the snaw the chapman smoor'd. . .
Where drunken Charlie brak's neck-bane. . .
Where hunters fand the murder'd bairn. . .
Where Mungo's mither hang'd hersel'. . .

while the second passage, in its vigorous and vivid burlesque, should be a special part of this particular tale—the responsibility of Tam rather than the narrator.

The narrator certainly tends toward the formal and moral—for a more elevated and less direct speech—but he is shown as being unable to preserve this elevation in diction. The periodic collapse of the narrator's rhetoric—from the sublime to the commonplace—is a notable feature of the style of the poem. We have already noted something similar in the passage concerning the short-lived pleasures of man, but the sudden reduction in grandeur of style may be seen in other parts of the poem:

The storm without might rair and rustle,
Tam did na mind the storm a whistle.

Here the movement from formality to colloquialism lets the reader down with a bump, and the effect is closely paralleled in

⁷ John Speirs, in *The Scots Literary Tradition* (London, 1940), p. 135, describes the passage as "comic melodrama at the point of farce."

⁸ These lines were canceled and do not appear in the standard reprints. They are quoted here from *Poems and Songs of Robert Burns*, ed. James Barke (London, 1955), p. 206. The present comment is not intended to suggest that the lines should be restored to the text, but merely to show that the canceled lines confirm the general tendency of the passage.

The swats sae ream'd in Tammie's noddle,
Fair play, he car'd na deils a boddle,

and in

But ere the key-stane she could make,
The fient a tail she had to shake!

The narrator chooses his moral comments off the peg, whether they fit the case or not: here we see him throwing in everyday idioms regardless of the general style of the poem. Similarly, the comment following the excellent description of the storm marks a sudden change in style:

The wind blew as 'twad blawn its last;
The rattling showers rose on the blast;
The speedy gleams the darkness swallow'd;
Loud, deep, and lang the thunder bellow'd:
That night, a child might understand,
The deil had business on his hand.

Bearing these passages in mind, the reader might well feel that the claim made by the narrator when the tale demands a description of Nannie's excellence in dancing—

But here my Muse her wing maun cour,
Sic flights are far beyond her power

—may not be entirely the result of modesty.

The descent from the magnificent to the mundane may perhaps also be cited at the end of the tale. The narrator's imitation of a moralist—the apparent desire to end his story, as if a sermon, with a pious exhortation to good behavior—is shattered by the final production of the tailless horse, an object for laughter rather than a symbol for the weak to treasure:

Think ye may buy the joys o'er dear;
Remember Tam o' Shanter's mare.

We do not remember Tam's sins or his adventures, but rather the undignified accident which has befallen his innocent horse.

It must not be understood, of course, that the elevated passages in *Tam o' Shanter* always collapse in this way. The incompetence of the narrator must not be allowed to overcome the competence of the poet. During the description of the dance of witches, the climax of the tale, there is no example of deflation of style. The idiosyncratic character of the narrator is cut off from the story and allowed few interruptions. Through the rest of the poem, however, the imitation of the incompetent narrator is vigorously carried out, and the ironic effect thereby gained is essential to the humorous success of the poem.

The reader must be constantly aware of the distinction in *Tam o' Shanter* between the parts of the poem devoted to the story and the parts principally devoted to an ironic portrayal of the speaker's personality. The fact that one element in the poem is framed within the

other is vital: the story itself is humorous and meaningless, an idle tale around the fireside rather than a Scottish *Ancient Mariner*. The placing of a comic narrator between the events and the reader succeeds effectively in distancing and diminishing the narrative.

The fact that *Tam o' Shanter* has not undergone much interpretation by critics is a sign of Burns's success here. Such critical interpretation as there is frequently appears solemn and ill-matching with the tone of the poem: "So Nannie, the young witch in *Tam o' Shanter*, is all the young women that Burns himself has seduced. Burns' own desire is reflected in Tam, and projected into the Devil himself."⁹ This may be true, but it is surprising. To arrive at this conclusion we have to forget so much of the narrative frame. By ignoring the character and scene—the image of the alehouse fire and the inexperienced, amateur storyteller—we ignore the major element of the poem.

Lake Erie College

⁹ William Montgomery, "Tam o' Shanter," in *New Judgments Robert Burns*, ed. William Montgomery (Glasgow, 1947), p. 80.

THE IMPRESSIONISTIC VIEW OF HISTORY IN THE DYNASTS

By EMMA CLIFFORD

The purpose of this essay is to attempt to establish something of the importance of Hardy's well-known "anti-realism" in the achievement of *The Dynasts*. I am not primarily concerned with Hardy's "philosophy" nor with his philosophic notions. Hardy did not like to be termed a philosopher. He preferred to think of himself merely as a man who was aware of certain impressions.¹ And, although there is no denying that Hardy's works display a view of life that it is well-nigh impossible to refer to as anything other than a "philosophy," I am of the opinion that this philosophy itself, often vague and even inconsistent in the various expressions that he gives to it,² leads him so inevitably to the formation of impressions rather than the assertion of dogma or the adumbration of "law" that, if we are fully to appreciate *The Dynasts*, we should consider the content of the work in relation to the impressionism that apparently means so much to him.

We may perhaps better understand the meaning that "impressions" have for Hardy if we recall that the sight of a picture hanging in the drawing-room at Max Gate led him to suggest that "Nature is played out as a Beauty, but not as a Mystery"; and he went on to say that when he looked at paintings, he wished to see "the deeper reality underlying the scenic" which is an expression of "abstract imaginings." He declared that in works of art he had come to scorn "the exact truth as to material fact," and believed a more imaginative approach to be more fitting when the mind had been awakened to "the tragical mysteries of life."³

The Dynasts certainly belongs to a time when the mind of the poet has been so awakened; and this essay is written in the belief that Hardy's impressionistic view of the historical content of his work is an important means whereby he is able to arouse imaginative aware-

¹ See Florence Hardy, *The Later Years of Thomas Hardy* (London, 1930), p. 219. I am indebted to Macmillan & Co. Ltd., St. Martin's Press Inc., New York, and the Trustees of the Hardy Estate for permission to quote from *The Dynasts* and from Florence Hardy's biography of Hardy.

² For example, it is difficult to wholly reconcile this note, made before Hardy had contemplated writing *The Dynasts* but given by Mrs. Hardy as an instance of how *The Dynasts* "had been slowly developing in his mind": "First Cause, omniscient, not omnipotent—limitations, difficulties, etc., and from being only able to work by Law (His only failing is lack of foresight)" (*The Later Years*, p. 226), with the omnipotent lawless power, "The purposive, unmotivated, dominant Thing" of the work itself. *The Dynasts* (London, 1918), Part II, II.iii, p. 191. A. Chakravarty, *The Dynasts and the Post-War Age in Poetry* (London, 1938), p. 15 and notes 1 and 2, has some interesting observations on Hardy's expressions of his "philosophy."

³ Florence Hardy, *The Early Life of Thomas Hardy* (London, 1928), pp. 242-43.

ness of that "deeper reality underlying the scenic" which is the core of the whole.

I propose in my observations to confine myself to the historical content of *The Dynasts*; and I would go so far as to say that the historical scenes in Hardy's epic-drama are impressions, and nothing more. He does not actually call his work an "impression," but he stresses that the doctrines of the Phantom Intelligences are "but tentative," and that they themselves are intended to be taken by the reader "for what they may be worth as contrivances of the fancy merely." The reader is to be a "mental spectator," and it is his duty to "fill in the junctions required to combine the scenes into an artistic unity." Hardy assures the reader that he will be able to do this because "the subject is familiar to all." But the drama is characteristically concerned with "the meditative world"; and Hardy allies his conception of the panorama of the historical events which he is depicting to modern wretchedness and uncertainty when he explains that the meditative world today is "older, more invidious, more nervous, more quizzical than it once was. . . ." And, as this modern universe is "unhappily perplexed by—Riddles of Death Thebes never knew," there are great difficulties for modern men as they strive to perceive "the deeper reality underlying the scenic" when the meditative world in all its misery may be today "less ready and less able than Hellas and old England were to look through the insistent, and often grotesque, substance at the thing signified."⁴

The references here to "mental spectator," "looking through," and "contrivances of the fancy" would seem to suggest that some kind of dream-world is implied, or at least a view of historical events that will encompass abstractions and impressions rather than a largely pictorial representation of actions and scenes. It looks as though it is necessary to dwell outside of "the exact truth as to material fact," and indeed Hardy declares that he sometimes feels "measureless layers of history lie upon him like a physical weight,"⁵ and he sometimes regards a historical event as a stormy thing that bursts "like winds grown visible" ("Fore Scene," p. 7) upon the progress of life to move the helpless human heart to new and dangerous experience. So, whatever the impact upon his consciousness may be, for him there is a special region of the mind in which historical events and personages exist with a degree of convincing realism that is different from the realism of a merely dramatic reconstruction of historical happenings.

The Spirit of the Years defines the course of history as "demonstrations from the Back of Things" (Pt. III, VII.vii, p. 505); Hardy refers in the preface to scenes from older dramas, suitable for mental performance, that take place "far in the Unapparent" (Preface, p. x); and in the tale that is unfolded in the progress of *The Dynasts*, there

⁴ Preface, pp. viii, ix, and xi.

⁵ *The Early Life*, p. 247.

is a shadowy region that is both separate from and an extension of Hardy's view of history and of life. For a man of Hardy's type, this shadowy region is to some extent a purely private world. It exists in certain conditions of his imaginative awareness; but it is also the meeting place in human consciousness of the observed present with the remembered past and a dimension of the web which is an aspect of the anatomy of the Will. And, always provided that history is regarded as nothing more than a conglomeration of events, uncomplicated by reasonable sequence of cause and consequence and unhampered by considerations of human judgment, it seems to me that the Back of Things, the region in which memory and actuality meet as one, is an ideal territory in which to observe dim matters in the shadows of the past.

It is a territory familiar to Hardy; a place of mists and winds and clouds, with the atmosphere of a weird world that brings a typically Hardeian realism to the scene. In Hardy's universe actions coexist eternally with dreams, and in his search for historical reality he is not necessarily looking for explanations in terms of temporal or historical values. His determinist's view of life supplies him with all the explanation he requires. In his search for "the deeper reality underlying the scenic," he is not seeking reality in terms of actual appearances and events; he is yearning after the authentic dream that lends authority to fantasy.

All that Hardy can do is to look at the course of history as he sees it and say that it is part of life. He does not need to explain it in specifically historical terms; but, if he is to convince others of his acceptance of it, he must create an atmosphere for his work that embodies imaginative qualities calculated to endow an accepted state of affairs, however dreadful and inhuman they may seem to be, with an aura of acceptable credibility.⁶ When he sees a historical event, he sees something more than a battlefield or council chamber, and something that is infinitely more diffuse than the mere actions and motives of human beings. For him an event is an impression of a point in time when the life of mankind and the life of the natural universe momentarily cohere in a recorded instance of suffering and pain; and even human action and human suffering partake of a measure of fantasy in his meaningless scheme of things.

The Spirit of the Pities, whom Hardy declares "approximates to 'the Universal Sympathy of human nature—the spectator idealized' of the Greek Chorus" (Preface, p. ix), has a persistent tendency to turn away from the spectacle that is presented to it. Its comments on historical events are sometimes qualified by such phrases as "I'll see no more. Relate" (Pt. II, IV.v, p. 246), and it takes refuge from the

⁶ See Carl J. Weber, "Chronology in Hardy's Novels," *PMLA*, LIII (1938), 314-20, for some interesting observations on the importance of atmosphere in Hardy's novels. Weber emphasizes the endless trouble that Hardy takes to achieve an appropriate atmosphere for each work.

sight of suffering by denying the actuality of the scene. As it sees Napoleon assume imperial power, it cries:

This tale of Will
And Life's impulsion by Incognizance
I cannot take.

And when the Spirit of the Years insists on it observing this event as it develops in the brain tissues of the Will, it pleads:

... for very sorriness
I cannot own the weird phantasma real!
(Pt. I, l.vi, p. 36)

Yet, the Spirit of the Pities must observe many historical events, for history is the scenic material of the work. It is one of the great strengths of *The Dynasts* that, in searching for the deeper reality that underlies the "weird phantasma," Hardy has devised his band of Phantom Intelligences who possess a special technique for seeing. It is his own "idiosyncratic mode of regard" that establishes the way for him; and this will, I think, bear a little investigation at this point.

Some of the notes in Hardy's journal reveal an acceptance of the possibility that the novelist may come in time to abandon the depiction of human life in its ordinary everyday aspect and become engaged upon "rendering as visible essences, spectres, etc. the abstract thoughts of the analytic school." Mrs. Hardy notes that this idea was "approximately carried out" in "the supernatural framework" of *The Dynasts*: "The human race to be shown as one great network or tissue. . . . Abstract realisms to be in the form of Spirits, Spectral figures, etc."⁷ And sometimes Hardy feels that, if one can manage it, it is perhaps best to get away from being human altogether and to become a ghost while one is still alive. He notes that, "For my part, if there is any way of getting a melancholy satisfaction out of life it lies in dying, so to speak, before one is out of the flesh. . . ." He claims that when he is free from all considerations other than those that may arise from purely personal observation of the scene, the experience has a special value of its own. He goes on to say: "I have unconsciously the habit of regarding the scene as if I were a spectre not solid enough to influence my environment; only fit to behold and say, as another spectre said: 'Peace be unto you!'"⁸ A. J. Guerard has written of Hardy's desire to see a ghost; and the matter goes deeper than that, he wants to be one as well.⁹

It seems to me that Hardy's liking for this odd state of spectral awareness arises directly from his view of life as it is influenced by the pessimistic philosophers of his time. Ernest Brennecke, writing of Hardy and Schopenhauer, notices what he calls "Tess's instinctive idealism" and suggests that Hardy's conception of it probably arises

⁷ *The Early Life*, p. 232.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

⁹ A. J. Guerard, *Thomas Hardy: The Novels and Stories* (London, 1949), p. 44. Guerard also notes: "Very possibly he had the great gift of being able to stand simultaneously inside and outside everyday life."

from his reading of the German philosopher.¹⁰ I believe that it is equally possible that Schopenhauer, and also Von Hartmann, influence Hardy in his conception of the dematerialized being as the ideal observer who penetrates through external appearances to significant reality. Both philosophers believe that intelligent lonely observers are the only beings who can transport themselves away from ordinary external appearances to find some satisfaction in contemplating the dreary misery of the world. They believe that, as the stream of being flows on and on, such observers may in their abstraction derive some value from it, although they run the risk of having to pay a price for their peculiar state in the shape of greater suffering than that endured by more ordinary men.

Von Hartmann avers that humanity is growing old and tired and that the time will come when, "imbued with that sublime melancholy which one usually finds in men of genius, or even in highly intellectual old men," it will "hover like a glorified spirit over its own body" and come to feel "in the anticipated peace of non-existence the sorrows of existence as if they were *alien* to it. . . ."¹¹ Schopenhauer defines lonely contemplation, the pursuit of pure knowledge unhampered by acts of will, as "that which we might otherwise call the most beautiful part of life, its purest joy, if it were only because it lifts us out of real existence and transforms us into disinterested spectators of it. . . ." But he emphasizes that

this is granted only to a very few, because it demands rare talents, and to these few only as a passing dream. And even then, even these few, on account of their higher intellectual power, are made susceptible of far greater suffering than duller minds can ever feel, and are also placed in lonely isolation by a nature which is obviously different from that of others.¹²

Hardy, who writes in his journal of "a certain small minority who have sensitive souls,"¹³ is acutely aware of the difference between highly sensitive persons and those of more common clay. He is also acquainted with a kind of dream perception that may be brought to ordinary visual awareness. He notes:

I was thinking a night or two ago that people are somnambulists—that the material is not the real—only the visible, the real being invisible optically. That it is because we are in a somnambulist hallucination that we think the real to be what we see as real.¹⁴

He would seem to possess enough of the rare qualities demanded by Schopenhauer to observe life from a tenuously disinterested point of view; and the course of history is surely sufficiently terrible in his eyes to warrant the necessity for finding a state of "anticipated peace of non-existence" in the contemplation of it.

¹⁰ E. Brennecke, Jr., *Thomas Hardy's Universe* (London, 1924), p. 23 n.

¹¹ E. Von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, trans. Coupland (London, 1893), III, 117.

¹² A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, trans. Haldane and Kemp (London, 1886), I, 405.

¹³ *The Early Life*, p. 243.

¹⁴ *Idem*.

To return to *The Dynasts*. In his journal Hardy asks, "Is not the present quasi-scientific system of writing history mere charlatanism?"¹⁵; and he asks this question because any notion of the course of history as an ordered process of cause and consequence cuts across his belief that the existence of life in the universe is a matter of blind determinism. He cannot understand that events and tendencies may have specific and assignable causes when his philosophy of life forces him to inquire if they are not "in the main the outcome of *passivity*—acted upon by unconscious propensity."¹⁶ One of his plans for *The Dynasts* contains the note: "Considered methods for the Napoleonic drama. Forces; emotions, tendencies. The characters do not act under the influence of reason."¹⁷

In the work itself the Immanent Will is characterized as "the Eternal Urger" (Pt. I, VI.iii, p. 118) or "Urging Immanence" (Pt. III, VII.viii, p. 518) whose workings display weird unrest within the universe. And in one of his essays Hardy has this to say of the historical process:

In history occur from time to time monstrosities of human action and character explicable by no known law which appertains to sane beings; hitches in the machinery of existence, wherein we have not yet discovered a principle. . . .¹⁷

He is saying that, as far as we know, history develops without the discipline of any kind of law, and it is devoid of sense. Even the hard reality of suffering can be described as

the intolerable antilogy
Of making figments feel!
(Pt. I, IV.v, p. 77)

And the whole panorama of events is small as well as senseless. In comparison with the universal immensities that surround it, the historical scene is both insignificant and incomprehensible:

Yet seems this vast and singular confection
Wherein our scenery glints of scantest size,
Inutile all—so far as reasonings tell.
(“After Scene,” p. 522)

In the Hardeian scheme of things, a panorama of historical events is an ideal field for the disintegrated ghostly observer. In one of his plans for *The Dynasts*, Hardy says: "I feel continually that I require a larger canvas. . . . A spectral tone must be adopted . . .";¹⁸ and when he comes to write the work, he causes the Spirit of the Years to explain that the Phantom Intelligences are specially gifted for the purpose of spectral observation:

¹⁵ *The Early Life*, pp. 219-20.

¹⁶ *The Later Years*, p. 9.

¹⁷ *The Art and Life of Thomas Hardy*, ed. E. Brennecke, Jr. (New York, 1925), p. 65. This quotation is from an essay entitled "The Profitable Reading of Fiction" in *The Forum* for March, 1888.

¹⁸ *The Early Life*, p. 290.

Our scope is but to register and watch
 By means of this great gift accorded us—
 The free trajectory of our entities.
 ("Fore Scene," p. 2)

The Spirits are to float above the agony of life and events, and are to be independent of the sufferings of mankind. The Spirit of the Years explains:

'Tis not in me to feel with, or against,
 These flesh-hinged mannikins Its hand upwinds
 To click-clack off Its preadjusted laws;
 But only through my centuries to behold
 Their aspects, and their movements, and their mould.
 ("Fore Scene," p. 4)

He tells the other Spirits that when they observe historical events in this way, they will see

the twitchings of this Bonaparte
 As he with other figures foots his reel,
 Until he twitch him into his lonely grave:
 Also regard the frail ones that his flings
 Have made gyrate like animalcula
 In tepid pools.—

And he urges them:

Hence to the precinct, then,
 And count as framework to the stagery
 Yon architraves of sunbeam-smitten cloud.
 ("Fore Scene," p. 6)

In his own highly individual way, Hardy succeeds. Walter de la Mare notes that the events of *The Dynasts* are brought about "in an atmosphere of pure imagination, an imagination with the powers of a creative, all-seeing spectator to whom the whole complex drama is but a succession of mental phenomena." And he declares that in this atmosphere Hardy achieves "a kind of phantom presentment of things themselves in all their most peculiar significance."¹⁹

When the "things themselves" are historical events, we find that they often take on the qualities of the web woven by the Immanent Will. Even the minor trappings of history sometimes have such characteristics. As Napoleon enters Berlin to the rhythm of "palpitating drums, and breathing brass" (Pt. II, I.v, p. 162), the movements of the surging web invade the sounds of war. Relatively unimportant objects are capable of assuming a life of their own that renders them a living factor in the atmosphere of the scene; the raft at Tilsit "acquires from the current a rhythmical movement, as if it were breathing, and the breeze now and then produces a shiver on the face of the stream" (Pt. II, I.vii, p. 167).

And Hardy writes of people as well as things in terms of weblike

¹⁹ Walter de la Mare, *Private View* (London, 1953), pp. 24 and 27.

characteristics. The battlefield itself, the locality of man's place in the wars, is an aspect of the Will. At Austerlitz

a preternatural clearness possesses the atmosphere of the battle-field, in which the scene becomes anatomized and the living masses of humanity transparent. The controlling Immanent Will appears therein, as a brain-like network of currents and ejections, twitching, interpenetrating, entangling, and thrusting hither and thither the human forms. (Pt. I, VI.iii, p. 118)

From the Puebla Heights the English and French armies are seen as "This vision, resembling as a whole the interior of a beating brain lit by phosphorescence . . ." (Pt. III, II.ii, p. 368). When Napoleon's army is massed on the banks of the Niemen,

The unnatural light before seen usurps that of the sun, bringing into view, like breezes made visible, the films or brain-tissues of the Immanent Will, that pervade all things, ramifying through the whole army, *NAPOLEON* included, and moving them to its inexplicable artistries. (Pt. III, I.i, p. 330)

Human beings are woven into the fabric of this web as into the fabric of a dream. When Russia and France are drawn together after the defeat of Prussia, Hardy says that the peoples of Europe are "enmeshed in new calamity" (Pt. II, I.viii, p. 180);²⁰ and in the Peninsula, as the battle rages around the Puebla Heights, it is the people themselves, the "padding pedestrians," who "haze the atmosphere" (Pt. III, II.ii, p. 369).

These historical events are seen in glimpses between uncertain moving mists as

The rolling brume
That parts, and joins, and parts again below us
In ragged restlessness, unscreens by fits
The quality of the scene.

(Pt. III, I.ix, p. 352)

And it is in this typically Hardeian atmosphere, evoked by images of vague and shifting natural things, that the poet sees with certain and sure insight into historical events in which man, nature, and the universe appear to coexist as one.

What is the significance of the reality which is perceived? Pictures and images derived from historical fact, the natural universe, and the life of man conjure up an atmosphere through which the lonely observer may penetrate to reality beyond. But the reality is suffering, and Hardy never comes to terms with history because there is nothing in the historical process as he sees it that can reconcile him to the agony of man.

Even the observer himself is vulnerable. In an ever-changing universe he needs to select, if he can, an ideal point in time. Hardy believes that it is "the on-going"—i.e., the "becoming"—of the world that "produces its sadness," and he has no doubt that "if the world

²⁰ The manuscript of *The Dynasts* at the British Museum shows that Hardy first wrote "peoples are entrapped in new calamity" (Pt. II, p. 61). At some later time he made the alteration to the more characteristic "enmeshed."

stood still at a felicitous moment there would be no sadness in it."²¹ But in the Hardeian scheme of things, the development of human experience in history will not stand still at any moment, felicitous or otherwise. As the Eternal Urger presses change on change, battle succeeds battle and calamity piles on calamity. All that the lonely and ghostly observer can expect is that the shifting moving scenes, whose common quality of vagueness is itself an arbitrary factor, will come together, part, fade, and finally dissolve, as the great confederacy of the nations dissolves, "like the diorama of a dream" (Pt. II, I.vii, p. 168).

But I have said that I believe the historical scenes in *The Dynasts* to be impressions and nothing more. So, perhaps we should not ask too much of Hardy's view of history. If we wish to find something of the reality underlying these impressions, we should also consider the importance that Hardy gives to problems of human consciousness in relation to the flow of universal life.

It is at a time when Hardy is writing of historical events that he suggests that human consciousness may be perceived to be something in the nature of a state of being that is separate from the monstrous course of things. Some notes that he made before he contemplated writing *The Dynasts*, and he troubles to copy them out in his old age, distinguish man's capacity for complaint from the inevitable cruelty and ferocity of human existence. He says:

The intelligence of this collective personality Humanity is pervasive, ubiquitous, like that of God. Hence e.g. on the one hand we could hear the roar of the cannon, discern the rush of the battalions, on the other hear the voice of a man protesting, etc.²²

These notes suggest that, if such a division were put into practice, as it is put into practice by organizing the material of *The Dynasts* into a panorama of history on the one hand and the comments and complaints of the Phantom Intelligences on the other, the voice of mankind, like that of a god, might perhaps echo a firm and consistent idea of human existence and the development of human history in the universal scheme. But this is not to be. An all-pervading vagueness clouds the scene.

Let us consider the function of the Spirit of the Pities. This spirit represents the most complete and sympathetic re-creation of human consciousness in *The Dynasts*, and it is a typically Hardeian creation in that it is "impressionable and inconsistent in its views, which sway hither and thither as wrought on by events" (Preface, p. ix). J. O. Bailey has suggested that it may be the equivalent of the hero of epic poetry "who must descend into Hell to find light or salvation," and that the Hell into which it descends as epic hero is suffering man.²³ But I am inclined to agree with those who find strength in

²¹ *The Early Life*, p. 265.

²² *The Later Years*, p. 226.

²³ J. O. Bailey, *Thomas Hardy and the Cosmic Mind* (Chapel Hill, 1956), p. 56.

the fact that the Spirit of the Pities has no heroic attitudes and no uncommon qualities. I think that *The Dynasts* gains much in vividness and poignancy by this spirit's affinity with the essentially ordinary in man; and it is also possible that *The Dynasts* gains thereby in power, for the foundation of this affinity lies in the Pities' belief that in a fantastic scheme of things there is a peculiarly realistic significance in the condition of ordinary humanity.

The more sardonic of the Phantom Intelligences may sometimes mock and jeer, but the Spirit of the Pities replies:

Mock on, Shade, if thou wilt! But others find
Poesy ever lurk where pit-pats poor mankind!
(Pt. II, III.i, p. 210)

But when we ask, "What is the quality of this poesy?" we realize that the answer is clouded with difficulty: difficulty which arises from the fact that there is nothing in Hardy's picture of mankind in history, nor in the function and observations of the Spirit of the Pities, that suggests any essential difference, apart from consciousness of pain and pity for suffering, between men and their experiences and the vague passive unfolding of the course of things.

At the terrible disaster of the Bridge of the Beresina, Napoleon's soldiers yell of their pain with a noise that is louder than that of the winds and more clamorous than the horrid din of war; yet, massed in crowds, they have no shape as men and no mighty course of action by which they may seek to control events. The Chorus of the Pities sings for them:

So loudly swell their shrieks as to be heard above the
roar of guns and the wailful wind,
Giving in one brief cry their last wild word on that
mock life through which they have harlequined!
(Pt. III, I.x, p. 356)

In this fashion they say what they have to say as they sink to death beneath the waters. Every event that has led to their destruction has been a mockery and a fantasy. They have endured the wars, and they have played their part in history. They have harlequined, and their endeavors have the vagueness of a dream. For Hardy's world is a yearning world. It exists within a perpetually changing universe in which the sensitive observer is always looking backward and forward; nothing that happens is ever over and done with, as each event goes on to be an object of eternal questioning in space and time. The purpose of man's existence in this world is to feel the suffering involved in the processes of life and to pioneer the gods in universal pity. But the surge of great events that takes up defenseless men and may deprive them of their lives and their humanity is a thing past understanding. In the modern universe cosmic agony is overwhelmed by cosmic energy. The course of history is a vast unreal experience for man, and the poet can only conclude:

Howsoever wise
The governance of these massed mortalities,
A juster wisdom his who should have ruled
They had not been. (Pt. I, I.ii, p. 15)

As the Spirit of the Pities watches the historical scene with rapt compassionate attention, its consciousness becomes one with a layer of changing dreams and fancies that haze the shifting panorama of historical events. In its fleeting impressions it sees all nature suffer as a living whole (Pt. III, VI.viii, p. 483);²⁴ in a moment of terrible ecstasy it comes face to face with the Monster Devastation (Pt. III, VI.v, p. 474); and, borne on the mist, it meets the sound and sight of suffering incarnate in nature and mankind when any battle might be that of Albuera:

I see red smears upon the sickly dawn,
And seeming drops of gore. On earth below
Are men—unnatured and mechanic-drawn—
Mixed nationalities in row and row,
Wheeling them to and fro
In moves dissociate from their souls' demand,
In dynasts' ends that few even understand!²⁵
(Pt. II, VI.iv, p. 299)

In the sight of the Spirit of the Pities, responding in dreams to the monstrous fantasy of things, the natural atmosphere of life is cruel, as if stained with blood; men are dehumanized automatons, inextricably mingled one with another; and life, "dissociate from their souls' demand," displays wide gaps in the reality of experience. The end of it all is a direct knowledge of horror. At Ligny, the Spirit of the Pities sings:

I see an unnatural Monster, loosely jointed,
With an Apocalyptic Being's shape,
And limbs and eyes a hundred thousand strong,
And fifty thousand heads; which coils itself
About the buildings there.

And the Spirit of the Years replies:

Thou dost indeed.
It is the Monster Devastation. Watch.
(Pt. III, VI.v, p. 474)

Hardy holds fast to his certain knowledge that mankind's qualities of love and compassion are needed in the scheme of things; but in Hardy's way of looking, compassion itself is liable to become involved in fantasy, and so a man may cry with the Spirit of the Pities that "for very sorrieness" he cannot "own the weird phantasma real!"

University of Liverpool

²⁴ The Chorus of the Pities introduces and concludes the lyric that tells of universal suffering in nature on the eve of Waterloo. This is also noted by Bailey (p. 58).

²⁵ Bailey also notes (pp. 57-58) that the Spirit of the Pities describes the suffering at Albuera.

A NOTE ON ACCENT AND QUANTITY IN
A BOOKE OF AYRES

By WALTER R. DAVIS

Each time Campion's "Turne backe you wanton flyer" (*A Booke of Ayres*, Part I, vii) has been edited, a different arrangement of the last few lines of the strophe has resulted. Here is the original form of the song, together with the lineations of the ending by Vivian in 1909 and Fellowes in 1922:

Turne backe you wanton flyer,
And answere my desire
With mutuall greeting,
Yet bende a little neerer,
True beauty stil shines cleerer
In closer meeting,
Harts with harts delighted
Should strive to be united,
Either others armes with armes enchainyng,
Harts with a thought, rosie lips
With a kisse still entertaining.

Either others armes with armes enchainyng;
Harts with a thought,
Rosie lips with a kisse still entertaining.

Either other's arms with arms enchainyng.
Hearts with a thought,
Rosy lips with a kiss
Still entertaining.

Of course, the trouble is that any way you do it you are left with a completely unrhymed line. Fellowes has two, but his lineation does make visible the "rhyme of thought" created by the parallel phrases about hearts and lips. A formal parallelism like this is especially appropriate to the ending of this song because it adds to a sense of logic and stasis coming after the rapid narration of the beginning. The song is composed of three parts, of which the second varies the first and the third sums them up in a manner like that of the two quatrains and sestets of a sonnet. The first section exhorts the mistress to approach; the second (set to the same music as the first) implies a reaction on her part and coaxes her further to "bende a little neerer." The third section completes the strophic idea by giving a reason for the demands of the first two; it also replaces movement with rest, for the argument is based on a vision of the results of turning back, the lovers intertwining on the lawn.

Some interesting effects are created by several repeated sounds and words in the third section: there is the half-rhyme of "either others" followed by "armes with armes" and preceded by "harts with harts"

two lines above. These sound effects call to mind the devices used to force identical quantitative values on syllables in the illustrative poems of the *Observations in the Art of English Poesie*. Take, for example, these lines from "Rose-cheekt Lawra":

Silent musick, either other
Sweetly gracing,

or

Heav'n is musick, and thy beauties
Birth is heavenly;

or the first two lines of "Come let us sound," the only song in classical meters in *A Booke of Ayres* (I, xxi):

Come let us sound with melody the praises
Of the kings king, th' omnipotent creator

The purpose of these devices of sound in "Turne backe you wanton flyer" is to impose the same time value on several neighboring syllables (especially in the ninth line) and thus to create a floating quantitative feeling about the third section. Moreover, if we turn to the music of the song, we find that the last two lines are blocked out by a pattern of minims alternating with pairs of crochets into a regular quantitative scansion:

Harts with a thought, rosie lips
With a kisse

Campion has reinforced the rest and formality of the ending of his strophe with a suggestion of classical quantitative meter which produces a calmer and more even type of movement than the bouncing accentual kind. And the unrhymed line that has bothered the editors is the clue to his method.

"Harke al you ladies," another song in *A Booke of Ayres* (I, xix), likewise combines two metrical systems, and in a way that suggests an interesting analogy between the nature of the song and its metrical technique. In terms of its matter, the song blends native folk elements like May Day with echoes of the Latin *Pervigilium Veneris*. The night watch in the third strophe outlines the situation of the *Pervigilium*,

In Myrtle Arbours on the downs
the Fairie Queene Proserpina,
This night by moone-shine leading merrie rounds,
holds a watch with sweet love,
Downe the dale, up the hill,
no plaints or groans may move
Their holy vigill,

while "Their holy vigill" reflects its title. The lines about the "Myrtle Arbours" are derived from lines 4 and 5 of the Latin:

cras amorum copulatrix inter umbras arborum
 implicat casas virentes de flagello myrteo;

and the whole fifth strophe is an expansion of the refrain of the *Pervigilium*, "cras amet qui numquam amavit, quique amavit cras amet":

All you that love, or lov'd before,
 the Fairie Queene Proserpina
 Bids you encrease that loving humour more,
 they that yet have not fed
 On delight amorous,
 she vowes that they shall lead
 Apes in Avernus.

The aesthetic of the song demands that folk elements and classical imitation stay in an even balance. Therefore the decorum of individual phrases like "lead / Apes in Avernus" (a proverbial expression which yet uses the classical name for Hell)¹ and the refrain "the Fairie Queene Proserpina" is truly magnificent.

As with the matter, so with the metrics. Each strophe is divided in two by rhyme and thought: a condition set up and a conclusion announced ("if you do this, then Proserpina will make that happen"). The first half is accentual; the second we find, when we examine the music, is forced by a pattern of two minims and a semibreve into a quantitative scansion like this:

You may doe | in the darke
 What the day | doth forbid
 feare not the | dogs that barke,
 Night will have | all hid.

A glance at "Rose-cheekt *Laura*" or "Come let us sound" will show what has happened here: the song has glided into a kind of Sapphic strophe at the end, the last line being true classical Sapphic. The rollicking Elizabethan May Day ends with the strict control and finality of classic verse. By fusing popular folklore and late Roman mythology, and by joining new and old metrical systems perfectly, "Harke al you ladies" gives us a new and unique music of ideas and meters.

It is interesting that this poem was first published at the end of Newman's quarto of *Astrophel and Stella* in 1591, for on October 12 of that year there was entered in the Stationers' Register a book that G. B. Harrison identifies as an early version of the *Observations in the Art of English Poesie*.² Therefore, we can see that Campion was concerned with truly classical quantitative experiment and the possible

¹ See Samuel Rowlands, 'Tis Merry when Gossips Meete, 1602 (in Hunterian Club reprint [Glasgow, 1880], p. 23): "There's an old grave Proverbe tell's us that / Such as die Maydes doe all lead Apes in hell."

² "Books and Readers, 1591-4." *The Library*, Fourth Series VIII (1927), 279-80. Harrison suggests that the entry is a "blocking entry" to prevent the publication of the manuscript before Campion himself wished to publish it in 1602.

uses of it in combination with ordinary accentual verse at the same time.

Some of the more indirect effects of this parallel development—forming a kind of connection between song and accentual theory more tenuous than the one we have discussed but more pervasive—are suggested by the casual sound effects of the airs. Mrs. Catherine Ing has demonstrated that Campion in his quantitative experiments frequently used repeated vowel sounds in order to force the identical length of different syllables.³ For example, in the twenty-second line of "Come let us sound," the third, fourth, and last syllables should all be long; the fact that they are assonances in *i* helps us to pronounce them correctly and to resist the natural tendency to shorten either the third or fourth syllable:

O then I'll shine forth as an Angell of light

likewise the long *o*-sounds of the first and fifth syllables help us to hear "of" as long.

This way of dealing with sounds seems to lie behind several lines in *A Booke of Ayres* where one vowel-sound is repeated and is made to "govern" the line by means of related vowel-sounds clustered around it. One example is "When thou must home to shades of under ground," where the long *ou*-sound is repeated and other back vowels *o* and *u* are related to it. Other random examples are "Though you are young and I am old," "Follow her whose light thy light depriveth," "Then tell, O tell, how thou didst murther me," "There is ever one fresh Spring abiding," "Poor Cupid sits and blows his nails for cold," and "Thou art not sweet, though made of meer delight." This technique has the effect of making the line an individual unit of sound as the quantitative line was in Latin prosody.

In at least one case—"When thou must home" (I, xx)—the autonomous line created by repeated sounds was used to good effect. One thing that strikes the reader of the *Observations* is the great variety of lines obtainable by quantitative metrics and the possibilities of subtle contrast between different sorts of lines placed together in a strophe. The best example of such contrast is the elegiac couplet, which, according to Ovid, was meant to create a rising effect in the hexameter and a falling effect in the pentameter: "sex mihi surgat opus numeris, in quinque residat" (*Amores* I.i.27). Campion's elegiacs create an analogous effect by following a relatively regular iambic line with a trochaic line having a strong medial caesura between two longs (or two stressed syllables if we scan accentually):

Constant to none, but ever false to me,
Traiter still to love through thy faint desires,
Not hope of pittie now nor vaine redresse
Turns my griefs to teares and ren'd laments.

³ *Elizabethan Lyrics: A Study of the Development of English Metres and Their Relation to Poetic Effect* (London, 1951), p. 164.

"When thou must home" gains a quite similar effect of contrasting lines (and one which allows more freedom in the musical setting) by repeated vowel-sounds instead of quantity, the *ou*-sounds of the first line, "When thou must home to shades of under ground," pitched against the *e*'s and *i*'s of the second, "And there ariv'd, a newe admired guest," the contrast being repeated in the third and fourth lines and thus setting a form for the strophe:

The beauteous spirits do ingirt thee round,
White Iope, blith Hellen, and the rest.

In his prefatory note to *A Booke of Ayres*, Campion carps at the public's distaste for classical meters and implies that popular taste has forced him to give up quantitative experiment in favor of rhymed accentual verse. He writes:

The Lyricke Poets among the Greekes, and Latines were first inventors of Ayres, tying themselves strictly to the number, and value of their sillables, of which sort you shall find here onely one song in Saphicke verse, the rest are after the fasion of the time, care-pleasing rimes without Arte.

But what the few examples we have treated here indicate is that, while Campion soon gave up his experiments for "care-pleasing rimes," he still used several devices of English quantitative metrics in order to create subtle effects of sound not obtainable in a purely accentual system.

University of Notre Dame

THE DOUBLE TIME SCHEME IN BOOK II OF CHAUCER'S *TROILUS AND CRISEYDE*

By JOSEPH A. LONGO

One of the most puzzling aspects of Book II of *Troilus and Criseyde* is Chaucer's apparent inconsistency in his use of time references.¹ These references are abundant, and a casual reading of the poem seems to imply that they contradict one another. There are direct and explicit indications of the passage of time within a short period; yet, interwoven with this scheme are allusions to an apparent passage of time covering a much longer period. It is entirely possible that Chaucer may have deliberately constructed these parallel time schemes for dramatic and logical purposes.

In the use of this double time scheme, one set of references, which may be called the short-time plan, appears to span a period from May 3 to May 6, and its dramatic purpose centers upon the machinations of Pandarus. Another set of references, the long-time plan, seems to cover an indeterminate period, and its function appears to be one of logic; that is, it centers on Criseyde in order to show that her love for Troilus is not sudden and superficial, but gradual and sincere.

Throughout Book II, Chaucer mentions formal dating of the action only once, "on Mayes day the thrydde" (56), and he may have been deliberate in this design.² If Chaucer had continued with his formal day-by-day dating of the short-time scheme, there would have been an obvious opposition between it and the long-time plan, something which he wished to avoid because it would disrupt the unity of action. As Chaucer describes them, both chronologies are somewhat alike in that he uses an informal rather than a formal dating method. For example, the short-time references are to "morwen," "fro soper unto bedde," "at pryme," "a Mayes morwe," "after noon," "dayes two," "er houres twyes twelve," and "the mountance of an houre."³ The long-time references are to "this other day," "fro day to day," "yeres two," "day and nyght," and "dayes."⁴

The long-time scheme is the less baffling of the two plans. This set

¹ A study by Henry W. Sams ("The Dual Time-Scheme in Chaucer's *Troilus*," *MLN*, LVI [1941], 94-100) centers on the time span of a seasonal cycle, one phase of the dual time scheme which he finds throughout the entire poem: "There are in the poem two concentric and contradictory time-schemes; one of them is based upon the formal dating of the books, the other upon a proportionately spaced series of seasonal images. The second of these time-schemes is the one with which this paper is concerned" (p. 94). The purpose of the present study, however, is to examine the apparently disparate time references of Book II.

² All references are to *Poetical Works of Chaucer*, ed. F. N. Robinson, Cambridge Poets Edition (Cambridge, Mass., 1933)—hereafter cited as *Works*.

³ *Works*, lines 65, 947, 992, 1098, 1185, 1362, 1399, 1707.

⁴ *Ibid.*, lines 507, 961, 1298, 1338, 1351.

of time references revolves about such plural nouns as days, months, and years, and it is a device to make plausible Criseyde's slowly developing love for Troilus. Throughout Book II, Chaucer is meticulous in pointing out this element of Criseyde's love: "Now myghte som envious jangle thus: / 'This was a sodeyn love'" (666-67). On the contrary, it is only "by proces and by good servyse, / He [Troilus] gat hire love, and in no sodeyn wyse" (678-79). Since Criseyde's unwillingness to act except after careful, deliberate reasoning is crucial to the delineation of her character, Chaucer takes particular pains to center the retarded time scheme upon this aspect of her love for Troilus.

There are, then, sufficient allusions to the long-time scheme, placed strategically throughout the action of Book II, to suggest substantial passages of time. For example, when Pandarus is telling Criseyde of his discovery of Troilus' love for her, his reference is to "this other day" (507, 554). Shortly thereafter, Pandarus remarks to Troilus, "For thus ferforth I have thi werk bigonne, / Fro day to day" (960-61). The comment "Fro day to day" is repeated again at lines 1343-44: "Fro day to day he [Troilus] leet it nought refreyde, / That by Pandare he wroot somewhat or seyde." In addition, Pandarus contends that "every thing hath tyme" (989). Again, Chaucer gives the illusion of the passage of considerable time through Pandarus' reference to "fully yeres two" (1298), and he is careful to indicate that Troilus' desire begins to increase "day and nyght" (1338). This illusion is continued in the observation, "So were his [Troilus'] dayes sory outhir gladdre" (1351). By these references, then, Chaucer indicates long lapses of time so as to make clear the gradual unfolding of Criseyde's love.

Juxtaposed with this scheme is another set of time references which, as noted earlier, focuses upon the rapid movements of Pandarus; in this plan, time is accelerated. This device is consistent with Chaucer's thematic unity, for throughout Book II one of the salient characteristics of Pandarus is the eagerness and rapidity with which he sets about to execute his plan. Once he has pledged his support to Troilus, Pandarus is constantly rushing and leaping about in order to fulfill his pledge.

An examination of this second set of time references, which begins at the very opening of Book II, reveals that the total length of time which Pandarus consumed, from the day that he actually began his manipulations to the day on which the lovers met at the home of Deiphebus, was exactly three days: from May 4 through May 6. As indicated in lines 50 and 56, where the only explicit time reference occurs, Book II opens on May 3. "Whan morwen com" (65), May 4, Pandarus visits Criseyde (75-76) and reveals Troilus' love, and again Criseyde dates the action with her comment of "This nyght thrie" (89). On this day, Pandarus receives Criseyde's pledge that she will look favorably on Troilus (960-63). In addition, as though

destined by Fate, Criseyde, seated at her window (the first window scene), watches as Troilus returns from a skirmish with the Greeks (610-51), and this event acts as the catalyst for her meditation scene (694-805), for the garden scene (806-903), and finally for her dream of the nightingale (911-31). The same evening, that of May 4, after "They spedde hem fro the soper unto bedde" (947), Pandarus suggests that Troilus write to Criseyde (1002-08). Troilus arises from bed (1059) and composes his love letter.

Pandarus tells Troilus he will deliver the letter to Criseyde the following morning "at pryme" (992), and on the morning of May 5, Pandarus fulfills his promise (1093-95). That afternoon (1185) Criseyde is persuaded by Pandarus to reply to Troilus' letter (1212-13), and shortly after, maneuvered by Pandarus to the window, Criseyde sees Troilus for the second time as he rides to the palace (1247-74). That evening "whan that it was eve" (1301-05), having accomplished his design, Pandarus returns home and delivers Criseyde's reply to Troilus (1301 ff.). On the evening of May 5, Pandarus promises Troilus that "er it be dayes two" (1362) Troilus "shalt come into a certeyn place, / There as thow mayst thiself hire [Criseyde] preye of grace" (1364-65). And again, during their conversation Pandarus specifically sets the time and place of the meeting as May 6 at the home of Deiphebus: "er houres twyes twelve. / He [Deiphebus] shal the ese, unwist of it hymself" (1399-1400).

According to his plan to employ the unsuspecting Deiphebus as his ally, Pandarus initiates this action when he solicits Deiphebus' help on Criseyde's behalf (1402-56). Immediately thereafter, Pandarus rushes to Criseyde with the ruse of Poliphete's lawsuit (1461), and during this conversation Deiphebus enters and invites Criseyde "To holde hym on the morwe [May 6] compaignie / At dyner" (1488-89). On the evening of May 5, Troilus visits Deiphebus (1540), and on the morning of May 6 the invited guests, Criseyde and Helen, with their retinues and Pandarus, gather at the home of Deiphebus. Dinner is to be sometime after 10:00 A.M., "an heure after the prime" (1557),⁸ and within a short time it is concluded (1597). Then, for "the mountance of an heure" (1707), Deiphebus and Helen are manipulated away from the chamber of the "ailing" Troilus so that Pandarus may achieve his goal, the meeting of Troilus and Criseyde. At this critical and suspenseful point in the action, on the afternoon of May 6, Book II closes and prepares for the consummation between the lovers which occurs in Book III.

Both time schemes are carefully worked out by Chaucer to lead ultimately to the consummation scene, but with the first meeting of Troilus and Criseyde at the conclusion of Book II, the short-time plan takes over and continues through the early portions of Book III. During their brief interview at Deiphebus', Pandarus conjures the lovers "That at myn hous ye ben at my warnynge, / For I ful well

⁸ See Robinson's "Explanatory Notes," *Works*, p. 933, n. 1557.

shal shape youre comynge' " (III, 195-96), and Robinson's comments on the planetary situation of Book III (624 ff.) suggest that the consummation occurs on or about May 13, approximately one week after the banquet.⁶

Chaucer's adoption of this double time scheme appears to be a relatively simple one. First, he sets the shorter time passage into play as he focuses on the interaction between Troilus, Criseyde, and Pandarus because this scheme centers on a rapid sequence of events. Since the emotions are the focus of the action, Chaucer needs to accelerate time to match the increased tempo of the drama. But, whenever he needs to indicate a slower passage of time to mark the gradual growth of Criseyde's love, Chaucer does so by an appropriate word or phrase. Thus the action apparently follows the shorter time plan, but is, at the same time, subjected to the longer time scheme. The juxtaposition of the two sets of time references seems to be subtly planned and directed toward its conclusion—the rapid but not hasty consummation of Troilus and Criseyde's love which is to follow in Book III.

Boston College

⁶ Robinson's introductory comments to his "Explanatory Notes" on the dating of *Troilus*, p. 922; in addition, see p. 936, n. 624.

THE FATHER-CHILD SYMBOLISM IN *PROMETHEUS UNBOUND*

By WILLIAM H. MARSHALL

The climax of the action of Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound* is the fall of Jupiter. Demogorgon, as the anticipated child of Jupiter and Thetis, arrives in the Car of the Hour and—after Jupiter's frightened question, "Awful shape, what art thou? Speak!"—identifies himself:

Eternity. Demand no direr name.
Descend, and follow me down the abyss.
I am thy child, as thou wert Saturn's child;
Mightier than thee: and we must dwell together
Henceforth in darkness. Lift thy lightnings not.
The tyranny of heaven none may retain,
Or reassume, or hold, succeeding thee:
Yet if thou wilt, as 'tis the destiny
Of trodden worms to writhe till they are dead,
Put forth thy might.

To which Jupiter answers:

Detested prodigy!
Even thus beneath the deep Titanian prisons
I trample thee! Thou lingerest? Mercy! mercy!
(III.i.51-63)

The source of the action in Shelley's play is, of course, Prometheus' prophecy in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, "A son she [Zeus's bride] shall bear, mightier than his father."¹

But the meaning of Shelley's development of this situation has caused difficulty for some critics. Vida Scudder wrote, "The form of Demogorgon assumed by the child of this fateful union is the most difficult in the whole drama to apprehend." Arthur Clutton-Brock observed, "Something happens in the middle of the play; but Shelley cannot tell us what it is, because he does not know. Demogorgon appears and descends with Jupiter into the abyss; but we do not learn why he appears or how he contrives the fall of Jupiter, or even who he is, except that he is Eternity and the child of Jupiter, as Jupiter of Saturn." Mrs. Campbell remarked, "What really Shelley means to be the relation between Jove and Demogorgon is not very clear." And recently Peter Butter has commented, "An awkward part for Shelley of the original story was the secret of the fatal child, which does not fit well into his scheme."²

All this, however, seems to be far from the case, for the theme of the fatal child by which Jupiter falls, as much as the fact of the fall

¹ Line 768, Paul Elmer More, trans., *Complete Greek Drama*, ed. Whitney J. Gates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr. (New York, 1938), I, 149.

² Vida D. Scudder, ed., *Prometheus Unbound: A Lyrical Drama* (Boston, 1908), p. xxxv; Arthur Clutton-Brock, *Shelley, The Man and the Poet* (New York, 1909), p. 182; Mrs. Olwen Ward Campbell, *Shelley and the Unromantics* (New York, 1924), p. 219; Peter Butter, *Shelley's Idols of the Cave* (Edinburgh, 1954), p. 169.

itself, is central to the meaning of the play. Shelley's use of the prophecy of Aeschylus' Prometheus that the child of Jupiter would destroy its father involves an adaptation to Shelley's own purposes of the central teaching of orthodox Christianity: that Christ was the Incarnation of the Son of God. This interpretation has been overlooked,³ largely because of the tendency to treat each element in the work as a fixed part of an allegorical whole, rather than as a symbol conditioned in its meanings by other symbols and in no sense restricted to one equation of value at a time or to consistency of meaning.⁴ Prometheus can represent the human aspect of the traditional image of Christ, the teacher of universal Love, and Demogorgon can at one point stand for the divine aspect, the Incarnation of the Son of God; but at all times each can suggest many other values as well.

Jupiter, the chief of the gods, whose reign has begun in time with the overthrow of Saturn, is for Shelley equatable with the traditional picture of an anthropomorphic deity, as opposed to the concept of an infinite and necessarily creative Love. To Asia's question, "Who made the living world?" Demogorgon replies, "God," and refers to the second concept; but the author of evil is he who now "reigns" (II.iv.9-31). Like all things except "eternal Love," Jupiter is subject to "Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change" (II.iv.119-20). He is limited, and in his limitation he is evil, the personification of the proposition which Shelley had Ahasuerus make in *Queen Mab* (VII, 84-266), that if there were a deity such as men have imagined, he would necessarily be evil. Jupiter's reign is described by Asia in such a way that the evils traditionally considered the result of Original Sin are attributed to him:

And Jove now reigned; for on the race of man
First famine, and then toil, and then disease,
Strife, wounds, and ghastly death unseen before,
Fell; and the unseasonable seasons drove
With alternating shafts of frost and fire,
Their shelterless, pale tribes to mountain caves:
And in their desert hearts fierce wants he sent,
And mad disquietudes, and shadows idle
Of unreal good, which levied mutual war,
So ruining the lair wherein they raged....

(II.iv.49-58)

³ Two writers approached or touched the idea, but neither developed it. J. Macmillan Brown believed that the fall of Jupiter illustrated that "old and false religions expect the new enthusiasms for freedom that are sometimes born of them near their death to reinforce their empire over the human mind. But they are mistaken; the new must overturn the old." *The "Prometheus Unbound" of Shelley* (London, 1905), p. 90. F. C. Gutteling proposed that in developing the myth of the overthrow of Jupiter, Shelley was "influenced no doubt by Christian conceptions" ("Demogorgon in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*," *Neophilologus*, IX [1924], 285), but he developed his proposal no further.

⁴ Newman Ivey White exposed many of the weaknesses of the allegorical method of treating the play ("*Prometheus Unbound*, or Every Man His Own Allegorist," *PMLA*, XL [1925], 172-84), but he did not propose that we interpret it instead as a work of many integrated but variable symbols. See Harold Bloom's treatment of Shelley as a mythopoeic poet, *Shelley's Mythmaking* (New Haven, 1959).

Or, as Prometheus asserts early in the action, "Evil minds / Change good to their own nature" (I, 380-81). It is impossible for Jupiter to do good, that is, to succeed or to create, for his nature, as Carlos Baker has pointed out, "is destructive rather than creative."⁵ For Jupiter's child to impose the ruler's will, the child must partake of the nature of the father; but Jupiter does not understand the meaning of his own nature and, only because of this, believes that the child of Thetis and himself will become the agent whereby he shall finally triumph over the will of Prometheus. Yet Prometheus, with an apparent foreknowledge that is actually a comprehension of the difference between the natures of good and of evil, holds the secret that the child is in reality to be the instrument for Jupiter's own destruction. In sending Mercury and the Furies to learn this secret, Jupiter merely demonstrates further his own limitation.⁶

The substance of the being destroyed, as Shelley conceived of it, becomes rather clear in the light of Mary Shelley's remark: "Shelley believed that mankind had only to will that there should be no evil, and there would be none."⁷ Jupiter, the image of the anthropomorphic deity with all its derivative evils, has been given reality by Prometheus (I, 381-82), who is, in one of his symbolic meanings, as most have recognized, the mind of Man.⁸ Shelley himself asserted in his "Preface" to the drama that Prometheus is a figure comparable in part to Milton's Satan, though "exempt from the taints of ambition, envy, revenge, and a desire for personal aggrandizement, which, in the hero of *Paradise Lost*, interfere with the interest."⁹ Man, the rational being, and Satan, the rebel against injustice, become one in the figure of Prometheus as soon as the notion of the evil of Satan's rebellion is removed from the idea, as Shelley would do quite simply by conceiving of the traditional picture of godhead itself as evil. In ridding himself of any effect of his early desire for revenge, by retracting the curse upon Jupiter, Prometheus gives full affirmation to Love, the only force to which Fate or inevitability, Demogorgon, is subject; and from this moment the fall of Jupiter is assured.

The parallel between Prometheus and Christ is made explicit when Mercury and the Furies try to wrest the secret from Prometheus by

⁵ Carlos Baker, *Shelley's Major Poetry: The Fabric of a Vision* (Princeton, 1948), p. 109.

⁶ Jupiter's statement, "Two mighty spirits, mingling, made a third / Mightier than either" (III.i.43-44), is crucial to the central irony of the drama, but it does not indicate what Peter Butter has suggested, that "curiously enough, Jupiter himself seems to know the secret" (p. 194).

⁷ "Note on the Prometheus Unbound," *Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, ed. Mrs. Shelley (London, 1839), II, 133.

⁸ See John Addington Symonds, *Shelley* (New York, 1879), p. 121; William Michael Rossetti, "Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*: A Study of Its Meaning and Personages," *Shelley Society's Papers*, Ser. 1, I (1886), 121.

⁹ J. Macmillan Brown demonstrated a rather striking misunderstanding of the meaning of the play by his assertion that Jupiter's downfall "reminds us so vividly of the descent of Satan from the battlements of Heaven in *Paradise Lost*, that it is manifest Shelley meant a parallel between the two natures" (p. 82).

demonstrating the futility of this or any attempt through self-sacrifice to save Man; and for this purpose they call forth the vision of the dying Christ and of his nominal followers who have rejected his essential teaching. Christ then becomes the benevolent champion of humanity, a portrayal which, Hoxie Neale Fairchild has pointed out, is a characteristic product of eighteenth-century deism or even atheism¹⁰ and which probably made an indirect contribution to Shelley's attitude toward Christ in 1818 and 1819.¹¹ This was based upon two firm distinctions: the first, between the Old Law dependent on what seemed to Shelley an image of an unjust deity and the New Law as taught by Christ; the second, between Christ and those who in his name have added to the body of unreasonable lore of the Old Law while rejecting Christ's teachings.

Shelley's attitude in 1819 is rather well illustrated in the prose piece "The Moral Teaching of Jesus Christ," in which he described the religion of Christianity as

the strongest ally and bulwark of that system of successful force and fraud and of the selfish passions from which it has derived its origin and permanence, against which Jesus Christ declared the most uncompromising war, and the extinction of which appears to have been the great motive of his life.¹²

The idea that Christ, the champion of Man bringing the lesson of Love, could do otherwise was as remote from reality as the thought that Prometheus could come to terms with Jupiter.

The image of an arbitrary anthropomorphic deity was for Shelley a manifestation of Man's intellectual corruption, a form of evil which existed only in the mind of Man. But though corrupt, Man was not without hope and thereby invented what seemed to be a means of expiating the wrath of such a god—the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son, who is to save Man. But salvation would be, in terms of the image of deity as Shelley interpreted it, merely the suppression of Man, the subjection of his will to that of the god. The purpose of the deity and the good of Man must be antithetical, and the Son could serve only one. The identification of Christ with the Son of God created a paradox. If Christ had subscribed to this, then his moral teachings would necessarily be meaningless, and he could be regarded only as a political fraud. If, on the other hand, Christ was sincere in

¹⁰ Hoxie Neale Fairchild, *Religious Trends in English Poetry* (New York, 1939-57), III, 338-39.

¹¹ Very early Shelley occasionally confused Christ with the Church or the orthodox tradition. "I once could tolerate Christ; he then merely injured me once; he merely deprived me of all that I cared for, touching myself, on earth; but now he has done more, and I cannot forgive," Shelley wrote to Thomas Jefferson Hogg on April 26, 1811. *Complete Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, ed. Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck (London, 1926-30), VIII, 75. But in 1812, the year he began *Queen Mab*, he wrote in "A Letter to Lord Ellenborough," "Jesus Christ was crucified because he attempted to supersede the ritual of Moses with regulations more moral and humane . . ." (*ibid.*, V, 289). In the Notes to *Queen Mab*, despite the qualification in the suggestion that Christ "was an ambitious man who aspired to the throne of Judea," Shelley made the distinction between Christ and the orthodox tradition.

¹² *Works*, VI, 255.

the assertion that Man's salvation was to come through the affirmation of Love, then his teachings could not coexist in Man's mind with the belief in an anthropomorphic but misanthropic deity. Or, to state the situation differently, Christ the benevolent champion, falsely identified with the Son of God, must destroy the notion of the Father in the mind of Man in order to vindicate his own humanity and goodness. It is this proposition to which Shelley subscribed in 1818 and 1819 and which he attempted to dramatize in the climax of the action of *Prometheus Unbound*, the destruction of Jupiter by his "fatal child."

All that emanates from Jupiter has reality in the human intellect only to the same degree that he does. Jupiter anticipates "the incarnation" (III.i.46), the child that Thetis is to bear him, through whom he expects to impose his will upon Prometheus. But by retraction of the curse upon Jupiter, Prometheus has demonstrated that he has ejected from his being the evil which Jupiter personifies and has substituted for it the universal Love taught by Christ, so that neither the god nor the incarnate son of the god has reality. For this reason Prometheus has not yielded to the despair supposedly inherent in the visions called forth by the Furies, which have, in fact, become positive symbols for him.¹³ By his Christ-like fulfillment of the highest of Man's ideals, Prometheus moves Demogorgon, Eternity which is subject to Love, to bring about the fall of Jupiter. The mind of Man has necessarily rejected the image of an unjust deity and the myth of the incarnation of the son of the deity, formerly created by Man in an attempt to avert divine injustice. It was not merely to enrich the irony of Jupiter's expectations regarding his son, therefore, that Demogorgon appears as the "fatal child" to bring about Jupiter's fall. Child and father descend into the abyss to "dwell together / Henceforth in darkness" (III.i.55-56). When Demogorgon reappears in the fourth act, in which Prometheus' exaltation of his humanity achieves a kind of universal consummation, he is Eternity only; the "fatal child" has ceased to be.¹⁴ Of the two aspects of the traditional image of Christ, the human and benevolent has destroyed the divine.

University of Pennsylvania

¹³ In terms of what I have proposed, the suggestion of an ironic parallel between Mercury in Shelley's play and Michael in *Paradise Lost* seems inescapable. Mercury comes to learn a secret whereas Michael comes to reveal one, but both deal with the meaning of the intercession of the son of the ruling deity. Each presents visions of Man's future, the center of which is the figure of Christ, for the purpose of inducing Man to conform to the will of the ruler of the universe. Michael offers hope to Man, but since it lies within the frame of orthodoxy, such hope would for Shelley be evil and unreal. Mercury brings despair, but it is based upon the assumption of the reality of divine powers; however, since these have had no existence outside the mind of Man, the Furies' fearful visions ultimately bring strength to Prometheus.

¹⁴ When Demogorgon refers to himself as "Eternity" in his final speech (IV, 565), the notion of fatality is clear, but the image of Demogorgon as the "child" is significantly absent.

LANGUAGE AND MORALITY IN KARL KRAUS'S *DIE LETZTEN TAGE DER MENSCHHEIT*

By DONALD G. DAVIAU

Concern for language stands as the central issue of all Karl Kraus's endeavors, and his lifetime of activities could most appropriately be summarized under the motto: "In the beginning was the word." This dedication to language stemmed not from an aesthetic but from a moral concern. For to Kraus the relation of language to existence in that sequence¹ was the most important connection in life and the one to which he devoted all of his activity: "Wort und Wesen—die einzige Verbindung, die ich je in dieser nutzbeffissenen Welt erstrebt."² Kraus's belief that the laws of language could and ideally should form the basis for morally acceptable behavior is evidenced from the following:

Die Nutzenwendung der Lehre, die die Sprache wie das Sprechen betrifft, könnte niemals sein, dass der, der sprechen lernt, auch die Sprache lerne, wohl aber, dass er sich der Erfassung der Wortgestalt nähere und damit der Sphäre, die jenseits des greifbar Nutzhaften ergiebig ist. Diese Gewähr eines moralischen Gewinns liegt in einer geistigen Disziplin, die gegenüber dem einzigen, was ungestraft verletzt werden kann, der Sprache, das höchste Mass einer Verantwortung festsetzt und wie keine andere geeignet ist, den Respekt vor jeglichem andern Lebensgut zu lehren. Wäre denn eine stärkere Sicherung im Moralischen vorstellbar als der sprachliche Zweifel? ... Welch ein Stil des Lebens möchte sich entwickeln, wenn der Deutsche keiner andern Ordonnanz gehorsamte als der der Sprache!³

The aim of this essay is to show, through an analysis of *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*, how Kraus conceives this relationship of language and morality. I have selected this particular work because it is generally accepted as Kraus's masterpiece, and because the drama

¹ As evidenced by Kraus's poem "Der Mann und das Wort":

Ein Mann ein Wort:
so ist die Sprache denn der Ehre Hort.
Doch diese, die verspricht, kann sich versprechen.
Oft haben Worte einen Mann ersetzt.
Doch kann ein Mann ein Wort ersetzen?
Ich möcht' es so gering nicht schätzen.
Die Ehre bloss, das Wort wird nicht verletzt
und jene kann man, dieses nimmer brechen,
da wohl der Mann, das Wort nicht anders kann.
Das meine ist: Ein Wort ein Mann!

See Karl Kraus, *Worte in Versen* (München, 1959), p. 131.

² Karl Kraus, "Nach zwanzig Jahren," *ibid.*, p. 258. Erich Heller has suggested a parallel between Kraus and Ludwig Wittgenstein: "With Karl Kraus [Wittgenstein shared] the conviction of an inescapable bond between the forms of living, thinking, feeling, and the forms of language (Wittgenstein's dictum, 'Ethics and aesthetics are one,' may serve as a perfect characterisation of Kraus' artistic credo)." "Ludwig Wittgenstein," *Encounter* (September, 1959), No. 72, p. 42.

³ Karl Kraus, *Die Sprache*, dritte Auflage (München, 1956), pp. 436-37.

is a linguistic tour de force dedicated to this idea. Although Kraus's mastery of language is unanimously acknowledged by critics,⁴ who otherwise hold widely diverging opinions about Kraus and his significance, the relationship of language and morality in Kraus's work, though observed in existing studies,⁵ has never received the attention it merits as the major theme of *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* and ultimately of all of Kraus's writings.

Kraus's grandiose, apocalyptic tragedy, *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*, chronicles with historical accuracy the events in Austria during the war years 1914-1918 and depicts the cultural and ethical decline which had undermined the stability of the country. Although he writes specifically of Austria, he clearly means the world, for as he states: "Auch Vorgänge an der Sirk-Ecke sind von einem kosmischen Punkt regiert."⁶ Why is man ripe for destruction, asks Kraus; and he answers: "Er zerbricht an der Lüge." His purpose is to portray in detail the calamitous state of mankind because of its lapse into a system of relative morality, which has brought with it sacrifice of integrity and honesty. His message affirmed the need for an absolute system of morality, for a revival of truthfulness in all phases of life. In an age which had neglected its cultural heritage and ignored its humanitarian tradition, Kraus emerged as a prophet, who saw clearly and proclaimed fearlessly, if not the way to the promised land of the future, at least the way to avoid self-destruction. His uncompromisingly idealistic program aimed at restoring meaning to language, the basis of cultural and intellectual life of any nation. Language, he believed, could provide the solution to the modern dilemma of mankind.⁷

⁴ Representative of the unanimous view is Paul Fechter, whose one-sided judgment of this play is otherwise open to question: "Nur von einem Blickpunkt aus bleibt die Arbeit von Kraus als Wert bestehen: vom Sprachlichen her ... Kraus ist der sprachlich stärkste, wenn auch böseste Wiener seiner Jahrzehnte gewesen; so konnte er die Wiener Sprachwelt seiner Jahre, vor allem die der Unterschichten mit einer Echtheit festhalten, die seine Tragödie 'Die letzten Tage der Menschheit' vielleicht zu einer Sprachgeschichtsquelle ersten Ranges machen wird." *Das europäische Drama* (Mannheim, 1958), III, 237.

⁵ The standard works on Kraus have long been Leopold Liegler, *Karl Kraus und die Sprache* (Wien, 1918), and *Karl Kraus und sein Werk* (Wien, 1920; zweite Auflage, 1933). These works have been supplemented by Werner Kraft, *Karl Kraus* (Salzburg, 1956). Walter Benjamin's essay, "Karl Kraus," *Werke*, II (Frankfurt am Main, 1955), is one of the most penetrating general studies written to date. An extremely fine article treating *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* is by Franz Mautner, in Benno von Wiese, *Das deutsche Drama*, II (Düsseldorf, 1958). Erich Heller's treatment of the drama in *The Disinherited Mind* (Cambridge, 1952) provides a worthwhile introduction.

⁶ Karl Kraus, *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* (München, 1957), p. 10. All subsequent references to this work will be indicated in the text.

⁷ "Kraus meinte, dass eine Weltverbesserung, wenn überhaupt möglich, nur von einer Sprachverbesserung der Menschen ausgehen könne, da nur gute und richtige Gedanken gute Taten zeugen könnten. Der Beweis im Negativen ist mit dem Hinweis auf die Sprachverwilderung unter Hitler und auf die Uniformierung der bolschewistischen Parteisprache leicht überzeugend zu führen." Helmut Uhlig, "Vom Pathos der Syntax," *Aksente*, Heft 6 (Dezember, 1955), p. 492.

Die letzten Tage der Menschheit is not intended as a drama of character or action, but as a portrayal of the meaninglessness of language in Austria and its ensuing repercussions. Kraus did not attempt to create external aspects of beings or rounded personalities, but to convey the essence, the very soul, of his characters. He purposely left his figures shadowy and masklike to highlight their lack of depth and integrity. He wanted to make audible this tragic loss, to preserve in his drama, as a testament for the ages, a knowledge of the essential degradation of his time. As Kraus observed of his characters:

Ich habe sie zu Schatten geformt, die sie sind und die sie in Schein umlügen wollten! Ich habe ihnen das Fleisch abgezogen! Aber den Gedanken ihrer Dummheit, den Gefühlen ihrer Bosheit, dem furchtbaren Rhythmus ihrer Nichtigkeit gab ich die Körper und lasse sie sich bewegen.... Ich habe das Wesen gerettet und mein Ohr hat den Schall der Taten, mein Auge die Gebärde der Reden entdeckt und meine Stimme hat, wo sie nur wiederholte, so zitiert, dass der Grundton festgehalten blieb für alle Zeiten. (pp. 680-81)

Kraus claimed that nothing in his tragedy was his own invention, but that everything was taken directly from reality:

Die unwahrscheinlichsten Taten, die hier gemeldet werden, sind wirklich geschehen; ich habe gemalt, was sie nur taten. Die unwahrscheinlichsten Gespräche, die hier geführt werden, sind wörtlich gesprochen worden; die grellsten Erfindungen sind Zitate. Sätze, deren Wahnwitz unverlierbar dem Ohr eingeschrieben ist, wachsen zur Lebensmusik. Das Dokument ist Figur; Berichte erstehen als Gestalten, Gestalten verenden als Leitartikel; das Feuilleton bekam einen Mund, der es monologisch von sich gibt; Phrasen stehen auf zwei Beinen—Menschen behielten nur eines. (p. 9)

Kraus, as an actor (he won outstanding acclaim in his day for his public readings), possessed an unusual ability to perceive as well as to reproduce distinctive individual shadings in both style and pronunciation. Willy Haas has commented that Kraus should have left recordings instead of books.⁸ Kraus did not need to characterize his people in stage directions, for their language alone affords an accurate and unmistakable portrait which can be fleshed out in the reader's mind. Thus, not only is what is said important, but so too is the manner of expression. Sentence construction, vocabulary, and pronunciation, which Kraus approximates in dialectical renditions, become indicative of the type of mentality being portrayed. Language thus becomes not merely a means of identification, but ultimately and most importantly the basis by which these people must be judged.

Kraus, the fanatic of truth, was logically a fanatic of language, the universally accepted means of communicating truth among men; for he believed that language served as an index to the state of morality of any given culture. The closer language, thought, and deed co-

⁸ "Er hätte Grammophonplatten hinterlassen müssen, nicht Bücher: nichts auf der Welt würde diesem Nachlass gleichen, die genialsten Karikaturen eines Daumier oder Thomas Theodor Heine würden in Nichts versinken vor dieser blossen Stimmenkarikatur. Doch bleibt das Hauptwerk dieser Art, 'Die letzten Tage der Menschheit,' etwas Einmaliges, immer Denkwürdiges." Willy Haas, *Die literarische Welt* (München, 1957), p. 23.

incided, the closer the individual or society approached moral perfection. In this sense Kraus, the *Aufklärer*, believed in the perfectibility of man. His tragedy shows the result of the breakdown of language, when words no longer represent actions or thoughts. In the words of the Nörgler (Kraus):

Du grosser Gott, der den Gedanken gab,
ihr Wort hat ihm den Rest gegeben.
Ihr Wort ist allem Werte nur ein Grab,
selbst Tat und Tod kam durch das Wort ums Leben.
(p. 614)

The inevitable concomitant of the breakdown in the communicativeness of language, as Kraus demonstrates, is the loss of ethical standards, which leads to the decline of society, and, if carried to its logical extreme, to the destruction of humanity itself. His viewpoint, which serves as a connecting theme of the entire drama, is: "Ein Volk, sage ich, ist dann fertig, wenn es seine Phrasen noch in einem Lebensstand mitschleppt, wo es deren Inhalt wieder erlebt. Das ist dann der Beweis dafür, dass es diesen Inhalt nicht mehr erlebt" (p. 256).

Kraus's method in this drama—satire—is directed exclusively at revealing the discrepancy between word and deed with the ultimate aim of restoring meaning to language. He was not a politician; he was interested in practical politics only in so far as it contributed to the general decline. Morally and intellectually, Kraus was an absolute idealist, who throughout his life lived according to unimpeachable standards of conduct and behavior. Compromise was unknown to him, and his code of ethical behavior permitted no deviation from absolute standards.⁹ He judged every aberration, great or small, by the same measure.¹⁰ His attitude was "Ein gesunder Stamm hat keine [Auswüchse]" (p. 260).

Kraus shows how words in his society have lost their significance by portraying scenes in which phrases are parroted mechanically, demonstrating that the speaker has not thought about their meanings. Slogans such as "jetzt ist Krieg," "Krieg ist Krieg," "durchhalten," "Heldentod fürs Vaterland," "ein Scherflein beitragen," "heiliger Verteidigungskrieg," "Kulturvolk," "Volk der Dichter und Denker," "Stahlbad," "seelischer Aufschwung," "Ausbau und Vertiefung der Bündnisse," recur constantly in the most inane and ludicrous contexts. These catchwords are frequently uttered in situations where they sound paradoxical and even grotesque. Not only are these words misused, but with equal glibness they are mangled and mispronounced by the lower classes, who try to echo newspaper phraseology with results such as the following: "wie ein Mann wollen wir uns mit

⁹ In particular, Kraus had no sense of humor or tolerance for those who misused language either through error or to achieve a unique style. He waged a bitter vendetta against *Die Neue Freie Presse* for its errors in word usage and against Maximilian Harden and Alfred Kerr for their stylistic innovations.

¹⁰ "Man versteht nichts von diesem Manne, solange man nicht erkennt, dass mit Notwendigkeit alles, ausnahmslos alles, Sprache und Sache, für ihn sich in der Sphäre des Rechts abspielt." Benjamin, p. 175.

fliehenden Fahnen an das Vaterland anschliessen in dera grossen Zeit! ... Mir führn einen heilinger *Verteilungskrieg* führn mir!" (p. 71, italics mine). In the same way "Hochverrat" becomes "Hofverrat" (p. 288). An extreme example of nonthinking stereotyped phraseology is the government official's reply to a distraught parent whose son is missing in action: "nehmen Sie also getrost an, dass er tot ist" (p. 414). Another is the newsboy who shouts "Extraausgabe—! 100.000 tote Italiener bitte—" (p. 323). The absence of the comma makes it seem as if he is hawking the dead. Perhaps the most incredible example is the man who is adjudged insane because he does not believe the victory propaganda (p. 437).

By examining the phraseology of war, Kraus attempts to expose the rottenness and corruption concealed behind the patriotic clichés. He points out the illogic of calling soldiers "Einrückende," when they have no free choice in the decision. More accurately, they should be termed "einrückend gemachte." He reveals the sham glory of the concept "Er starb den Heldentod fürs Vaterland" by juxtaposing a government declaration, in which workers are threatened with being sent to the front as punishment for complaining about working conditions (302).

When the Optimist, a composite character representing enlightened opinion in Austria, chides the Nörgler with wanting to conduct the war with grammar, the latter replies with one of the key statements of the drama, concerning the confusion of war and business:

Im Krieg gehts um Leben und Tod der Sprache. Wissen Sie, was geschehen ist? Schilder und Schilde sind nicht mehr zu unterscheiden und alle, die nur ein Schild und einen Verdienst gehabt haben, werden dereinst ein Verdienst und einen Schild haben. So mischen sich die Sphären und die neue Welt ist blutiger als die alte, weil sie den furchtbaren neuen Sinn furchtbarer macht durch die alten Formen, denen sie geistig nicht entwachsen konnte. Fibel und Flammenwerfer! Panier und Papier! Weil wir zum Schwert greifen, mussten wir zur Gasbombe greifen. Und wir führen diesen Kampf bis aufs Messer. (pp. 255-56)

This confusion of Mars and Mercury (p. 162) has caused the prostitution of every noble idea, aim, and personage for money. Foods in restaurants, as well as common household items, are sold under the names of famous generals or battles. Feats of heroism are depicted in movies and on the stage. Battlefields strewn with the dead and scenes of hangings are sold as picture postcards. Manufacturers produce special frames to hold pictures of dead soldiers. Children are given games such as "Russentod" to play with. Cemeteries of the war dead are regarded as tourist attractions for foreigners after the war is over.

Business terminology has likewise been extended to the realm of human values. A general talks of "erstklassige Truppen," and a doctor speaks of "Menschenmaterial." Human beings are no longer individuals, but a commodity to be exploited and manipulated.

The atrophied spiritual state of the time, attributable to the vacuousness of language, prevents people from recognizing the hopelessness of the course of action to which they have committed themselves:

Sie [diese Geistigkeit] befähigt uns eben noch, die Begriffe "Menschenmaterial", "durchhalten", "Scherflein", "Hamstern", "Mustern", "Nachmustern", "Tachinierer", "einrückend gemacht", kurz den ganzen ABC-Befund unseres Zustandes in seiner abgründigen Tiefe zu erfassen, ohne doch die völlige Aussichtslosigkeit eines Tuns ermessen zu können, zu dem wir uns innerhalb dieses Mechanismus verurteilen liessen. (p. 495)

The responsibility for the breakdown of language Kraus attributes mainly to the press, and particularly to Moritz Benedikt's *Die Neue Freie Presse*, the most influential newspaper in Vienna. He devoted the largest portion not only of this drama, but of all his works, to denouncing the evils of journalism, which he held directly accountable for the moral irresponsibility that made war possible. The press, in Kraus's opinion, introduced chaos into the world by ignoring the question of right and wrong and by twisting events to suit its own purposes. Reporters did not report what was true, but what they wanted their readers to believe, as, for example, the correspondent who, upon witnessing the capture of an Austrian general, protests, "Das ist nicht wahr!—Ich hab es selbst gesehen!" (p. 242).

One of Kraus's favorite terms for journalists is *Hyänen*, and their activity he describes as "Walzer der Hyänen um die Leichen" (p. 754), for he feels that they gleefully pick over the bones of the dead for a story. The full measure of his hatred and contempt is reserved for Benedikt, who, he claims, has triumphed over all the moral and spiritual values of his time: "Er ist nur ein Zeitungsherausgeber und triumphiert dennoch über unsere geistige und sittliche Ehre. Seine Melodie allein hat mehr Opfer gefordert als der Krieg, den sie erregt und befeuert hat" (p. 504). Kraus considers Benedikt more powerful than the Pope in this sense: "Was vermag eine Predigt für den Frieden gegen einen Leitartikel für den Krieg. Und da es nur Predigten für den Krieg gibt—" (p. 258). In the epilogue Kraus portrays Benedikt as Antichrist, rejoicing in his victory over the power of good:

Ich bin sein erster Faktor,
ich bin des Worts Redaktor,
das an dem Ende steht.
Ich kann die Seelen packen
und trete auf den Nacken
von aller Majestät! (p. 752)

By substituting empty phraseology for factual reporting, the press created a situation in which the word no longer represented the deed, but existed independently of reality. The effect of this dishonesty was to produce a society incapable of judging truth:

Das gedruckte Wort hat ein ausgehöhltes Menschentum vermocht, Greuel zu verüben, die es sich nicht mehr vorstellen kann, und der furchtbare Fluch der Vervielfältigung gibt sie wieder an das Wort ab, das fortzeugend Böses muss gebären. Alles was geschieht, geschieht nur für die, die es beschreiben, und für die, die es nicht erleben. (p. 210)

His charge against the press culminates in the judgment that, while

it did not actually cause the war, it alone created a climate favorable for war:

Invalide waren wir durch die Rotationsmaschinen, ehe es Opfer durch Kanonen gab. Waren nicht alle Reiche der Phantasie evakuiert, als jenes Manifest der bewohnten Erde den Krieg erklarte? Am Ende war das Wort. Jenem, welches den Geist getötet, blieb nichts übrig, als die Tat zu gebären. ... Nicht dass die Presse die Maschinen des Todes in Bewegung setzte—aber dass sie unser Herz ausgehöhlt hat, uns nicht mehr vorstellen zu können, wie das wäre: das ist ihre Kriegsschuld! (pp. 676-77)

Equally culpable with the press are the military high command and the system of bureaucracy, which suppress truth to conceal bungling and inefficiency. Kraus believes that if the public knew the truth about war and its conduct, the war could not continue. Conversely, evil flourishes best when it can be concealed behind an ideal, as in this instance war behind patriotism. According to Kraus, the military, which should be a tool of society, has become an autonomous body fighting to protect and expand its own interests and sphere of authority rather than to serve humanity: "Der Unrat weiss, dass er selbst die Idee ist, für die er kämpft . . ." (p. 219). They protect themselves from criticism by using gibberish and official gobbledegook (Scene 16, p. 274), and by exercising their unchallengeable authority: "No wirst scho machen," says a member of the general staff trying to conceal the excessive number of daily casualties, "—wann drauf steht 'amtlich', so is's eh scho die halberte Wahrheit und die andere Halbscheid machst halt dazu, bist ja ein gscheiter Bursch, also servus servus—Schluss!" (p. 579). Even when there is no attempt at concealment, Kraus cites the inaccuracy and ridiculousness of military usages:

Ein U-Boot-Kommandant hält die Fahne hoch, ein Fliegerangriff ist zu Wasser geworden. Leerer wird's noch, wenn die Metapher stofflich zuständig ist. Wenn statt einer Truppenoperation zu Lande einmal eine maritime Unternehmung Schiffbruch leidet. Wenn der Erfolg in unsern jetzigen Stellungen bombensicher war und die Beschiessung eines Platzes ein Bombenerfolg. (p. 257)

The retention by the military of the vocabulary of knighthood in an age of modern warfare produces that gap between language and reality which Kraus is attacking. As Mautner aptly expressed it:

Hierher gehört der Hohn, den Kraus mit einer vorstellungsentleerten Metaphorik des Teutonischen, des Rittertums, des Einzelkampfes treibt, mit der "schimmernden Wehr" der "Feldgrauen", den Phrasen von den Fehden und Panieren und Schwertern in einem Zeitalter der Tanks, der Gas- und Fliegerangriffe. . . .¹¹

Likewise, a baseless mythology, created by statesmen and spread by the press, supported the Emperor Franz Joseph, under whose leadership the decline of Austria occurred:

Eine siebenjährige Gehirn- und Charaktererweichung der nur um solchen Preis und selbst dann nicht zu verbindenden Völker ist der Inhalt der so regierten Tage, eine Verfälschung, Verschönerung und Korruption aller Edelwerte eines Volkstums, die in der Weltgeschichte ohne Beispiel ist und zumal ohne Beispiel durch die Verlogenheit, mit der dank dem einzigen Fortschritt dieser

¹¹ Mautner, p. 377.

Zeit, nämlich der entwickelten journalistischen Technik, ein Schein vor ein Unwesen gestellt und die Legende der Gemütlichkeit über eine tödliche Realität der Leere gebreitet werden konnte. (p. 498)

Kraus also attacks the writers of his time for supporting the war instead of combatting it and for devaluating literature by placing it in the service of an aim contrary to its ideal spirit. Even a poet like Dehmel, who enlisted for service and saw action, negates his positive deed, according to Kraus, by his war lyrics.

Kraus is particularly incensed by the war parodies of Goethe's "Über allen Gipfeln." He feels that a nation capable of debasing its cultural treasures proves its lack of humanity:

Dass nämlich dieses Zeitalter, das als verstunkene Epoche preiszugeben und glatt aus der Entwicklung zu streichen wäre, um die deutsche Sprache wieder zu einer gottgefälligen zu machen, sich nicht damit begnügt hat, unter der Einwirkung einer todbringenden Technik literarisch produktiv zu sein, sondern sich noch an den Heiligtümern seiner verblichenen Kultur vergriffen hat, um mit der Parodie ihrer Weihe den Triumph seiner Unmenschlichkeit zu begründen. (p. 494)

According to Kraus, the Germans have never made their language a vital factor in their lives:

Kein Volk lebt entfernter von seiner Sprache, also von der Quelle seines Lebens, als die Deutschen. . . . Dieses Volk schreibt heute das abgestutzte Volapük des Weltkommis und wenn es die Iphigenie nicht zufällig ins Esperanto rettet, so überlässt es das Wort seiner Klassiker der schonungslosen Barbarei aller Nachdrucker und entschädigt sich in einer Zeit, in der kein Mensch mehr das Schicksal des Wortes ahnt und erlebt, durch Luxusdrucke, Bibliophilie und ähnliche Unzucht eines Ästhetizismus, die ein so echtes Stigma des Barbarentums ist wie das Bombardement einer Kathedrale. (pp. 200-201)

Because the loss of linguistic sensitivity by the Austrians and Germans reflected a loss of spiritual, cultural, and humanitarian values, Kraus believed that the war (the drama was written during the war) would confirm his faith in the importance of language by concluding with a German defeat; a German victory would be "der vollkommene Verrat am Geiste" (p. 201). He detects a direct connection between the war and language in this sense: "dass jene Sprache, die am meisten zu Phrase und Vorrat erstarrt ist, auch den Hang und die Bereitschaft hat, mit dem Tonfall der Überzeugung alles das an sich selbst untadelig zu finden, was dem andern zum Vorwurf gereicht" (p. 201).

As the catalogue of vices grows throughout the play, the Optimist at one point exclaims, "Ihr Verfahren entfärbt alle Fahnen des Vaterlands. Alles Lüge, alles Prostitution? Wo ist Wahrheit?" To this Kraus replies, "Bei den Prostituierten!" (p. 303). This relentless unmasking of sham and hypocrisy seemingly opens Kraus to the charge of one-sidedness. His rebuttal was that only those who were guilty could protest: "Gerade indem man auf die Schurken hinweist, bleibt man frei von dem Vorwurf, zu generalisieren, den nur die Betroffenen, nicht die andern erheben können" (p. 453). Although he recognized that many people acted bravely and nobly during the

war, his intention was not to single out good behavior, as if that were an exception, but to attack corruption which the war exaggerated.

The aspect of the war that caused Kraus the profoundest suffering was that those most guilty were spared from the consequences of their actions, while innocents died in their stead. Once he had become resigned to the fact of war, he had accepted it as a means of scourging the earth of its destroyers. However, in this he was disappointed. *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* is his testimonial for the ages on behalf of the vain sacrifices of war. In addition, it is his attempt to redeem his own spirit from having been witness to this crime against humanity:

Dies ist mein Manifest. *Ich habe alles reiflich erwogen.* Ich habe die Tragödie, die in Szenen der zerfallenden Menschheit zerfällt, auf mich genommen, damit sie der Geist höre, der sich der Opfer erbarmt, und hätte er selbst für alle Zukunft der Verbindung mit einem Menschenohr entsagt. Er empfangen den Grundton dieser Zeit, das Echo meines blutigen Wahnsinns, durch den ich mitschuldig bin an diesen Geräuschen. Er lasse es als Erlösung gelten! (p. 681)

The term *Erlösung* is of fundamental importance, for Kraus's personal salvation, his hope for the future of humanity, stems from a profound religiosity. Significantly, the play concludes with the voice of God intoning the words attributed to Emperor Wilhelm II, "Ich habe es nicht gewollt." This final statement counterbalances the apparent negativeness of the entire work. Kraus indicates here his belief that God does not intend His world to exist in chaos nor to end in apocalypse. Man controls his own fate, and it is his hope that humanity will work in a positive direction toward achieving that ideal state which formed Kraus's vision.

The means to salvation, according to Kraus, lie in man's relation to his language. In *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*, he demonstrated the major dilemma of the modern world—the rootlessness of language, the divorce of language from meaning. His drama remains a living reminder of the moral decline which inevitably results when a society preserves the vocabulary of an earlier, humanistic culture, while at the same time operating and thinking on a different basis. The tragedy of his time occurred because life had outstripped language, and Kraus contends that if humanity is to recover its balance, morally speaking, then word, thought, and deed must become one again; an absolute system of morality must replace the bankruptcy of ethical relativism. In this day of "the big lie," the totalitarian state, and the powerful press, Kraus's formulation of the problem of language and his solution are as vital¹² and as valid as when this tragedy was written, and will remain so as long as men are bound to language as a means of communication.

University of California, Riverside

¹² The current effect on Germany of the breakdown of language during the Nazi period has been discussed by George Steiner, "The Hollow Miracle," *The Reporter*, Feb. 18, 1960, pp. 34 ff.

THE "DISEASED" ARTIST ACHIEVES A NEW "HEALTH"
THOMAS MANN'S *LOTTE IN WEIMAR*

By WILLIAM V. GLEBE

Thomas Mann's now familiar concept of artistic genius as having a bond with "disease" is based largely upon the romanticists' ideas about genius and illness, upon Schopenhauer's pessimistic credo of the artist's noble vocation to suffer, and upon Nietzsche's definition of the human being as "das kranke Tier." Although Mann supplied variations on these themes according to his own lights, he never succeeded in overcoming his early belief that the artist, the highest manifestation of man, was afflicted with a kind of "disease" peculiar to him alone.

This artist's "disease" has special connotations for Thomas Mann;¹ it has both organic and psychical facets which, when added together, constitute everything that distinguishes the *Künstler* from the unproblematical naïveté of the average *Bürger*. The disease of the artist accounts, then, for the hyperrefinement of the artist's aesthetic sense and for the acuity of his critical intellect, but also for his lack of vitality. In the conflict between art and life, the main subject of Mann's early tales, the artist has hardly a chance of survival. However, in the course of Mann's development, the artist's disease loses its destructive character. Tonio Kröger rejects the lure of death in favor of a positive assertion of life, which anticipates Mann's turning away from the romantic heritage toward the classical tradition as represented by Goethe. In spite of certain relapses, for instance in *Der Tod in Venedig*, the mature works of Thomas Mann, beginning with *Der Zauberberg*, reflect his search for a reconciliation of disease and health, art and life, the outcast-artist and the human community. The climax of this development comes in the Goethe-novel, *Lotte in Weimar*,² in which the genius of Goethe achieves the great synthesis by transforming the artist's disease into a creative power which is completely integrated in the ironic polarity of his personality.

It was in accord with Thomas Mann's new and wider interest in humanity after *Der Zauberberg* that Goethe should come more and more into his line of vision. It was not that his interest in Goethe began only at the time he published his essay "Goethe und Tolstoi" (1922).³ Rather it was that Goethe, the man and the poet, the renowned and universally accepted symbol of Germany and its people,

¹ I dealt in detail with the ramifications of the artist's "disease" in my doctoral dissertation, "The Relationship Between Art and Disease in the Works of Thomas Mann" (University of Washington, 1959); L. C. Card No. Mic. 60-857.

² Thomas Mann, *Lotte in Weimar* (Stockholm, 1958). Subsequent citations will be to pages in this edition.

³ Thomas Mann, *op. cit.*, in *Adel des Geistes* (Stockholm, 1955), pp. 157-273.

seemed after World War I—and all the more so in view of the second great holocaust taking shape when this new work was being conceived—to offer a unique example of the ambivalent qualities which constitute the German character. More than that, it was a matter of presenting Goethe as the *Weltdichter*, the world poet-artist, the philosophy of whose works was universally applicable, and of showing Goethe as the supreme embodiment of the "middle road" where Tonio Kröger had once upon a time walked with such trepidation.

Lotte in Weimar is a study of the German artist-genius who, for Thomas Mann, is the greatest of them all. Goethe in this work is all that the artist had come to mean to Mann since that long-ago time when little Herr Friedemann, a pigeon-breasted, aesthetically minded hunchback defeated by life, crawled to the edge of the river and deliberately drowned himself. Basically, the work offers no striking change in Mann's earlier judgment concerning the relation of the artist to his vocation and to life. Yet there had to be some special reason for his choice of Goethe as a hero: what *Lotte in Weimar* does is emphasize a side of the artist which took on infinite value when Hans Castorp deserted the magic mountain for the bourgeois world "down below"—the "natural" side, the side which bound Hans to life, after all. Thomas Mann saw Goethe as the artist-Bürger par excellence.

Mann wrote in "Goethe und Tolstoi": "Auch das naturgesegneteste Genie ist niemals im Sinne des Philisters natürlich, d.h. gesund, normal und nach der Regel."⁴ We know that this refers to Goethe and Tolstoi, the "naïve" artists, as opposed to Schiller and Dostoevski, the "sentimental" artists. The words quoted are important for us here: they link Goethe to all Mann's previous artist-protagonists and, at the same time, place a vast gulf between them and him. The statement makes Goethe, in effect, what we may call a "healthy" "diseased" artist. This is not "speaking in riddles": from Mann's viewpoint, Goethe is "diseased" because he is, in the first instance, an artist; but he is also "healthy"—in contrast to Mann's previous artists—because of the "natural" source and quality of his genius, because he is "naturgesegnet." It is this combination which, in the final analysis, enabled Goethe to achieve such artistic greatness without having to lose contact with life, as did Hans Castorp for a time.

We recall that Hanno Buddenbrook, the Bajazzo, Tonio Kröger, Gustav von Aschenbach—and Thomas Mann himself—all had their "Lust zu fabulieren," like Goethe, from their mothers. The dualistic character compounded of father-mother qualities is one of the basic symptoms of the "disease" of Thomas Mann's artists. In the course of his thought-monologue in *Lotte in Weimar*, musing upon the characteristics he has inherited from his "querulous" and "cross-grained, half-witted" father, from his "blithe, happy-natured" mother and other forebears, Mann's Goethe says: "Wunderlich Gemisch! Wahrschein-

⁴ Mann, *op. cit.*, in *Adel des Geistes*, p. 240.

lich musst ich all meine Geschwister töten, damits in mir ansprechend-genehmere Formen annahm, weltgewinnende—ist aber hinlänglicher Wahnsinn übrig in mir, als Untergrund des Glanzes . . ." (p. 296). In other words, Goethe has just the right blend of qualities from his parents and other relatives. Herein lies the difference between Goethe and Hanno Buddenbrook, for example: the latter had no such blend in his nature, and hence was too weak to withstand life. Tonio Kröger, however, was acutely aware of traits inherited from his father and mother, and he was already able to achieve a certain compromise between them and to utilize them to a degree for his own benefit.

In Goethe the blend of characteristics from his forebears is perfected; in him this aspect of the artist's disease attains its highest value. Mann's Goethe is having his hair dressed by his barber; pursuing his daydreaming, Goethe's eyes light upon his own hand, broad and firm, shaped by generations of blacksmiths and butchers—a hand which does not fit at all with the soft and silky hair of his head, upon which the barber has just remarked. Overcome by the mystery of his own splendid being, Goethe is moved to consider all that has gone into the making of the great genius symbolized by that hand:

Was muss an Zartheit und Tüchtigkeit, an Schwäche und Charakter, infirmité und Derbheit, Wahnsinn und Vernunft, ermöglichter Unmöglichkeit sich glücklich-zufällig verbunden, durch die Jahrhunderte sich familiär herangemischt haben, damit am Ende das Talent, das Phänomen erscheine? Am Ende. Erst eine Reihe Böser oder Guter bringt endlich das Entsetzen, bringt die Freude der Welt hervor. Den Halbgott und das Ungeheuer . . . (p. 293)

This line of thought brings him to reflect upon the contradictory character of Nature, which does not seem to draw any lines between the good and the evil, does not appear to distinguish between disease and health, allowing the morbid to give birth to joy and healing. He addresses Nature:

Zuerst bist du mir durch mich selbst gegeben—ich ahnde dich am tiefsten durch mich selbst. Darüber gabst du mir Bescheid: Erhalten Geschlechter sich lange, so kommts, dass, ehe sie aussterben, ein Individuum erscheint, das die Eigenschaften seiner sämtlichen Ahnen in sich begreift und alle bisher vereinzelt und andedeuteten Anlagen vereinigt und vollkommen ausspricht. Sauber formuliert, sorgsam-lehrhaft bemerkt, den Menschen zu besserer Kenntnis,—Wissenschaft der Natur, besonnen abgezogen vom eignen nicht geheueren Sein. (p. 293)

There is a ring of the familiar in some of the above—it reminds us of what is the sum and substance of *Buddenbrooks*. Or it almost sounds as if we were reading again the words of Detlev Spinell in that notoriously high-flown letter to the husband of Gabriele Klöterjahn at Sanatorium Einfried: "Ein altes Geschlecht, zu müde bereits und zu edel zur Tat und zum Leben, steht am Ende seiner Tage, und seine letzten Äusserungen sind Laute der Kunst, ein paar Geigentöne voll von der wissenden Wehmut der Sterbensreife . . ."⁸ Almost like these words—but there is, after all, a great difference. Compare the

⁸ Thomas Mann, "Tristan," in *Novellen* (Berlin, 1925), I, 361.

end of Spinell's statement with that of *Lotte in Weimar's* Goethe: "Saubere formuliert, sorgsam-lehrhaft bemerkt, den Menschen zu besserer Kenntnis. . . ." In the latter it can be seen that Thomas Mann has passed through the *Zauberberg* phase of his career: from the finality of an art ripe for death, he has come to an art concerned with the future, with the enlightenment and betterment of mankind.

The dualistic, ambivalent, biological heritage had resulted, to be sure, in *Buddenbrooks* and *Tristan*, in genius and art; but it was artist-genius morbidly concerned only with itself and hence doomed to uselessness and destruction in death. How vastly different it now appears to Thomas Mann in Goethe, whom he allows to make the claim that he who knows himself to be "Naturziel, Résumé, Vollendung, Apotheose weiss, ein Hoch- und Letztergebnis, das herbeizuführen Natur sich das Umständlichste hat kosten lassen" (p. 293) has the right to be egocentric; in his Goethe, who can assert—with perfect equanimity and belief in the justness of his assertion—that the world has found in him its issue, because in him the most dangerous native tendencies have been "überwunden, genützt, verklärt, versittlicht. . . zum Guten und Grossen gewendet und gezwungen" (pp. 293-94).

Thomas Mann freely admitted to the fascination which the pathological held for him;⁶ the fact that he makes liberal mention in *Lotte in Weimar* of the many illnesses which plagued Goethe during his lifetime leaves little doubt that Mann was convinced that they were directly related to Goethe's artistic genius and productivity. Goethe himself is made to express sentiments about disease which are clearly those of Thomas Mann. On one occasion he remarks to his ailing secretary, Johannes: "Krankheit hat ja auch ihr Vorteilhaftes, sie ist ein Dispens und eine Befreiung. . ." (p. 306). Here is an echo of what Hans Castorp said to Clavdia Chauchat about her disease making her "free," making her *genial*.⁷ Moreover, it points forward to the later novel, *Doktor Faustus*, in which Adrian Leverkühn contracts syphilis so that he may be free to pursue his art in the *genialischen* realms into which this disease transports his mind.

This desire for intellectual freedom is fundamental to the artist's disease, just as is his dualism of character. It means an innate, in-born urge, even a need, to think in terms other than those of the norm. In the Bajazzo, Hanno Buddenbrook, Tonio Kröger, Gustav von Aschenbach—and again in their creator—it was manifested as soon as they were subjected in the normal course of events to a process of formal education. All found "school education" dull and gained little from it. Goethe, in *Lotte in Weimar*, fits this pattern perfectly. Speaking to Lotte of Goethe's ideas on education, Riemer says that Goethe thinks of it as a process of "ripening" which, in the

⁶ Cf. Thomas Mann, "Vorwort zu einer Bildermappe," in *Rede und Antwort* (Berlin, 1925), p. 353.

⁷ Cf. Thomas Mann, *Der Zauberberg* (Berlin, 1925), II, 427.

right circumstances, may be left more or less alone. The question arises as to Goethe's seeming genius at being able to make so much more than anyone else of the facts and knowledge which come into his possession. What Goethe does, and what makes all the difference, Riemer declares, is that he adds himself, puts his own stamp and image upon that which he has picked up, and so gives the lie to persons who actually have had a better training than he: "andere schuf-ten, schürfen, läutern und horten; aber der König schlägt Dukaten heraus" (p. 73). This faculty Riemer defines as personality. And it is Goethe's personality which, in Thomas Mann's view, puts him at the top of his roster of artist-heroes. In other words, it is in the other side of his "disease," in the psychological side, the seat of man's personality, that the difference between Goethe and Mann's previous artists lies.

Speaking further in "Goethe und Tolstoi" of the genius blessed by nature and of his divergence from the norm, Mann continues: "Da bleibt . . . im Psychischen immer viel den Durchschnitt Befremdendes, ihn unheimlich Berührendes, dem Psychopathischen Nahes. . . ." How, then, does the personality, the psychological side of Goethe in *Lotte in Weimar*, bear this out? Riemer calls him a "Proteus, der sich in alle Formen verwandelt und in allen zuhause ist, der zwar immer Proteus, aber immer ein anderer ist und recht eigentlich sein Sach' auf nichts gestellt hat. . ." (p. 85). Of this Proteus-genius, renowned and respected, loved and revered, as poet, playwright, novelist, statesman, scientist, and *grand gentilhomme*, we learn that he often displays sullenness, disgust, helplessness, pedantry, intolerance, coldness, aloofness, stiffness, a defensive formality hiding secret embarrassment, sudden fatigue, desire for solitude, crotchiness, affectation, periods when he seems as though possessed. He is variously referred to as a tyrant and a parasite, as charming and inconsiderate; he is an admixture of naïveté and extraordinary intellectual gifts, of modesty and prodigious vanity and self-conscious egocentricity, of zeal and indifference, passion and contempt.

Here is a man who goes to extremes in all he says and does, yet whose key is always measured and sober, always in the middle register; a man who is said to be tolerant with a tolerance compounded of love and indifference and disdain. He does not wish to offend the majority of "good folk" with whom he likes to mingle, yet he is always on the side of aristocratic privilege and favors making distinguished exceptions the rule. He has a quick and perceptive mind, a lively intelligence, a retentive memory; his is not an improvising mind, however, but one which hesitates and procrastinates, is circumstantial, fitful, tires easily, and can never stick to one thing for very long, so that it often takes its possessor years to complete a work. It is a nature given to slow unfolding, with a tendency to secrecy about the work upon which it is engaged; its essence is indus-

* Mann, *op. cit.*, in *Adel des Geistes*, p. 240.

try, patience, audacity—and it is the latter which the master is said to have claimed as alone constituting talent. Ultimately, we understand that here is a poet who basically is contemptuous of art and yet is its greatest champion, who unites absolute art and all-embracing irony, the All and the Nothing, Nature and Spirit—who is, in short, all man and all god.

Some of this smacks of the Lübeck-born Thomas Mann himself. This is not surprising, for what we have found out about Goethe binds him undeniably to Mann's artists who came before *Lotte in Weimar* and, therefore, to their prototype and creator, Thomas Mann. Mann's Goethe embodies in extreme measure the dualism, the ambivalence, that two-in-oneness which is at the root of the disease of the artist. But there is something more, as we said earlier, that justifies Mann's choice of Goethe as the hero of a new work: that something lies in the fact that Goethe, although in Mann's view afflicted with all the facets of the artist's disease contained in himself and in all the artists previously created by him, is the artist blessed not alone by spirit, but by nature as well. He is a "diseased" artist who has attained to a new "health"; he represents the reconciliation of the previously irreconcilable; he is the perfect union of the natural and the spiritual, of the at once human and godlike. It is Riemer, perhaps best qualified of all Lotte's visitors, who gives us the one word needed to sum up the effects of the disease of the artist upon Goethe as Thomas Mann sees it: that word is harmony.

This Goethe is the "true-life" harmonious whole for which Thomas Mann had striven in his own life, the harmonious whole which was foreshadowed in the imaginary Tonio Kröger and approached, if not completely realized, in Hans Castorp; a human being in whose gaze "aus einem Auge der Himmel und die Liebe und aus dem anderen die Hölle der eisigsten Negation und der vernichtendsten Neutralität hervorschaut." This gaze, Riemer continues, "ist der Blick der Kunst, der absoluten Kunst, welche zugleich die absolute Liebe und die absolute Vernichtung oder Gleichgültigkeit ist und jene erschreckende Annäherung ans Göttlich-Teuflische bedeutet, welche wir, 'Grösse' nennen" (pp. 79-80). It is the blessing of nature and spirit, which is the blessing of humanity as a whole and probably, as Riemer suggests, its curse as well. It is Goethe blessed with "the blessings of heaven above, blessings of the deep that lieth under."⁹ Riemer explains to Lotte:

Denn da haben wir nun das ... Phänomen der Grösse, des grossen Menschen,—welcher in der Tat ebenso sehr *Mensch* als *gross* ist, insofern jener Segensfluch, jene apprehensive menschliche Doppelsituation in ihm zugleich auf die *Spitze* getrieben und *aufgehoben* erscheint,—ich sage *aufgehoben* in dem Sinne, dass ... die Segenscombination, oben von Himmel herab und von der Tiefe, die unten liegt, jedes fluchhaften Einschlages entbehrt, zur Formel wird einer, ich will nicht sagen: demutlosen, aber ungedemütigten und absolut vornehmen Harmonie und Erceanlichkeit. (p. 81)

⁹ Genesis xlvii: 12.

The essence of Goethe, then, is harmony—that means unity, compromise, reconciliation, mediation, the “middle road” in Thomas Mann’s terms. What Riemer has so all-inclusively expressed, Goethe confirms in *Lotte in Weimar*:

Ist nicht Versöhnung und Ausgleich all mein Betreiben und meine Sache Bejahen, Geltenlassen und Fruchtbarmachen des Einen wie des Anderen, Gleichgewicht, Zusammenklang? Nur alle Kräfte zusammen machen die Welt, und wichtig ist jede, jede entwickelnswert, und jede Anlage vollendet sich nur durch sich selbst. Individualität und Gesellschaft, Bewusstheit und Naivität, Romantik und Tüchtigkeit,—beides, das andre immer auch und gleich vollkommen,—aufnehmen, einbeziehen, das Ganze sein, die Partisanen jedes Princips beschämen, indem man es vollendet. . . . Humanität als universelle Ubiquität . . . im leichten, tiefen Spiel will ich exemplarische Versöhnung feiern, will das magisch reimende Gemüt umwölkten Nordens mit dem Geist trimetrisch ewiger Bläue sich gatten lassen zur Erzeugung des Genius. (p. 298)

It would be superfluous to ask why there is so much of “unity,” “reconciliation,” “compromise,” “harmony,” in a work from Thomas Mann which appeared in 1939. Not only does Goethe symbolize the new “health” to which Mann himself had come after his experiences with disease and death from the beginning of his work through *Der Zauberberg*; he is the embodiment of the perfect union of nature and spirit, of the dualism inherent in human life, and Mann holds him up to the German nation and to the world as the model for salvation from universal catastrophe. Says his Goethe:

Ich bin die braune Lindheimerin in Mannsgestalt, bin Schoss und Samen, die androgyne Kunst, bestimmbar durch alles, aber, bestimmt durch mich, bereichert das Empfangene die Welt. So solltens die Deutschen halten, darin bin ich ihr Bild und Vorbild. Welt-empfangend und welt-beschenkend . . . gross durch Verstand und Liebe, durch Mittlertum, durch Geist. . . . (p. 304)

For, when Thomas Mann wrote *Lotte in Weimar*, death was stalking Europe and the universe—another reason for choosing Goethe as a protagonist. Mann had turned away from death with *Der Zauberberg*. Goethe was of a nature, as August tells Lotte in the novel, “die ihn die Berührung mit Tod und Gruft meiden lässt” (p. 211). The literary successor to Hans Castorp refused to think of death; he was not interested in it, but rather in life: “All Heroismus liegt in der Ausdauer, im Willen zu leben, und nicht zu sterben. . . .” (p. 266). This is a final piece of evidence that Thomas Mann’s artist had achieved a new “health”; at the same time, it represents Mann’s own revitalized view of life. There is no Schopenhauerian longing for escape in death in *Lotte in Weimar*; on the contrary, there is a positive Nietzschean will to live. But it is a will to live for good, for the enlightenment of humanity, not for nationalistic power and morbid, evil enslavement of mankind on the basis of a philosophy become perverted in the hands of self-styled “supermen.”

Lotte in Weimar represents, then, the apex of the altered philosophical and creative trend which had emerged in Thomas Mann from his writing of *Der Zauberberg*. The possibilities of a militant human-

ism, by which Mann had attempted to arrive at a synthesis of individualism and collectivism, had already become apparent in his *Joseph tales*.¹⁰ Mann sees Goethe as such a synthesis in the person of the artist-genius. This new work, with Goethe as the hero, had made it possible for Thomas Mann to pose anew the question of the antithesis of the individualistic artist and the collective *Bürger*, a question which had dominated his existence from the outset of his career. In Goethe, Mann believed he had found in the fullest measure a happy and healthy fusion of these two apparently irreconcilable polarities; as such, the poet seemed the ultrafavorable model to recommend for the attainment of a healthier humanity.

Thomas Mann had turned to Goethe in search of justification for his own ironical state of mind; he sought to find in the great German the forces which would enable him, Thomas Mann, to counteract the irresistible claims which Wagner, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche had made upon him for so long.¹¹ Through Goethe, in *Lotte in Weimar*, Mann reached what we may term a creative compromise. While the artist, "diseased" as he is, cannot rid himself wholly of all his decadent proclivities, he can, as proved by Goethe, check and control them and attain to a highly desirable harmony between them and other conflicting elements in his nature and in the external world—and thus maintain his "health." *Lotte in Weimar* signified the establishment of such an equilibrium in Mann's creative career. To all appearances, he had forsworn the dark and suffering isolation of Schopenhauer's world and the sensual allure of death in Wagner's music in favor of life and mankind; the lure of Nietzsche's "sick animal" had seemingly been replaced by the "healthy" human being. Time alone could supply the answer to the question whether Thomas Mann, now "of the world" and "in the world," as it were—i.e., as compared to pre-Zauberberg times—would be able to maintain this new psychological balance, his own new creative "health."

Ohio Wesleyan University

¹⁰ Cf. Gerhard Loose, *Thomas Mann and the Problem of Decadence*, University of Colorado Studies, Series B, I (October, 1941), 441-42.

¹¹ Cf. Erich Heller, *The Ironic German: A Study of Thomas Mann* (London, 1958), p. 29.

DANTE'S FRANCESCA AND THE TACTICS OF LANGUAGE

By GLAUCO CAMBON

Since writing this essay in its original form, I have read Renato Poggioli's *PMLA* article¹ which convincingly argues some of the main points I was trying to make—namely, that Dante feels a deep compassion for the two unhappy Ravenna lovers but does not absolve them, that consequently the episode is “truly infernal” instead of eccentric to the total design of the *Inferno*, and that Francesca's implicit self-condemnation includes a poignant critique of dubious “romantic” literature, as well as of its irresponsible use. There is, according to Poggioli, a “tension between the ethos of contemplation and the pathos of experience . . . the artistic achievement lies in the fact that the poem reconciles within itself Dante the witness of the wretched misery of man, and Dante the beholder of the awful majesty of God.”

The subsequent publication of Domenico Vittorini's Italian essays in book form,² however, encourages me to set forth my ideas, in the hope that other elements of understanding will be added to Poggioli's masterful, but far from exhaustive, treatment (it will be recalled that Vittorini, resuming an old romantic position, sees Francesca as a paradisaical figure, in but not of Hell). And Poggioli's interpretation itself may bear revision when, in order to refute the current view of Francesca's style as *Dolce Stil Nuovo*, he maintains that she “speaks not in verse but in prose,” and sees her speech as “rhetorical stylization.” I feel he is overstating his case here for the sake of a sane polemic, and I am also uneasy about his denial of a tragic status to Francesca da Rimini in Dante's *Divina Commedia*. It is the whole poem as such that progresses beyond tragedy, while Paolo and Francesca are locked in it as examples of fallen nobility.

It will be noted that Francesca's account may be divided into two parts, spaced by Dante's moved silence and the attendant exchange with Virgil; and both times she begins to speak at the express request of the poet—a trait of modesty which shows her to be a born gentlewoman (Pier delle Vigne, Farinata, and other rugged males do not have to be solicited to speak). The same breeding shows in her oblique mention of the murderous husband, who appears in her discourse anonymously, and only once—when evoked by the word “morte”:

¹ Renato Poggioli, “Tragedy or Romance? A Reading of the Paolo and Francesca Episode in Dante's *Inferno*,” *PMLA*, LXXII (1957), 313-58.

² Domenico Vittorini, “Francesca da Rimini and the *Dolce Stil Nuovo*,” *High Points in the History of Italian Literature* (New York, 1958), pp. 68-81.

Amor condusse noi ad una morte:
Caina attende chi a vita ci spense.⁸
(*Inferno* V, 106-107)

This could be termed a poetical execution. The lady refers to Gianciotto in the quickest possible way, as if to avoid touching a repulsive object, and she makes it explicitly clear that he indeed finds himself in the lowest pit of Hell, as indicated by the tenor of the vocabulary used (the constellation of deathly references—"morte-Caina-spense"). By refusing to name him, or even to qualify his relationship to herself, she preserves her feminine modesty and shows how really remote from her thoughts he is. Paolo is her man, not this legal husband who married her almost by proxy and for political reasons; and Paolo arose first in her speech, in connection with love. Even him she refrains from naming directly; he is referred to as "costui." Modesty again, intensified by love; but note how qualitatively different that gestural pronoun is from the frozen impersonality of "chi."

It is indeed fitting that Gianciotto Malatesta, the cruel avenger who did not hesitate to inflict on his carefully spied relations the fate Hamlet once would have liked to mete out to another kind of kinsman, should end up in ice. Whatever the wrong suffered by him, or rather by the divine sacrament of marriage, he is more sinning than sinned against; he represents abstract legality and death. For this, and for not having given her a chance to save her soul (and Paolo's), she resents him as a sneaking murderer: "e 'l modo ancor m'offende." She refuses to give him even a semblance of life in her narrative—which accounts for her using the passive form the first time she mentions her death ("della bella persona / che mi fu tolta"), rather than introduce him as an agent. Indeed, when she has to acknowledge his existence at all, she does so by making him a passive object of action in the formal convention of discourse—a verbal stratagem of retribution.

Once the references to death enter her account, however, the story is told, and her own silence, unlike her listener's, has a deathlike finality. She has given him a concentrated biography, from the alpha of birthplace to the omega of murder. It is now Dante the man, the fool and hero of love, who cannot accept such headstone finality; accordingly, he will now put a direct question to her, as he had not done the first time:

Ma dimmi: al tempo de' dolci sospiri
a che e come concedette amore
che conosceste i dubbiosi disiri?

This way the elicited answer will conclude the interview on the note

⁸ My quotations from the *Commedia* are all from Vandelli's critical edition of *La Divina Commedia*, Testo critico della Società Dantesca Italiana, sedicesima edizione (Milano, 1955); and I omit passage reference numbers when quoting further from the canto of Francesca.

of love—another tribute of Dante to the conjured victim, in the form of a symbolic reaffirmation of love in the face of death. He has carefully chosen his question. He wants to know how the fateful love was mutually revealed: namely, the turning point of the two interlocked lives, marking the climax of happiness and the beginning of doom. He narrows the focus of dialogue to grasp in a flash his interlocutor's essential reality, just as the face of destiny—sinful love—was an instant's revelation for the two lovers:

Per più fiate li occhi ci sospinse
quella lettura, e scolorocci il viso;
ma solo un punto fu quel che ci vinse.

It is toward this "punto" that the enveloping tactics of language have been moving all along, and on it pivots Francesca's harrowed memory. This was the moment of decision, the kiss of fate:

questi, che mai da me non fia diviso,
la bocca mi baciò tutto tremante. . . .

We are now at the center of the whirlwind with Dante and Francesca; the absolute focus has been reached through firm graduality, from an initial confused perception of wails, yells, and forms turning around in darkness to a recognition of their state, to an occasional identification of some of the fleeting crowd's members, to the choice of two of them for personal colloquy. And the colloquy itself has passed from the general exposition of its first part to the completely intimate revelation of the second part; from an account of the birth, growth, and workings of love in the distended arc of time to its sudden breakthrough in the perpendicular of an irrevocable moment. This reaches the highest poetical intensity by concentrating everything—love, sin, death, damnation—in the ideal projection of a kiss:

Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse:
quel giorno più non vi leggemmo avanti.

In her story, Francesca has moved from sequential, historical time to the pivotal instant, and this in turn becomes her eternity, the revolving timelessness of damnation. She sums herself up in her last words by telescoping everything she and Paolo were, and did, and are, in one final gesture of reticence. In the act of disappearing, like so many Dante figures, she is realized; and we must be careful not to interpret her concluding line too narrowly. She is thinking primarily of the embrace that followed that kiss and sealed the sinful couple's fate; "quel giorno" is the first day of fulfilled love (deceptive though such fulfillment may be in terms of Dante's ethics) and not, chronologically speaking, the day of physical death. Gianciotto is by now safely removed from her thought, having been disposed of in the way we saw; but she puts it as if time had stood still, and this expresses both her natural desire to prolong the climactic instant forever and the nemesis visited upon it. Thus the implication of violent

du Lac—a love story that pandered to passion instead of sobering it: "Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse." Her insistence on the verb "leggere" (to read) and derivatives in the second part of her speech (four times in twelve lines!), her knowing reference to Virgil as "dottore" (Dante's teacher and mentor), and the fact, unknown to her but not to her audience, that she is talking to a writer, seem to clinch the point in this regard. Dante had written Chapter XXV of *La Vita Nuova* and the entire *Convivio* as a plea for responsible art; the clear example of it, Virgil, is present in this scene in such a way that a telling comparison of his *Aeneid* with the meretricious story *Lancelot du Lac* is inevitable. And we may add that the *Commedia* itself, as a poem in the making, exemplifies the good use of literature in its relation to the Latin epic.

Francesca and Paolo succumbed to romantic literature and duplicated its seductive image in their lives; Dante lets the lesson sink in. (Don Quixote will be a later, and comic, version of the same predicament, except that his romanticism, by placing Dulcinea in the sphere of unattainable fantasy, will escape, if not the confusion of reality and fiction to which the Ravenna couple fall prey, at least their ultimate catastrophe.) Virgil's discretion in the whole scene adds to his stature; he lets Dante do all the talking and never intrudes except to prod his overwhelmed disciple on to further questioning after Francesca's first declaration:

china' il viso, e tanto il tenni basso,
fin che 'l poeta mi disse: "Che pense?"

This is the Virgil who stands to Dante, in the latter's poem, as wisdom to youth, as teacher to pupil; the guide who, in *Purgatorio* XVII-XVIII, will clarify the problems of love, which can err through a wrong choice of object or through excess or lack of strength. The retrospective focus on Francesca's Canto is obvious, and so is the reason why Virgil, while respecting Dante's compassion, tactfully urges him to draw Francesca out. Thus it seems to me that the ethical point of the Canto, dramatically and not didactically made, does not exclude the tragic dignity of Francesca herself, as Poggioli seems to believe.

At any rate, if De Sanctis, Croce, Maud Bodkin,⁵ and Domenico

⁵ See *De Sanctis on Dante*, essays edited and translated by Joseph Rossi and Alfred Galpin (Madison, Wisconsin, 1957), pp. 33-52; Francesco de Sanctis, *Lezioni sulla Divina Commedia*, a cura di Michele Manfredi (Bari, 1955), pp. 137-47 *et passim*. These essays, which represent lecture drafts or notes from his Dante courses as given first in Turin and then in Zurich from 1854 to 1857, contain precious elements for our understanding of De Sanctis and Dante, and are actually the headwaters of his 1866 *Saggi critici*, including the one on Francesca da Rimini in its final form. See also his *Storia della letteratura italiana* (1870-1871). As for Benedetto Croce, I refer here to his *La poesia di Dante* (Bari, 1921). Finally, Maud Bodkin, in *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry* (New York, 1934; reprinted by Vintage Books, New York, 1958), concurs with De Sanctis' vindication of earthly love in connection with Francesca. See especially Chap. IV, "The Image of Woman."

Vittorini had seen the episode as something more than just episodic, by relating it to the over-all drama of Dante's education, their several contributions would be less misleading than they actually are despite their respective degrees of brilliancy. Because they find the episode poetically self-contained (which is true of several others in the *Commedia*, but only to some extent), or because they are uneasy about the relegation of great love to Hell, they have to make it totally eccentric to the general pattern; and it escapes them that this eccentricity, if it exists, is not the one of a comet, but springs from the inner circles of the system and ultimately rejoins a stable orbit. Powerful centrifugal forces are at work in Dante's soul as he undertakes his journey, but he knows that they must be counteracted by a centripetal pull:

e io sol uno
m'apparecchiava a sostener la guerra
sì del cammino e sì della pietate,
che ritrarrà la mente che non erra.
(*Inferno* II, 3-6)

The ordeal of compassion in the first stage of the trip through Hell and the ordeal of terror, hatred, and disgust in the subsequent ones are prerequisites of the Aristotelian tragic catharsis that will make a new man out of the bewildered pilgrim, who is the poetic focus of the action, not just its mechanical pretext. We can forget that Dante is not Lawrence or Byron or even Goethe, and we can condemn his condemnations, or try to catch him napping and riven inwardly between theological judgment and his human sympathy. But all this is a necessary tension in the poem; it is objectified as Dante's "bewildered"* condition that necessitates the intervention of Beatrice and Virgil. Without the objective system (which is not of itself the structure of the poetry, but which makes it possible) there would be no *Divina Commedia*, and even the individual episodes we justly admire for their dramatic surprise would lack the resilience that represents the degree of freedom paradoxically arising within a tight pattern of absolute norms.

This is not to say that the single episodes are to be seen as simple functions of the total pattern or as pedagogical exemplifications of the underlying doctrine. There is in every case the emergent thrust of poetry, its *principium individuationis* which both demonstrates and transcends the over-all idea. Paolo and Francesca, at the passionate call of Dante, provisionally leave their orbit to re-enter it in a short while; actually, they have not pulled free from it, but have only varied and widened it for the benefit of poetry's prying eye. Likewise, their whole episode is not tangential to the *Inferno* or to the solar system

* As everybody remembers, Dante is lost in a dark wood at the outset, and shortly after (*Inferno* II, 141) describes his decision to follow Virgil's guide through the wilderness of Hell as an entering "per lo cammino alto e silvestro." He can be said to find himself in a situation of poetically literal and allegorically moral "bewilderment."

of the *Commedia*, whose complex harmony results from the elasticity of thrust and counterthrust.

As a consequence, Vittorini's responsive interpretation of this Canto as a *Dolce Stil Nuovo* achievement, to be viewed entirely in the light of the *Vita Nuova*, and his definition of the murdered heroine of love as a sister of Beatrice, need careful re-examination. Much of what has been said before would already suffice to question it; but the best way to follow that to its logical completion is to venture into the labyrinth of language, keeping in mind the results thus obtained by Auerbach or Spitzer.⁷ One further reason to try the experiment would be to broaden Poggioni's somewhat drastic reductions as mentioned above, although I feel closer to his viewpoint than to most others.

To begin with, when Vittorini links Francesca with Beatrice, he implies only an affinity, based on the atmosphere of gentleness created by Dante's sympathy, by expressions like "Amor, ch'al cor gentil ratto s'apprende" or "ch'amor di nostra vita dipartille,"⁸ and by the very insistence of the word *love*. Actually, Dante is instructed by Francesca in love, as he will be later on by Beatrice—but how differently, and how important it is to realize that the couple Paolo-Francesca is what the other couple, Dante-Beatrice, might have become had they yielded to expediency!

This oppositional parallelism, covering the dangers and use of passion, corresponds to the other antipodal similarity which bears out, in the episode, the possibilities implicit in the use of literature: Francesca-Lancelot du Lac versus Dante-Virgil. Francesca and Beatrice are related to each other like the two faces of the moon, and the antithesis is so subtle that a glimpsed ray of lost Paradise illumines Francesca's visage, while a deadly power inheres, before Dante is ready for it, in Beatrice's radiance. Francesca is a victim, self-defeated despite all the extenuating circumstances Dante knows, and Beatrice a victor; the former shows him love as despair, the latter introduces him to heavenly joy. Both tests can be too much for the mortal mind, and Dante in both situations struggles to regain control, only to lose it, finally, in a swoon which represents the zero point of experience. In Hell its counterpart only culminates the "war of compassion," but still it makes memorable punctuation. This pattern is one of the double-star systems that could be added to those von Richthofen⁹ describes in the poem with his philological telescope.

The matrix of the Francesca-Beatrice antithesis is to be found in the first poem of *La Vita Nuova*, the sonnet Dante addressed to Cavalcanti and other connoisseurs of love in the hope of obtaining an ac-

⁷ Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis* (Bern, 1946; Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1957), particularly the chapter on Farinata. As for Leo Spitzer, I have been unable so far to secure a copy of his essay on the *Vita Nuova*, but his studies in Romance literatures, conducted as they are on the basis of linguistics and style, are revealing.

⁸ It will be noticed how Dante here makes Love a fatal power, and his line anticipates (grammatically and semantically) Francesca's first speech.

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ceptable explanation of his troubling dream. Fear, even horror in memory, issued from the godlike youth who in mirth fed the dreamer's heart to the cloaked girl he held in his arms and then vanished in tears. At the time, young Dante could not know that what he asked his friends to do in connection with the cryptic poem was to decipher the main problem of his future career. As Charles Singleton¹⁰ and Maurice Valency¹¹ have said in their studies, the *Vita Nuova* came to crown and transform a medieval tradition of long standing, centering on the ritual of Love, who could be both a ravenous wolf and a nourishing inspiration. The Provençals, cherished by Dante, had known it, and Denis de Rougemont¹² thinks Catharist Manicheism had much to do with it; Singleton interprets the *Vita Nuova* as an imaginative endeavor to domesticate the wild god, retracing a whole culture's steps from Eros to Charity.

In the *Commedia* the dangerous ambiguity of the unruly god is overcome by a strategy of diffraction, which separates the two faces of this double-headed figure—Francesca and Beatrice. Thus in the Francesca episode, after the intellectualizing maneuver of the *Convivio*, a whole stream of European poetry, including the *langue d'oïl* legends of Chrestien de Troyes, the Breton cycle, etc., is tapped. The infinite that a more naïve or earthly romanticism had been trying to grasp in love is now hunted for in another way; but Dante could not have done this unless he had brought to full fruition, in the moving poetry of this Canto, the earlier tendency. That is why this thorough critique of medieval romanticism is at the same time its imaginative peak; and the acme of the vision having been attained in the *Commedia* with Beatrice, it is no wonder that European poetry, after Dante, found it wise not to repeat the attempt. Petrarch, not Dante, was to be the universal model of love poetry; and in the great writers who grappled with Dante's problem after him, the image of Beatrice would be split into Dulcinea and Gretchen. As for Wagner, he would revert to Tristram and Isolde—the beginning of the tradition.

We cannot, therefore, reduce the Francesca episode to its *Dolce Stil Nuovo* antecedents, if we recognize the nature of its filiation from them. It is, after all, a matter of style; the similarity is offset by the far more complex treatment of language, rhythm, and speech, which by comparison makes Dante's earlier love poetry sound stiff and naïve. Here he has reached maturity: he conducts a richer, suppler orchestra,

¹⁰ Charles Singleton, *An Essay on the Vita Nuova* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949). See also his following *Dante Studies* volumes, the second of which discusses the allegorical structure of the *Inferno*, and the third, published in 1958 by Harvard University Press with the title *Journey to Beatrice*, dwells on the same aspect of the *Purgatorio*. Apart from this, I find of particular interest his explication of the first two Cantos of the *Inferno*, published in the Spring, 1952, issue of *Kenyon Review* (Dante number), along with remarkable contributions by T. S. Eliot, Allen Tate, Francis Fergusson, R. P. Blackmur, Erich Auerbach, and Robert Fitzgerald.

¹¹ Maurice Valency, *In Praise of Love* (New York, 1959).

¹² Denis de Rougemont, *Love in the Western World* (New York, 1940; Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1958).

of the *Commedia*, whose complex harmony results from the elasticity of thrust and counterthrust.

As a consequence, Vittorini's responsive interpretation of this Canto as a *Dolce Stil Nuovo* achievement, to be viewed entirely in the light of the *Vita Nuova*, and his definition of the murdered heroine of love as a sister of Beatrice, need careful re-examination. Much of what has been said before would already suffice to question it; but the best way to follow that to its logical completion is to venture into the labyrinth of language, keeping in mind the results thus obtained by Auerbach or Spitzer.⁷ One further reason to try the experiment would be to broaden Poggioni's somewhat drastic reductions as mentioned above, although I feel closer to his viewpoint than to most others.

To begin with, when Vittorini links Francesca with Beatrice, he implies only an affinity, based on the atmosphere of gentleness created by Dante's sympathy, by expressions like "Amor, ch'al cor gentil ratto s'apprende" or "ch'amor di nostra vita dipartille,"⁸ and by the very insistence of the word *love*. Actually, Dante is instructed by Francesca in love, as he will be later on by Beatrice—but how differently, and how important it is to realize that the couple Paolo-Francesca is what the other couple, Dante-Beatrice, might have become had they yielded to expediency!

This oppositional parallelism, covering the dangers and use of passion, corresponds to the other antipodal similarity which bears out, in the episode, the possibilities implicit in the use of literature: Francesca-Lancelot du Lac versus Dante-Virgil. Francesca and Beatrice are related to each other like the two faces of the moon, and the antithesis is so subtle that a glimpsed ray of lost Paradise illumines Francesca's visage, while a deadly power inheres, before Dante is ready for it, in Beatrice's radiance. Francesca is a victim, self-defeated despite all the extenuating circumstances Dante knows, and Beatrice a victor; the former shows him love as despair, the latter introduces him to heavenly joy. Both tests can be too much for the mortal mind, and Dante in both situations struggles to regain control, only to lose it, finally, in a swoon which represents the zero point of experience. In Hell its counterpart only culminates the "war of compassion," but still it makes memorable punctuation. This pattern is one of the double-star systems that could be added to those von Richthofen⁹ describes in the poem with his philological telescope.

The matrix of the Francesca-Beatrice antithesis is to be found in the first poem of *La Vita Nuova*, the sonnet Dante addressed to Cavalcanti and other connoisseurs of love in the hope of obtaining an ac-

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ceptable explanation of his troubling dream. Fear, even horror in memory, issued from the godlike youth who in mirth fed the dreamer's heart to the cloaked girl he held in his arms and then vanished in tears. At the time, young Dante could not know that what he asked his friends to do in connection with the cryptic poem was to decipher the main problem of his future career. As Charles Singleton¹⁰ and Maurice Valency¹¹ have said in their studies, the *Vita Nuova* came to crown and transform a medieval tradition of long standing, centering on the ritual of Love, who could be both a ravenous wolf and a nourishing inspiration. The Provençals, cherished by Dante, had known it, and Denis de Rougemont¹² thinks Catharist Manicheism had much to do with it; Singleton interprets the *Vita Nuova* as an imaginative endeavor to domesticate the wild god, retracing a whole culture's steps from Eros to Charity.

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and his approach is firmer. Tonal words are placed in sensitive spots in such a way as to differentiate Francesca from Beatrice, and at the same time the latter's climate is not made totally foreign to this subterranean sky. Few polarities are so effective in literature. Hawthorne's Miriam-Hilda binomial is too abstract; Melville's Isabel-Lucy ambiguity, in *Pierre*, has rare moments, but does not compare with this Dante constellation, to which he keeps referring in that unevenly beautiful grotesque of a novel.

To be sure, the word *Amor* "Love" dominates the episode from beginning to end, and a hint of his unearthly power is given by the threefold repetition in Francesca's closely packed autobiography:

Amor, ch'al cor gentil ratto s'apprende,
 prese costui della bella persona
 che mi fu tolta; e 'l modo ancor m'offende.
 Amor, ch'a nullo amato amar perdona,
 mi prese del costui piacer sì forte,
 che, come vedi, ancor non m'abbandona.
 Amor condusse noi ad una morte:
 Caina attende chi a vita ci spense.

The number three is never without a symbolic meaning in the *Divina Commedia*, be it analogy of the Trinity (as it vaguely implies here) or its parody (as in Lucifer's case); but in these transfixing lines it fulfills a heightening function. Love is here the destructive god untrammelled by ritual; the swift pace of the verse, telescoping a whole life into a few lines, expresses the weird rapidity of the irresistible destroyer. By placing the noun, raised to name status, at the beginning of the first line of each of the three tercets, and using it each time as the grammatical agent, Francesca shows of what god she was a votary, and how the whole drama was enacted this side of reason. This god was a tyrant; the qualification she will add upon Dante's request as to her margin of free will adds truth and perspective to this unforgettable first account.

The absolute power of Love is here manifested also by the horizontal refraction of the vertical threefold iterative pattern in "Amor, ch'a nullo amato amar perdona": this perpendicular intersection on the page, and in the voice, shows Love as an insistent presence through time (vertical sequence) and in space, spreading from person to fated person. Controlled as it is by rigorous form (but here really engendering it), the repetition raises intensity of feeling to the breaking point—it is hard to see how Poggioli could have read this as "prose" and not "verse." Other traits of the passage contribute to this grand effect, notably the downward movement from "cor gentil" to "morte," and the fact that the beginning of love is described as a fire quickly catching ("ratto s'apprende"), whereas at the end life itself is extinguished ("a vita ci spense"). Love's torch begets a consuming fire which leaves only ashes—and as for the cruel self-avenger, he will be stuck in ice ("Caina").

We have already seen how Love's fiery dominion over the initially captured gentle heart is syntactically stated by Francesca in the dominant, active position she gives to the word "Amor." But if we now look at the verbs it governs, we shall descry a further tyrannical posture to which the lovers passively succumb, for these verbs all express imperious action: "prese" (seized), twice repeated and combining with the initial "s'apprende" into a phonetic and etymological trinity; "non m'abbandona" (does not leave me); "condusse" (led). Against this background, the waiting posture of Hell's deepest circle, icy Caina ("attende") gains in sinister intensity, further enhanced by the faint echo of "apprende" which expressed the start of trouble. Hell itself, in that name Caina, thus becomes a character in the drama, a vulture-like witness who is to wreak vengeance on the slave of revenge and will finally clear the field.

A spontaneous rhetoric in Francesca's talk makes both her and Paolo mere passive objects (even syntactically) of Love's actions, while in her second confession the two lovers appear both as passive objects and agents: her first account gives the subjective phenomenology of love, and her second probes into its crucial groping and occasion.¹³ First, we get a picture of Love as an absolute, as a ravenous cosmic force not unlike the Greek Moira or, better, Hindu Shiva; then, at the indirect suggestion of rational Virgil, this picture is questioned and replaced by a more plausible one which admits relativity and resistance and intelligible secondary causes—and without weakening the power of Eros Turannos, who is said to have "clutched"

¹³ A problem of interpretation is involved in Francesca's expression "la prima radice / del nostro amor." Dante had asked her to tell him the manner and occasion of secret love's mutual revelation between herself and Paolo, but she declares herself ready to let him know the "first root" of their love. Actually, she has already told him in her first speech how love took Paolo of her beautiful person because he had a "gentle heart"; now, her confidential words will describe the manifestation of that love, its rise ("radice") as an acknowledged and consciously shared rapport in the heart and (as we believe) in the flesh. For, despite Dante's awareness of a spurious literary element in Francesca's sin, it would be naïve to interpret her words literally and imply that the reading of *Lancelot du Lac* marked, of itself, the beginning of love in the two siblings-in-law. The irony of their situation is included in the tragedy and does not obliterate it; passion, not only literature, plays a fundamental role in it, as Dante very well knew, for it was common knowledge that Paolo had been employed by his wily brother Gianciotto to woo Francesca for him. Thus Paolo's fiction became reality (in a fatal way), and the other fiction, the story of Lancelot and Guenevere, could act so powerfully on the two unhappy lovers only because of the initial situation—the parallelism is multiple. Still, "prima radice" is a strong expression, and does reverberate on the part played by literature as a seducer. It also contains, however, elements of nontemporal quality, as if Francesca in her reply expanded Dante's words to imply a curiosity about more than the extrinsic occasion of love's reciprocal unveiling; about, in fact, the very nature and essence of that love as borne out by its sudden outburst in the given circumstances. She understands Dante's interest is passionate and far from shallow; he has *affetto*, and he wants to get at the root of things. To reward his tact and concern, she gives him the intimate confession after the initial epitaph, which though beautifully poetical is a bit more official than what follows. In view of this, I would not overplay the "parody" aspect of this episode, as Foggioni does in his remarkable analysis; it would be just as much an oversimplification as the romantic reading that ignores it.

(*strinse*) Lancelot. But by the mere device of letting herself and Paolo appear in her discourse as grammatical agents, Francesca has this time implicitly admitted the existence of responsibility; she and her lover are at least the source of their own actions and not just playthings of fate. It has been seen how this device, instead of creating an anticlimax, sets up a subtler dramatic development in the whole.

One sees the resemblance of Francesca's first image of love to the omnipotent "amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle" at the end of the *Paradiso*, except that hers is an inverted image, in the mirror of death and despair, so that we get also a linguistic inverted image throughout the episode. The last line of the *Paradiso*, just quoted, celebrates Love as moving the sun and the other stars, and thereby resumes and completes the first line of that Cantic: "La gloria di Colui che tutto move." The source of universal movement, which Dante poetically envisages as the ideal goal of his trip through the spheres and as the theme of the whole *Commedia*, is, of course, the Christian God of love seen through the philosophical eyes of Aristotle-Aquinas as the Unmoved Mover; so that when, through the intercession of Beatrice, St. Bernard, and the Virgin, he has attained unison with this Original Impulse, words fail him, and the poem reaches its perfect consummation:

All'alta fantasia qui mancò possa;
ma già volgeva il mio disio, e 'l velle,
sì come rota ch'igualmente è mossa,
l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle.
(*Paradiso* XXXIII, 142-45)

Movement, of the vital, oriented kind centered on God, is here emphasized both on the moral-psychological and on the cosmic level; Dante's "desire" and "will" are now entirely motivated by Divine Love, which is to say that they gravitate on It as do the heavenly bodies. The verb "muovere" (to move) carries, therefore, such a weight that we shall find it only in strategic positions from beginning to end, often coupled with "Amor" as its natural emanation; and the intimacy of this nexus is enhanced by the syllabic echo *amor-move*. Thus, at the outset of the dramatic action, Beatrice's "Prologue in Limbo" to helpful Virgil (as reported by him) goes:

I' son Beatrice che ti faccio andare;
vegno del loco ove tornar disio;
amor mi mosse, che mi fa parlare.
(*Inferno* II, 70-72)

She has received her motivating impulse from Divine Love, and she is communicating it to the Roman poet, who, in his turn, will relay the movement that marks the beginning of salvation to his pupil and ward: "Allor si mosse, e io li tenni retro" (*Inferno* I, 136). Although Virgil's "movement" is severed from direct contact with its divine

source, both linguistically and theologically, it is enough to get Dante started on the way to deliverance:

Così li dissi; e poi che mosso fue,
intraì per lo cammino alto e silvestro.
(*Inferno* II, 141-42)

The significant constellation "amor-muovere" reappears again and again, particularly in *Paradiso* XXIV, where Dante recites his Credo to St. Peter:

Io credo in uno Dio
solo ed eterno, che tutto il ciel move,
non moto, con amore e con disio.
(*Paradiso* XXIV, 130-32)

It appears again in Canto XXVI, where the tourist of Heaven satisfies St. John on the orthodoxy of his views on Love-Caritas:

più che in altra convien che si mova
la mente, amando, di ciascun che cerne
il vero. . . . (*Paradiso* XXVI, 34-36)

Later on in the same Canto, the intercession of Beatrice with Virgil is appropriately commemorated by Adam with the topical verb, "Quindi onde mosse tua donna Virgilio" (*Paradiso* XXVI, 118), where the multivalent intensity of "muovere" could not be improved on; and it reminds us of the Second Canzone in the *Convivio*:

Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona
de la mia donna disiosamente,
move cose di lei meco sovente . . .

with the attendant commentary in *Trattato Terzo* II, 11-12, which equates "to move" with "to feel" as one of the three basic powers of the soul as discussed by Aristotle in *De Anima*. Certainly, in order to "move" Virgil physically, Beatrice had to "move" him psychologically by appealing to his reason and heart; the pun is no mere word-play. As is to be expected, St. Bernard will talk about Beatrice's command to him in the same terms, in Canto XXXI:

A terminar lo tuo disiro
mosse Beatrice me del loco mio. . .
(*Paradiso* XXXI, 65-66)

and he will refer to St. Lucy's initial intercession with Beatrice with the same powerful verb:

siede Lucia, che mosse la tua donna,
quando chinavi, a ruinar, le ciglia.
(*Paradiso* XXXII, 137-38)

But in the Paolo and Francesca episode, although "Amor" is abundantly quoted, the joining echo will be with "morte" (death): "Amor condusse noi ad una morte." This is what can be called an inverted linguistic image of heavenly love as presented in the *Paradiso*; and

the image will be complete if we observe the conspicuous absence, in this Canto of love, of the privileged verb "muovere" and its derivatives. For "muovere," as focused by Dante in the light of his Thomistic philosophy, expresses only purposive movement, and as such appears only as direct or indirect emanation of Divine Love; but the kind of movement to be found in the *Inferno* Circle of Lustful Love is mad, disorderly, and obsessively repetitious, like the whirl of passion itself. Consequently, its proper verbal predicate will be "menare" (to drive, to drag, to carry away), a distorted phonetic echo of "Amor" and "muovere":

e tu allor li priega
per quello amor che i mena, ed ei verranno.¹⁴

The phrase, in Virgil's advice to Dante about securing an interview with the Ravenna lovers, aptly describes their mad gyrations in the wind of undirected passion. No expediency of rhyme or rhythm compelled Dante to use "mena" here instead of, say, "move" or even a less specific verb like "porta"; he meant what he wrote with his usual clarity and preciseness. The nature of the action conveyed by "menare" (chaotic or compulsive movement) is unmistakably emphasized at the beginning of the episode:

La bufera infernal, che mai non resta,
mena li spirti con la sua rapina:
voltando e percotendo li molesta . . .

and shortly after: "di qua, di là, di giù, di su li mena. . ." The fourth time this focal verb appears in the episode, it will have a much less erratic connotation, for Dante has been careful to stress the human dignity of the two unhappy lovers:

quanti dolci pensier, quanto disio
menò costoro al doloroso passo!

The verb here sounds like "condusse" (led) in "Amor condusse noi ad una morte"; yet, if the action seems more rationally oriented and less chaotic than before, it is defined by its term ("doloroso passo," mournful passage) as a negative force.

Another key word, "disio" (desire), though in itself ostensibly unaltered, changes connotation according to whether it is used in an infernal or in a heavenly context; and it appears frequently indeed. It represents the subjective pull of love, which, if thwarted, distorted, or unfulfilled as in Hell, engenders misery, and if aimed at the one object of desire, "l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle," becomes the needle of happiness in the compass of the soul; thus Dante uses "disio" and "velle" at the conclusion of the *Paradiso*, as quoted above. Beatrice says of herself to Virgil, "vegno del loco ove tornar disio," and

¹⁴ It is interesting to observe how even the best modern translators (Binyon, Sayers, Ciardi) are either unaware of this "muovere"-"menare" dichotomy or are unable to render in English its subtle gradations.

Virgil describes his allotted unhappiness as desire without hope, "sanza speme vivemo in disio" (*Inferno* IV, 42), which is a fitting definition of wisdom without fulfillment (= God). Divine justice is manifested in the souls of the damned in a perversion of desire; they yearn to reach their place of torment "à che la tema si volge in disio" (*Inferno* III, 126). But in Canto I of the *Paradiso*, the word connotes fulfillment, not deprivation or masochism:

perchè, appressando sè al suo disire,
nostro intelletto si profonda tanto,
che dietro la memoria non può ire.
(*Paradiso* I, 7-9)

One of Plato's most famous myths, as told in the *Symposium*, has it that Eros (Love) is the child of Poros (Affluence) and Penia (Poverty). Such dialectic of desire we find in Dante, so that we might well consider in a favorable light his recommendation of "Poema Sacro" to Can Grande as a guide to happiness, if by happiness we mean spiritual fulfillment—for that is the great theme of the *Commedia*. Notice, too, that the first time the word *desire* appears in the *Paradiso* (see the above quotation) it shows a paramount semantic change: it no longer means the simple tension of desire toward its object, but the object of desire itself, and thus signalizes our entrance into the realm of Fulfillment.

Here in Francesca's Circle, "disio" is tragically unfulfilled, just as with Virgil it is an expression of quiet, resigned unfulfillment. It acts funereally, by driving the lovers to the "doloroso passo"; it glows with nostalgia—without hope—in the superb simile of the doves:

Quali colombe, dal disio chiamate,
con l'ali alzate e ferme al dolce nido
vegnon per l'aere dal voler portate...

The doves are the birds of love, and here they introduce a ray of Paradise, but only as a foil to the two lovers' distress; there will be no "sweet nest" for the latter! On the other hand, two bird similes have been used before in the Canto to denote the hopelessness of the souls carried around by the gale; the sureness of instinct, as manifested in bird migrations, emerges here as unavertible doom. The contrapuntal play finds its climax in Francesca's use of the word "pace" (peace), twice applied to other subjects than herself; i.e., to Dante:

se fosse amico il re dell'universo
noi pregheremmo lui della tua pace...

and to the Po River seeking peace in the Adriatic Sea, near her birthplace:

Siede la terra dove nata fui
su la marina dove 'l Po discende
per aver pace co' seguaci sui.

Peace is what Dante and the river will have, and Francesca can never

have; that she says it by implication is another proof of her "gentility" and gentleness, but also of Dante's mastery, which shines out in even greater power when we reflect how focally he introduces the word *peace* in the *Paradiso*: "E'n la sua volontade è nostra pace" (*Paradiso* III, 85).

Peace is not inertia, but the transparency of mind and soul fulfilled in the contemplation of God and forever activated by His love "si come ruota ch'igualmente è mossa"; therefore, the word "pace" complements, in Dante's verbal universe, "moto" and "muovere," "amore" and "disio," to indicate what the nature of fulfillment is. And just as he contrapuntally inserts "pace" in Canto V of the *Inferno* to deepen Francesca's despair, he also uses the verb "muovere" there, but only with regard to himself, and as a foil to the lovers' driven unrest:

"e tu allor li priega
per quello amor che i mena, ed ei verranno."
Si tosto come il vento a noi li piega,
mossi la voce: "O anime affannate,
venite a noi parlar, s'altri nol niega!"

The simple fact that Dante can "move" his voice shows he is connected with Beatrice, whom Love moved to speak, and that he will be capable of salvation. Not so the "anime affannate"!

The master of language, just because he knows his words thoroughly and can focus them like nobody else, succeeds in translating the Penia-Poros, Tristram-Francis, Francesca-Beatrice contrast into the tersest, most compact, and irresistible verbal counterpoint to be heard in Western literature. Knowing that true civilization could be founded only on an accurate definition of the wild god of Love, he set out to face the sphinx, and tamed it, but at the cost of total risk for himself. Francesca, Virgil, Ugolino were voices in his soul; and here in Canto V of the *Inferno*, the clash of philosophies becomes a lucidly faced tempest of the heart. Reason or free passion? The alternative was not an academic problem, but the core of his quest and the perpetual impasse of Western civilization down to romanticism and beyond. In the terms of his theological symbols, he saw that passion is a dangerous, if fascinating, animal, and that reason alone is not enough; so, leaving Francesca and Virgil himself behind (after internalizing them), he tried to progress with Beatrice beyond pure reason, yet with reason. Peace and Movement, the Unmoved Mover: neither stasis nor perpetual unrest; he knew this all along, from the moment he dwelt with Francesca in that deceptive Elysium of a moment which was really the eye of the cyclone.

University of Michigan

THE UNITY OF MONTAIGNE IN THE *ESSAIS*

By FLOYD GRAY

The more Montaigne has been studied, the less complex he has been made to seem. Confronted by his multiplicity, scholars of the past half century or so have attempted to organize, to classify, to simplify him. Their main objectives have been twofold: to establish a chronology of the *Essais*, and subsequently to retrace the evolution of Montaigne's thought. One of the first to suggest the possibility of discerning a growth and unfolding in Montaigne's thought was Edme Champion in his *Introduction aux Essais de Montaigne* (1900). Then Fortunat Strowski in his *Montaigne* (1906), and especially Pierre Villey in his *Les Sources et l'évolution des Essais de Montaigne* (1908), described more precisely the various periods or moments of this thought in its supposed progression from Stoicism through Pyrrhonism to Epicureanism.¹ More recently, in 1955, Donald M. Frame, in his *Montaigne's Discovery of Man*, has sought to bring out the organic character of this evolution by relating it more closely to the events in Montaigne's life.² His approach is a continuation of Champion's, Strowski's, and Villey's, with the emphasis placed on biography rather than on Montaigne's readings.

The concept of an evolving Montaigne is reasonable enough in itself. But when this means that there are three separate Montaignes, that the three stages of his development correspond to the three books of the *Essais*, then it is time to hesitate and to question. Because of Montaigne's reading habits, and because of his idea of the *Essais*, it is somewhat hazardous to reconstruct the evolution of his thought by basing it either on his reading preferences at a given moment or on the events of his life. What he reads is frequently determined by circumstances or chance rather than by choice or inclination, and although his life and his book exist side by side, they are almost inde-

¹ It was the Darwin of literary criticism, the expounder of evolution in literature, Brunetière, who insisted that Montaigne should be studied in his evolution and who directly influenced in their respective studies both Strowski and Villey. Their theory was quickly contested by Arthur Armaingaud, who claimed that Montaigne was never a Stoic or a skeptic, but an Epicurean at all times. See his *Cœuvres complètes de Montaigne*, I (Paris, 1924), especially the two chapters entitled "L'Épicurisme de Montaigne" and "Le prétendu scepticisme de Montaigne," pp. 107-38. In his review of Villey's thesis, as well as in *Les Essais de Montaigne* (Paris, 1958), pp. 122-25, Gustave Lanson expresses his doubts about Montaigne's so-called Stoical period.

² Does not Montaigne really become more of a humanist rather than less, as Donald Frame suggests in his book (*Montaigne's Discovery of Man* [New York, 1955]), the more he reads? In the early essays there is little that a humanist would claim as his own, whereas in the later ones he would feel perfectly at home. And is not this change due more to a change in the way Montaigne looks at his book than in the way Montaigne looks at himself?

pendent.³ Whereas a tripartite unity has the advantage of providing the professor or the student with three convenient handles for grasping Montaigne, it has the decided disadvantage of systematizing him. Montaigne was opposed to classifications, perhaps more than any other writer, and any attempt to force him into one is doomed inevitably to failure. "Je veux qu'on voye mon pas naturel et ordinaire, ainsin detraqué qu'il est,"⁴ he writes. Since it is his intention to reproduce in the *Essais* the diversity he remarks in himself, the multiplicity which he considers man's most universal quality, any ordering of this natural disorder can result only in a falsification of the portrait that Montaigne wished to draw for us in the pages of his book.

It is frequently overlooked—or its significance is not fully understood—that when Montaigne read Seneca, Sextus Empiricus, Plato, he was between forty and sixty years old. He came to them already formed, to assay them, not to adopt them. The importance of this did not escape Villey's attention, for he modified his 1908 position in the preface to his 1930 edition of the *Essais*, proposing what is actually a completely different approach:

L'évolution que je vais retracer est beaucoup moins l'évolution de la pensée de Montaigne que l'évolution des *Essais*. N'oublions pas que Montaigne a déjà 38 ans. Il va se chercher et se trouver pour se montrer dans son livre; et les étapes de cette recherche, ce sont les étapes de l'évolution des *Essais*. En se cherchant, sans doute on se façonne, on se définit, on se perfectionne; on ne se transforme pas.⁵

Villey's sudden death prevented him from expanding this change of view, and it has generally been overlooked by Montaigne scholars.⁶ The distinction which he makes between an evolution in Montaigne's thought and an evolution in the *Essais* is certainly of major importance, for it implies a closer identification of Montaigne with his book. If we study the *Essais* primarily with the intent of retracing in them the history of the development of Montaigne's thought, then we are looking more at Montaigne than at his book. If, however, we consider the *Essais* themselves as evolving, our interest must then be centered in the work itself, in its own growth and unfolding, in Montaigne's reactions to it and its action on him. Since this would seem to be in conformity with Montaigne's own views on the subject, perhaps we should see Montaigne's thought as nonevolving, in a book which is evolving, and in a manner perfectly consistent with his reading habits.⁷

³ Montaigne does not reveal himself entirely in the *Essais*. He selects only certain facts of his life for the pages of his book, and, paradoxically, his private life is considerably better known to us than his public life. Alphonse Grun (*La Vie publique de Michel de Montaigne* [Paris, 1855]) and Roger Trinquet ("Du Nouveau dans la biographie de Montaigne," *RHL*, jan.-mars 1953, pp. 5-16; jan.-mars 1954, pp. 1-22) have both revealed aspects of Montaigne's life which the reader of the *Essais* might never even suspect.

⁴ Montaigne, *Essais*, ed. Albert Thibaudet (Paris, 1950), p. 449. Further references to the *Essais*, incorporated in the text, will be to this edition.

⁵ Pierre Villey, ed., *Essais*, I (Paris, 1930), xxx. The italics are Villey's.

⁶ In the opening pages of his book (*Montaigne's Discovery of Man*, p. 6), Frame writes that "this view [as expressed by Villey in 1908] or a variant of it has been accepted by most Montaigne scholars of the last forty years."

⁷ Montaigne wrote as he read, and his is perhaps the only example in French

"Mes premieres publications," Montaigne writes on a page of the *Exemplaire de Bordeaux*, "furent l'an mille cinq cens quatre vingts. Depuis d'un long traict de temps je suis enueilli, mais assagi je ne le suis certes pas d'un pouce" (III.ix.1079). In this and in numerous other passages of his last essays, Montaigne refers to himself as unchanged, except physically. It would seem logical, therefore, to speak of a progressive revelation rather than of an evolution in the *Essais*: a revelation of the various possibilities and limitations of Montaigne's thought and character; the revelation, too, of an artist who grows little by little in self-confidence and self-expression, and who, as a result of long years of cultivating and verbalizing his thoughts—*stilus exercitatus*—will finally achieve the union, the complete fusion of man and book, of thought and image, in the full ripeness of the last essays; the revelation, finally, of a moralist who becomes a philosopher, and who, after constant and prolonged exploration of the philosophers and philosophies of antiquity, with his task still incomplete, steps out of the *Essais*, paradoxically, a man who has questioned others, who has found in them indications or confirmations, and yet who remains, in spite of his heterogeneous literary friends, the solid center around whom they revolve.

The key to Montaigne's unity lies not so much in the evolution of his thought as it does in its multiplicity. If he had been able to embrace completely the various figures or systems he explored, if he had given himself instead of lending himself, then truly he would have become another. But Montaigne was not attempting to become someone else—only himself—and his *Que sçay-je?* could easily be interpreted as meaning *Qui suis-je?*⁸ In a word, there is an essential Montaigne, a Montaigne before whose eyes Seneca, Sextus, Plato, pass, but who, for all that, never loses his own identity. Though this may not necessarily have been his original intention, the *Essais* are also a quest for self-identification, self-definition, and the answers Montaigne sought he found in himself, through his readings, but not in them. In the presence of the Ancients, he could have said, as Pascal did in the presence of the *Essais*, that it is not in them but in himself that he finds all that he sees there.⁹

The first authors of antiquity which Montaigne read carefully, as evidenced by his earliest essays, were the Stoics. This, however, is not the same thing as saying that he first passed through a Stoical period, one of tutelage and apprehension. It can readily be explained, literature of a book formed on the margins of books, of an author whose writings are almost exclusively the product of reflections on the writings of others. This is quite literally true, as evidenced not only by his notations on the *Annales et chroniques de France* of Nicole Gilles, by his Caesar and Quintus Curtius, but especially by the margins of the *Exemplaire de Bordeaux*.

⁸ *Je est un autre*, perfectly understandable in the case of Rimbaud, would be incomprehensible in Montaigne.

⁹ He actually does say something similar in the "Institution des enfants": "Ce n'est non plus selon Platon que selon moy, puis que luy et moi l'entendons et voyons de mesme" (I.xxvi.184). Pascal only echoes him in the *Pensées*: "Ce n'est pas dans Montaigne, mais dans moi, que je trouve tout ce que j'y vois."

by external reasons, why he read Seneca before he read Plutarch or Plato. In the first place, considering the circumstances which brought him into his tower—the deaths of La Boétie and his father, his marriage, his household in which his was the only beard (under similar circumstances Cervantes escaped into *Don Quixote*), his illness, the troubled political and religious situation of his times—we can understand why Stoicism might recommend itself as a refuge, as a kind of tower within his tower. But these are contributive and explanatory rather than determining factors.

The second reason—more important than the first—is that, in the latter half of the sixteenth century in France, Stoicism was as much the order of the day in humanistic circles as Existentialism was in certain intellectual quarters immediately following the second world war.¹⁰ Whereas the humanists of the first half of the century, Budé, Rabelais, Estienne, were primarily Hellenists, in its final quarter the Latinists predominated. Montaigne was not *utraque linguae peritus*, any more than were Lipsius or De Thou. Plutarch presented a language barrier, and Plato, mostly because of the nature of the Neoplatonism of the first half of the century, did not seem very attractive.¹¹ Although Montaigne had probably discussed Xenophon with La Boétie, and even though he had on his shelves the 1551 Latin edition of his complete works, he did not read the *Memorabilia* until he read Plato, after 1588. Had he done so before, had there been in Plato the same interest in humanistic circles as there was in Seneca, had his contact with him been as early, the first essays might have resembled the dialogue, might have been Socratic rather than Stoical. That they are not is certainly due less to any evolutionary factor in Montaigne's thought than to the accidents of his literary environment.

Montaigne turned to Stoicism, therefore, as had his friend La Boétie—whose influence on Montaigne's reading habits could be a third reason—examined its tenets and its disciples, quill in hand, and found them wanting. What he writes about them is exploratory and

¹⁰ Raoul Morçay (*La Renaissance* [Paris, 1935], p. 190) writes that near the end of the century, due in great part to the efforts of one of Montaigne's friends, Justus Lipsius, and to the disorders brought on by the religious wars, "il y eut... un renouveau sérieux du stoïcisme." See especially Léontine Zanta, *La Renaissance du stoïcisme au XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1914). The Stoicism of the religious wars was in reaction and in violent contrast to the Hedonism of the joyous years of the reign of François I^{er}.

¹¹ The second half of the sixteenth century was less interested in Platonism than the first half. The mystical and poetical interpretation it had received in the hands of Marguerite de Navarre and the Court poets in general had transformed it into a "platonisme pour dame," according to Raymond Lebegue ("Le Platonisme en France au XVI^e siècle," *Association Guillaume Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers* [Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1954], p. 351). With its covering of Ficinean commentaries, there was little in it to attract Montaigne. This probably explains why he hardly read Plato until the last years of his life, and why he did not really appreciate him until he sought to define through him the mysterious figure of Socrates. There is a clear indication of his change in attitude in "De l'institution des enfants." Montaigne wrote in 1580 that he had not "rongé les ongles à l'estude de Platon et d'Aristote" (p. 177), but in 1588 he crossed out the name of Plato.

expositional. He investigates their beliefs, assays them on various subjects, including illness and death, admires them for their constancy (which he finds a bit theatrical, however), and moves on. Though he tried to identify himself in them, his greatest discovery, perhaps, was that he could not be like them, except in his imagination.

Montaigne's skepticism presents a somewhat more difficult problem to analyze than his Stoicism. However, if we examine closely the *Apologie de Raymond Sebond*, the stage of his so-called skeptical crisis, we discover that his debt to the *Hypotyposes* is primarily a surface one.¹² His reading of Sextus Empiricus served to confirm him in his observation that man is a creature of change and movement, "un subject merveilleusement vain, divers, et ondoyant" (I.i. 29), and it is this conviction which lies at the heart of the *Apologie*, rather than the formal skeptical dialectics as outlined in the *Hypotyposes*. Moreover, skepticism may imply suspension of judgment, refusal to decide, or inability to know. But suspension of judgment in Montaigne's hands is an active force, and *Dubito* for him is as much a necessary condition of a living intelligence as *Cogito* was for Descartes. Nowhere more than in the *Apologie* does Montaigne demonstrate both his multiplicity and his unity. Here he enters into close contact with all the dogmatists in his library—including Pyrrho himself—shows the absurdity of their intransigence, and proposes as a substitute for their artificially acquired unities the diversity which he has observed in himself and in all things natural and human.

The pleasure and excitement with which Montaigne greets Amyot's translation of Plutarch can be compared to the joy which Keats expressed when first looking into Chapman's Homer. With Plutarch, Montaigne was able to stand on a peak surveying at a glance the wide expanse of the philosophy of antiquity; his dialogue with its philosophers—similar in intent to Bergson's in the *Évolution créatrice*—was to fill much of the three books of the 1588 edition of the *Essais*. If Plutarch was his Chapman, Plato was to be his Socrates, was to bring to him after 1588 the revelation of a whole new philosophical concept of life. At the same time that he read Plato, he took off the shelf his by then somewhat dusty copy of Xenophon, and read the *Memorabilia*. If he had not read it before, it was mostly because he had not as yet been interested in Socrates.¹³ And, after all, it was impossible, even for Montaigne, to explore all the writings of the Ancients at once, and he read them in the order that circumstances brought them to his attention. The important thing is that he read them at all, that his quest was never finished, and that the more he read the wider and deeper the *Essais* became. The influence they had

¹² It is significant, as Villey pointed out, that "les emprunts à Sextus, à peu de chose près, sont concentrés dans l'*Apologie* de 1580." See his *Sources et l'évolution*, I (Paris, 1933), 243.

¹³ Montaigne was alone in his century in his appreciation and understanding of Socrates. Plato was read for other reasons then. See Lebègue, "Le Platonisme en France," pp. 339-40.

on him was the influence they had on his book: they were the material out of which it grew, but they are not its nucleus.

In "De l'institution des enfants," there is a famous passage, dating from the posthumous edition, which pictures virtue "logée dans une belle plaine fertile et fleurissante," reached "par des routes ombrageuses, gazonnées et doux fleurantes," pleasantly and without effort. There is another passage on virtue in "De la cruauté," this one dating from 1580, which is generally compared to the one in the "Institution" whenever it is a question of demonstrating the evolution of Montaigne's thought:

la vertu refuse la facilité pour compaignie; et . . . cette aisée, douce et panchante voie, par où se conduisent les pas reglez d'une bonne inclination de nature, n'est pas celle de la vraye vertu. Elle demande un chemin aspre et espineux; elle veut avoir ou des difficultez estrangeres à luicter . . . par le moyen desquelles fortune se plaist à luy rompre la roideur de sa course; ou des difficultez internes que luy apportent les appetits desordonnez et imperfections de nostre condition. (II.xi.465-66)

According to those who would discern several periods in Montaigne, this passage shows that the first figure to inhabit his tower was that of constraint, whose companions were Seneca and Cato, whereas the posthumous addition in the "Institution" shows him in the company of the more relaxed figure of Socrates. This, of course, is perfectly true. But does this mean that Montaigne's thought has evolved, or might different conclusions be drawn from these same facts? In "De la cruauté" Montaigne distinguishes three orders of virtue, and suggests the means for arriving at each: (1) by a lofty and divine resolution, to prevent the birth of temptation, and to have so formed oneself to virtue that the very seeds of vices are rooted out; (2) to prevent their progress by main force, and, having let oneself be surprised by the first commotions of passion, to arm and tense oneself to stop their course; (3) to be provided with an easy and affable nature, along with an inborn distaste for debauchery and vice.¹⁴ The first degree is that of virtue as habit, the virtue of the "Institution," that of Socrates. The second is virtue as self-determination, self-domination, that of Seneca and Cato; the third is that of nature, which is Montaigne's, and which he cannot call virtue: "Car cette tierce et dernière façon, il semble bien qu'elle rende un homme innocent, mais non pas vertueux . . ." (II.xi.469).

In his discussion of this passage, Donald Frame finds Montaigne's position "a little confusing." He assumes that Montaigne here, on the lowest level, is beginning to feel the lightness of his feet, is almost ready to start his ascension toward a higher order: "Already he appears to suspect that the middle level of struggle may be a detour on the road from innocence to virtue."¹⁵ And yet, although Montaigne considers the virtue of Socrates as perfect, he acknowledges

¹⁴ See Donald M. Frame's excellent translation of the *Complete Works of Montaigne* (Stanford, 1957), p. 310.

¹⁵ Frame, *Montaigne's Discovery of Man*, p. 103.

that it is not in his power nor is it his intention to emulate it any more than the virtue of Seneca. I find it difficult to agree with Frame when he writes that "Montaigne is often at odds with himself—verbally at least—on the question of self-improvement."¹⁶ He appears to be that only to those who attempt to define in him a progressive evolution and who are reduced to calling him inconsistent when he fails to progress as he is supposed to.

Montaigne does note points of similarity between himself and Socrates, but at the same time he realizes that between him and Socrates, just as between him and Cato, there exists a difference of nature as well as of temperament. "Je n'ay pas corrigé," he writes, "comme Socrates, par force de la raison mes complexions naturelles, et n'ay aucunement troublé par art mon inclination. Je me laisse aller, comme je suis venu, je ne combats rien" (III.xii.1189).¹⁷ From where he stands, on the lowest rung, the other two degrees of virtue tower above him, represent a moral order which he can analyze and admire, but which he cannot reach. This was as true in 1580 as it was in 1595.

Montaigne's idea of himself corresponds perfectly with his idea of the *Essais*, and his three degrees of virtue are analogous to the three degrees of beauty which he perceives in "Du jeune Caton," in a passage dating from the 1595 edition, formed by Ovid, Lucan, Virgil: "premierement une fluidité gaye et ingenieuse; depuis une subtilité aiguë et relevée; enfin une force meure et constante" (I.xxxvii.270). Virgil's poetry moves with the same easy, gliding rhythm—*vera incessu patuit dea*—as virtue in the "Institution" or as Socrates in "De la cruauté": "Il me semble la voir marcher [Socrates' virtue] d'un victorieux pas et triomphant, en pompe et à son aise, sans empeschement ne destourbier" (II.xi.466). Lucan's verse displays the same pinched, tense step as Seneca's virtue in "De la cruauté," whereas Ovid's verse is characterized by its fluidity. Once again Montaigne associates himself with the lowest degree, the one with the least distinction, but which enables him to depict himself as he is. He considers his prose "informe et sans regle," just as he terms his virtue accidental and fortuitous or his philosophy "impremeditée et fortuite." In both the moral and the artistic spheres, what he represents does not constitute an order, for that would imply effort. The *otium*

¹⁶ Frame, *Montaigne's Discovery of Man*, p. 156.

¹⁷ In an interesting article on "The *Essais* and Socrates" (*Symposium*, X [1956], 204-16), Frederick Kellermann has shown that in "De la phisionomie," and in spite of the passage which I have quoted, Montaigne does not really dissociate himself from Socrates. This is not equally true, however, in "De l'expérience." In this final essay, especially in those passages dealing with his *daimon*, we are introduced to an almost supernatural Socrates, and Montaigne concludes: "Ces humeurs transcendentes m'effrayent, comme les lieux hautains et inaccessibles; et rien ne m'est à digérer fascheux en la vie de Socrates que ses ecstases et ses demoneries" (III.xiii.1256). Socrates is now presented as "l'image à tous patrons et formes de perfection" (p. 1249), and therefore has little in common with Montaigne, who advances his own example, his own life, "sans miracle et sans extravagance" (p. 1257).

which he professes, the multiplicity which he cultivates and which he identifies with nature, deprive him of that unity which an order implies.

There is little justification for slicing the *Essais* into three equal parts, one leaning on or growing out of the other like the three floors of Montaigne's tower. These quotations seem to indicate that such divisions are not only artificial, but misleading. We see from them that Montaigne had a clear idea of himself, of his book, and of his relationship to other philosophers, to other books. He is not the dilettante that he is sometimes made out to be, flitting from one system to another. There is an essential unity to Montaigne, a solid and heavy mass which lies at the bottom of the *Essais* and which he alludes to so clearly in numerous passages. The life he proposes is a humble one, without luster. "On attache aussi bien toute la philosophie morale à une vie populaire et privée," he states, "que à une vie de plus riche estoffe" (III.ii.900). If he speaks of other natures, it is not because he is identifying his with theirs, but because he is trying to define his through theirs. At no time does he place himself in a Stoical, a skeptical, or an Epicurean camp; never does he consider himself more than "l'homme moyen." In his imagination he can conceive of a Socrates, a Seneca, a Virgil, a Lucan, he can comprehend and appreciate the moral and aesthetic values which they incorporate, but he realizes fully that they represent an order of perfection which both he and his book are incapable of attaining.

When Montaigne tells us that he has painted himself in the *Essais*, he is telling the truth up to a certain point. He wrote the *Essais* to portray himself, but also to complete himself, to portray what was not himself, to present an ideal of man based on a synthesis of classical philosophy stretching from Socrates to Plutarch. The *Essais* themselves evolve both in form and objectives, but to interpret this as meaning an evolution in Montaigne's thought is to confuse the man with his ideals, his "essais" with his essence, is to fail to see the unity inherent in his multiplicity. Both the moral order as represented by Seneca and Socrates, and the aesthetic order as represented by Virgil and Lucan, are reconstructed in the *Essais*, but both orders imply an art which Montaigne means to avoid. He is as anti-Socratic, as opposed to the rule of the concept, of the Idea, as he is anti-Senecan, opposed to the rule of force. He is the defender and the example of a natural order in philosophy as well as in art, and his typical attitude, one of philosophical and artistic indifference, is nowhere better expressed than in the following passage from "De mesnager sa volonté": "Il y a tant de mauvais pas que, pour le plus seur, il faut un peu legierement et superficiellement couler ce monde. Il le faut glisser, non pas s'y enfoncer" (III.x.1126). He places himself beneath these two orders, happily and naturally, on a level which—in his own eyes—does not constitute an order, with his book—which he does not consider a book—under his arm.

University of Michigan

REVIEWS

Arthurian Triptych: Mythic Materials in Charles Williams, C. S. Lewis, and T. S. Eliot. By CHARLES MOORMAN. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Perspectives in Criticism No. 5, 1960. Pp. ix + 163. \$3.50.

Charles Moorman's study is a recognition not only of revolutionary trends in modern Arthurian literature, but also of a great wave of interest in the mythical works of at least two of its exponents: Charles Williams and C. S. Lewis. Moorman's approach is through the avenue of myth. In this, as he points out at the very beginning, he is following a method currently popular among literary scholars, and he makes his case carefully and thoroughly. One might question, however, the appropriateness of his opening paragraph, in which the tone of his remarks as to "myth-hunting" is at least one of bantering condescension. From that point on, however, he is in earnest.

Moorman's intention is to explain the function of myth in literature and its method of operation in the works of the three authors. Briefly, myth makes possible the portrayal of an ordered experience, a consideration especially valuable in our chaotic years. We need to know, says Moorman, "how the creative artist uses myth to convert the raw materials of chaotic experience into a finished artistic work that represents an ordered view of that experience." This end is achieved most strikingly by the "sacramental" approach, in which there is an exchange or substitution between the natural and the supernatural. The Arthurian legend is particularly open to such treatment, especially as handled by the authors discussed, since all of them place a characteristically mythical element, the story of the Holy Grail, at the very heart of the cycle.

In approaching the works of Williams, Lewis, and Eliot, Charles Moorman devotes a chapter to a general discussion of the Arthurian myth. Here he is sound and informative, stressing especially the mystical significance of the Grail story. The emphasis is questionable at only one or two points. For example, the designation of Arthur as a "culture hero," while it helps to explain the resplendent figure he became, blurs the outline of what was probably a very human Celtic general of the sixth century. Likewise, the implication that in Tennyson the Holy Grail entirely lost its original mystical tone needs a slight qualification. There is no doubt that Tennyson is far from Robert de Boron in this respect, yet it is worth noting that Williams himself praised Tennyson's remarkable phrase describing the Grail: "Rose-red, with beatings in it, as if alive." Also, a little-noticed passage in "Galahad" (unfortunately overshadowed by the copy-book evangelism which maintains that purity of heart gives Galahad the strength of ten) emphasizes the otherworldly, mystical nature of the Grail.

Moorman is at his best when dealing with the Arthurian legend extensively employed and in elaborate mythical detail. His most successful chapter is on Charles Williams, especially his treatment of the Arthurian poems *Talesin Through Logres* and *The Region of the Summer Stars*. He sees clearly the appropriateness of the legend for the illustration of Williams' belief in the imposition of order on experience. In the poems this became a highly metaphorical exposition of the virtually geometrical order of the Emperor's realm of Byzantium, by means of which the dedicated spirits in Logres hope to bring Christianity in its fullest sense to the civilized world. This is discussed with fullness and care.

Moorman is distinctly less comfortable, however, when considering Williams'

Arthurian novel, *War in Heaven*. Indeed, he speaks of it as "almost useless" for his purposes because "it contains no hint of the elaborate reconstruction of the Arthurian myth which Williams later developed." This seems to be an arbitrarily exclusive statement. In both the novel and the poems, the myth is the very center of the action, moving in mystical, supernatural apperceptions of order and chaos, and sacramental substitutions. In both cases the power of the Grail in fighting against vast evil is shown with surpassing skill. Needless to say, they are works of different character, but the tense excitement of struggle for possession of the Grail in present-day England need not be derogated. This is especially true since the novel is an outstandingly successful exposition of what Moorman calls Williams' primary theme, i.e., "order and chaos." The conspirators against the Grail are literally seeking to bring about the fall of God's heaven; they are frustrated by the divine order moving through Prester John and Archdeacon Davenant.

Both C. S. Lewis and T. S. Eliot are treated more briefly than Williams. Any other course is hardly to be expected, since their contribution to Arthurian literature is not extensive. As with Williams, Moorman discusses Lewis' non-Arthurian fiction in such a way as to show how myth is used as a preparation for dealing with *That Hideous Strength* in which the Matter of Britain plays a central part. But when he gets to this point, Moorman shows less enthusiasm than he does in his chapter on Williams. Through the early part of the chapter runs a note of condescension toward Lewis, as a writer of "polished style" who covers Christian moralizing with a "veneer of chatty sophistication" and who "discusses the weightiest of spiritual matters with the air of a cocktail-party companion." Yet in spite of these failures in sympathy, in spite of Moorman's emphasis on the "orthodoxy" of Lewis' religious doctrine—a point of view which would be surprising to Norman Pittenger, who in 1958 made a slashing attack on Lewis' heterodoxy, and indeed which surprises many who are struck by the grace and originality of Lewis' beliefs—the account of the Arthurian material in *That Hideous Strength* is a good one. The reader might only wish for a greater awareness of the part played by both the Studdocks in the novel and for a fuller appreciation of that superlatively exciting supernatural episode when the Oyëresu descend to the manor house of St. Anne's.

In this reviewer's opinion, the chapter on Eliot, though a serious and scholarly labor, is bound, by the very nature of the material, to be disappointing. At first glance, it would seem quite in the stream of explaining Williams' and Lewis' method of using the Arthurian legend as a means of imposing order on a chaotic world through myth. Yet in spite of Moorman's disclaimers, the order in Eliot's search is hard to discover. Like the much-discussed order of the Odyssean journey in Joyce's *Ulysses*, the order in *The Waste Land* is largely an illusion. Moreover, the Arthurian material in the poem, in spite of Eliot's indebtedness to Jessie Weston and fragmentary allusions to the Tristram story and a shadowy Grail chapel, is so exiguous as (paraphrasing Joyce) virtually to refine the narrative out of existence.

One or two minor corrections might be noted, in a book punctiliously written and printed. The tradition that Arthur was transported to Avalon began with Geoffrey's *Vita Merlini*, not with Wace and Layamon (p. 113). On page 29 Moorman surely means "sexual" instead of "phallic."

These are small matters. On the more serious side is the feeling that Moorman's book, scholarly and informative as it is, does not go far enough in a direction which he apparently thought worth exploring. On page 18 he says that by the use of myth the poet increases the "richness and fullness of his own

ordering of experience." Earlier in the same chapter, he refers (in a quotation already cited) to the conversion of raw materials into a "finished artistic work." These are statements of critical apperception and, presumably, intention. In the last chapter he states that his study would be incomplete without an attempt at evaluation. There then follow two and a half pages directed to this end, unconvincing as a far too brief afterthought, especially since needlessly constricted by the assumption that those works are good which give the clearest visions of the modern world.

In other words, *Arthurian Triptych* is essentially a book of analysis preparatory to evaluation, though Charles Moorman apparently believes it should serve the latter end also. The analyses are done with scrupulous care and scholarly perception; they give us valuable material for understanding what the authors set out to do. But seldom does Moorman go beyond this point to show how method anticipates power. As an introduction to the mythic explorations of three greatly gifted modern writers, however, *Arthurian Triptych* is a solid and valuable contribution.

NATHAN COMFORT STARR

University of Florida

Apollo and the Nine: A History of the Ode. By CAROL MADDISON. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960. Pp. x + 427. \$6.50.

To write a book of this sort requires unusually scholarly equipment—and this Carol Maddison has. First of all, she appears to be almost as much at home in ancient Greek and Latin, in "humanist" Latin (or, as she writes it, neolatin), and in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italian and French as she does in English. Second, she possesses an immense amount of patience and industry, which has allowed her to read, translate, and analyze—sometimes in very great detail—scores of pretty dull, conventionalized poems which would have quickly floored a person of a more mercurial temperament. Third, she has accomplished this task without letting it blunt the edge of her enthusiasm and her general acuteness of critical perception. Last, she has had the requisite financial aid from the Canadian Federation of University Women, The Johns Hopkins University, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Humanities Research Council of Canada to enable her to carry her research and publication to a conclusion.

The title of the book, however (apparently designed as an eye-catcher), is somewhat misleading, since the study is restricted to one Muse, the Muse of lyric poetry, and—even more narrowly—to one lyric genre, the ode. Even in this limited field, Carol Maddison pursues the subject only to the end of the seventeenth century, when, she believes, the tradition of the "Pindaric" ode became sufficiently well established in England to prepare the ground for its great eighteenth- and nineteenth-century practitioners: Gray, Collins, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Tennyson. The author who was principally responsible for bringing the ode to this critical turning point in its history was Abraham Cowley who, with his theory of translation, preached the virtues of adapting, modernizing, and acclimatizing a foreign work so that the new poet could in his own way make restitution for what must inevitably be lost in language, versification, and thought through the passage of a work from one culture to another.

Cowley's decisive contribution, however, came only after more than two mil-

lennia of experimentation, modification, and development in many lands and in many regular and eventually irregular forms. Carol Maddison devotes her first section to a study, evaluation, and comparison of the odes of Pindar, Anacreon, and Horace. She then goes on to a similar discussion of the humanist "neolatin" ode in Italy, influenced chiefly by poets such as Filelfo, Landino, Pontano, Marullus, Crinito, Lampridio, and Flaminio, and coming to a close with Torquato Tasso. Each of these men had his individual contribution to make through the extension of the possibilities of prosodic, rhetorical, and poetic effects and of mythological, biographical, religious, and political material. Among the Italian vernacular practitioners, the most important were Alamanni, Minturno, Bernardo Tasso (the father of Torquato), and Chiabrera, with his followers Testi, Cesarini, and Menzini, all of whom fought out and exemplified among themselves the battle between the Pindaric and the Horatian types of ode. In France, following Macrin and others, the *Pléiade* finally took over the form, and Ronsard, Du Bellay, and Peletier dominated the scene for many decades. From the late Renaissance, French poetry passed directly to neoclassicism, with no intervening baroque period as in Italy and England, and Malherbe became the arbiter of "correctness" in the ode, giving it its definitive form until the romantic movement.

Across the Channel, John Sootherne (or Southern) introduced the ode into England in 1584 with his clumsy pilferings from Ronsard. Southern was followed more successfully by Barnes, Campion, and Drayton, "the first proper ode writer in English." Jonson, Herrick, Milton, and Crashaw (the only other poets Carol Maddison mentions, though some—Davenant, for example—tried their own experiments) exploited the Pindaric, the Horatian, and the Anacreontic forms in the seventeenth century with considerable success, while showing the influence of various classical and modern Continental odists; but it remained for Cowley to give the Pindaric genre (though he also wrote excellent Anacreontics) its prosodic and metaphysical cast which helped to goad Dr. Johnson to his notorious attack a century later.

In her discussion of the English ode, Carol Maddison acknowledges her indebtedness to such predecessors as Robert Shafer, George N. Schuster, and others, but maintains, rightly, that her preceding study of the long Continental tradition has enabled her to set the English ode more fully and properly in its international context than has been done before, particularly since no full-length, specialized studies of the genre have been made in Italy and France.

ARTHUR H. NETHERCOT

Northwestern University

Theme and Structure in Swift's "Tale of a Tub." By RONALD PAULSON. New Haven: Yale University Press, Yale Studies in English, Vol. 143, 1960. Pp. xiv + 259. \$4.50.

With Ronald Paulson's two main contentions, that *A Tale of a Tub* is concerned with moral problems and that it is "a unified structure...cunningly planned and executed," there can be little argument. Paulson possesses both historical learning and critical sensibility, but the historical method in *Theme and Structure in Swift's "Tale of a Tub"* is often impressionistic (the seventeenth century becomes a vast hunting ground for any stray allusion or analogue that reminds the critic of the *Tale*), and the critical sensibility sometimes seems to carry him beyond Swift's probable or even possible limits. "Swift's genius is a

poetic one," we are told; his method is to let "the word or object re-assert its own objectivity"; "his metaphors carry on with a life of their own," for his "texture" is like that of a poem. Thus there is a curious kind of irony to the history of *A Tale of a Tub*, as it became a *cause célèbre* in its own time, lost its viability, and within the last decade of our century has grown to new life, has had its form closed, opened, and is now in the hands of the very latest, the most Modern, critic.

Paulson's analysis is divided into four parts: "The Parody of Eccentricity," "The Quixotic Theme," "The Gnostic View," and "The Christian View of Man." He claims for the *Tale* "an encyclopedic fullness in protean disorder" and an "intensely personal quality" as "the key to the *Tale's* structure and Swift's relationship to his material." To support this structural claim, Paulson posits a Hack-persona through whom symbol and image operate—"the Hack is himself the story: even the story of the three brothers is to some extent a reflection of his mind"; he only seems to talk "satirically." More discursively conceived, however, Mr. Ewald's persona, less constrained by Quixotic exigencies, seems more faithful to Swift's generic and rhetorical realities. Paulson has it that *A Tale of a Tub* is anti-Ciceronian, not in its prose style particularly, but in its total asymmetry of structure, an interesting, if doubtful, subjectivism. Even more doubtful is his claim for Gnosticism as a source for much of the satire in the *Tale*. "Whether Swift himself had Gnosticism in mind is not so important as that some such category appeared to him to catch all the various sects and societies, religious fanatics and scientists, in one very basic error." Ultimately, any Enthusiasm can be reduced to a core of Gnosticism, but the Enthusiasm of the seventeenth century seems more accurately sectarian than Gnostic.

Nevertheless, Paulson's approach to *A Tale of a Tub* is not unfruitful. In his vast, if unselective, range of reference, he has elucidated many details in the *Tale* that have hitherto remained obscure. He has coped with the *Mechanical Operation of the Spirit* heroically: its "pseudo-heaven" turns out "to be nothing more than a physical orgasm." His study helps prove the vast complexity and erudition of the *Tale* even beyond what other critics have suspected; it helps prove (as Adams previously suggested) the essential openness of the form of *A Tale of a Tub*. There remains some considerable question, however, whether Ronald Paulson has exacerbated or resolved the eccentricity of Swift's work.

MIRIAM K. STARKMAN

Queens College

The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson. Edited by THOMAS H. JOHNSON. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960. Pp. xiii + 770. \$10.00.

Emily Dickinson's Poetry: Stairway of Surprise. By CHARLES R. ANDERSON. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. Pp. xviii + 334. \$5.95.

Whatever our regard for accuracy, we cannot expect the churchgoer to be willing to pray, "Give us this day our—*epiousios* is untranslatable—bread." Nor need we accept Jerome's "supersubstantial"; "daily" is a reasonable guess, and we ought to be satisfied with it.

Similarly, the general reader does not want to be bothered with folio texts and quarto texts and variant readings. He wants Shakespeare's play or Dickinson's poem in a readable version, freed from textual complexities. He wants accuracy within the limits of reasonable guesses. Behind these, however, must

lie certain editorial principles, and, in reviewing Thomas H. Johnson's new, one-volume edition of *The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson*, I find that it is of those principles that I must speak.

Dickinson's poems offer textual problems comparable in complexity to those offered by Shakespeare's plays—and for the same reason: the author did not oversee their printing. Though vast numbers of Dickinson's original manuscripts exist, the problem of variant readings is merely thrown back from printed to manuscript alternatives, both because of the differing drafts of individual poems and because of the many rough or semi-final drafts in which no choice has been indicated among the variants clustered around the margins and between the lines. Though there will inevitably be continuing scholarly quibbling about the choice among various words in a single manuscript, the following would seem to be principles upon which the most satisfactory edition would be based:

- (1) *When only one fair copy exists, it will naturally be reproduced as it is.* If, however, there is a semi-final draft or a work sheet of a demonstrably later date than the fair copy, it should perhaps be treated as a separate, though related, poem.
- (2) *When more than one fair copy exists:*
 - (a) *If the handwriting or other evidence indicates differing dates, the latest will be reproduced.* This assumes that we seek the author's "final intention."
 - (b) *If the evidence indicates that they are contemporary with each other, one sent out will be preferred to one found in Dickinson's packets.* Packet-copies are so often semi-final drafts and recipient-copies so often demonstrably later that this seems the safest procedure in all doubtful cases. Johnson confirms this observation when, in the three-volume Harvard edition, he writes: "... ED's custom was to send copies of her poems to friends after she had entered them in her packets, not before" (p. 627).
- (3) *When no fair copy exists, a semi-final draft will be preferred over a work sheet.*
- (4) *In reducing either a semi-final draft or a work sheet to final copy, an editor must select any variant which Dickinson has underlined, and probably should select any in handwriting of a later date.*

These will not solve all problems by any means, but they seem clear enough as general principles that departure from any of them would warrant explanation. (Poem 1619, for example, might be an exception to 2a because the latest version is clearly an adaptation of the earlier poem to the circumstances of a particular recipient.) For the large number of poems which must be edited from those semi-final drafts upon which the poet has indicated no choice among her variants, one can only ask that an editor exercise all the sensibility he can bring to bear.

Turning now to the new edition, I am sorry to report that Johnson has not produced the definitive text we had all hoped it would be. In one regard it is better than we had reason to expect. In speaking of Dickinson's liberal use of dashes, Johnson wrote in the Harvard edition, "Quite properly such 'punctuation' can be omitted in later editions..." (p. lxiii); fortunately, he has recognized in the intervening five years that "Dickinson used dashes as a musical device, and though some may be elongated end stops, any 'correction' would be gratuitous" (pp. x-xi). The dashes are reproduced as they should be. But Johnson has not adopted the second principle listed above, and he is inconsistent in following the principle of selection which he does announce.

Of fair copies from differing dates, he writes: "one text is apparently as 'final' as another" (p. x). Omitting those in which the only differences are in punctua-

tion, there remain twenty-one poems for which, according to the evidence in the Harvard edition, Johnson has rejected the latest fair copy in favor of an earlier version (Poems 4, 41, 130, 155, 174, 229, 269, 343, 523, 683, 794, 813, 814, 815, 986, 1068, 1072, 1180, 1471, 1528, and 1640). One might easily make a case for listing also the versions in which the differences are in the punctuation (the later "As He—defeated—dying" and "Burst—agonized—and Clear!" being more effective lines in Poem 67 than "As he defeated—dying—" and "Burst agonized and clear!"), but I won't pursue it. Nor have I tried to count the much larger number of instances in which Johnson has printed the packet-copy in preference to recipient-copies. Poems 58, 60, 61, 62, and 69 are examples. In Poem 61, it might be pointed out that the variant thus rejected is more consistent with the tone of the poem than the one accepted; and in Poem 69, the variant which Johnson reprints is actually begun and crossed out in the recipient-copy, evidence for later composition which ought to bring the poem under principle 2a, even if one were to distrust 2b. Such notation could be continued throughout the edition at much greater length than this review allows.

In dealing with variants within semi-final drafts and work sheets, I would tend to be willing to allow the editor his sensibility, were it not that Johnson does not consistently follow the rule he announces. "In order to keep editorial construction to a bare minimum," he writes, "I have followed the policy of adopting such suggestions only when they are underlined..." (p. x). This acknowledges the "must" in my fourth principle, but elects complete conservatism beyond that. When we have fair copies in addition to semi-final drafts and work sheets, the evidence indeed indicates that Dickinson probably chose her original word as frequently as she chose one of the variants. Even so, the case for such complete conservatism is not strong (the very presence of variants arguing dissatisfaction with the original), and the fact is that Johnson does not adhere to it. In thirty poems he adopts variants which, according to the Harvard edition, are not underlined (Poems 214, 215, 281, 290, 316, 584, 585, 588, 596, 597, 598, 608, 613, 618, 628, 634, 642, 649, 739, 952, 958, 968, 1058, 1062, 1099, 1108, 1126, 1201, 1445, and 1474). This is fine. Given the popularity of the variants in Poem 214, for example, it would be difficult to go back to the first draft. Except that he announces otherwise, Johnson's adoptions here are commendable. One can only wish that he had seen the logic of exercising the same sensibility on many other poems.

In Poem 588, listed above, the variants selected were added to the copy at a date some time after the original composition. In at least four other poems (59, 322, 718, and 1177), such later changes are rejected, including, in Poem 718, a later change that is also underlined. In fact, in spite of his announced policy, there are three other poems (1170, 1255, and 1445) in which Johnson does *not* adopt the underlined variants. In Poem 1445, where he would seem to have a choice between the original conclusion "And Kinsmen as divulgeless / As throngs of Down—" or, for the first line, "And Kindred as responsive," or, for the second, "As Clans of Down," or, for both, "And Pageants as impassive / As Porcelain," he not only rejects the underlined "Clans" but follows Mrs. Bingham's version in *Bolts of Melody*, "And Kindred as responsive / As Porcelain," which would appear from the Harvard edition to have been concocted out of two incompatible variants. One would have to see the original manuscript to be sure.

Let me add a few more notes in this shorthand style. In Poem 755, Johnson, in the Harvard edition, indicates correctly what Dickinson "evidently... meant the last three lines to read," but in this edition he neglects to adopt it. In Poems 1385 and 1444, desired changes are doubly attested on the manuscript but ignored by Johnson. Then there is a whole series of problems involving printed versions

deriving apparently from manuscripts now lost. Let this one stand as an example: for Poem 57, the existing manuscript is torn, but there is a second stanza published in *Poems, Third Series* (1896). Johnson fails to include the second stanza. Admittedly, Mrs. Todd may have tampered with it, but she did not invent it.

So I say again, regretfully, this is not the definitive text we had hoped it would be. However, it is the best available for the general reader, and undoubtedly some time must pass before the job can be done over again. It is an attractively printed volume, with not only a first-line but a subject index, a kind of selective concordance, carried over from the Harvard edition. I have noted only three misprints (505, 14] "endured" should be "endued"; 680, 13] "sure" should be "surer"; 1132, 2] "Hearts" should be "Heart"). Scholars will want to stay with the Harvard edition in any case, or to go to the manuscripts behind it, and the inconsistencies I have been discussing will probably not worry the nonscholarly reader. It is only fair to point out that they do not affect a majority of the poems printed in the volume. However, the reader deserves better than he has been given. What he probably wants next, rather than a corrected *Complete Poems*, is a *Selected Poems* that will trim away much of the trivia and present Dickinson's best poems in authentic texts.

Anyone seeking to distinguish that best from the trivia will be interested in Charles R. Anderson's *Emily Dickinson's Poetry: Stairway of Surprise*. Here also, incidentally, is an illustration of the textual confusion. The texts of twenty-six of the perhaps one hundred poems Anderson quotes in full, differ from those of the same poems as reproduced by Johnson. Except for one instance in which Anderson adopts a word that Dickinson actually crossed out, each editor might present arguments for his own choice. (On the basis of the principles listed above, I would consider Johnson's version "correct" in seven instances, Anderson's in four, and neither in one, leaving fourteen in which it is a question of sensibility.)

Anderson's is a very good book and a large step in the direction in which—now that the textual evidence is available—Dickinson criticism should continue to move. This is not a biographical speculation, but a study of the poetry itself. Admitting the limitations and the flaws, Anderson sets out to define and demonstrate the strengths. Though the close reading this involves occasionally slips over into misreading (as on p. 204, when the pronoun "Him," clearly meaning God—"God have mercy' on the Soul / The jury voted Him"—becomes, curiously, "the reunited halves of the prisoner") or into downright invention (the boy who kills the bird, on p. 193 turns into Eros), it is more often perceptive and even exciting. Dickinson's thought was surely not as systematic as it sounds at times here, verging on an almost Yeatsian system of *noons* and *crescents* and *circumferences*; but Anderson really knows this, and, though he does not carry us all the way with him, he calls our attention to much of interest and importance.

WILLIAM H. MATCHETT

University of Washington

The Ethical Idealism of Matthew Arnold: A Study of the Nature and Sources of His Moral and Religious Ideas. By WILLIAM ROBBINS. Toronto: University of Toronto, Department of English, Studies and Texts, No. 7, 1959. Pp. xi + 259. \$3.75.

"With a philosophical aim ethically controlled, Arnold was neither content to

sacrifice humanistic sanctions, and so gain a metaphysical transcendence free of limitations and contradictions, nor willing to forego his longing for absolute and eternal truth and remain content with a solution for the human problem at a purely human level."

This comes as close to the ethical position of Matthew Arnold as William Robbins can get, and no one has given so complete and satisfying an analysis of Arnold's ethics as Robbins has achieved in this book. It begins with an excellent chapter on "The Old and the New" (1860-1880) in which he discusses the "crisis in religion." He reviews the arguments of the great opponents from Newman's faith in the supernatural foundations of religious dogma to W. K. Clifford's idea of Christianity as "That awful [*sic*] plague which has destroyed two civilizations."

Arnold grew up in the "old" and graduated into the "new," never quite relinquishing the one nor fully accepting the other. Nothing could indicate this more fully than his belief that "The Christianity of the future will be a form of Catholicism: but Catholicism purged, opening itself to the light and the air." This is as much of a contradiction in terms as to write of a Protestantism of the future which will seek the authority of Rome.

Robbins' discussion of the "Major Formative Influences," "Experience and Dogma," and "The Idea of God" are detailed, analytical, and very well done. They bear out the idea of the conflict that was the mark of the time. They place Arnold in the midst of the intellectual confusion and reveal his discontent at not being able to fully resolve his problem. Even Arnold must have realized that a prayer addressed to a God who is "That something not ourselves which makes for righteousness" as a bit ludicrous.

If Robbins' study of Arnold fails in anything, it is that he refuses to take sides on the evidence. He leaves the impression that Arnold's argument is as cogent on one side as on the other. He sees hope in Arnold as a prophet for our day—"A means of reconciling the persistent differences of Christian, scientist and humanist."

At the core of Arnold's thought was a basic realization that it is absurd to think of reconciling science and supernaturalism and that humanism finds its chief barrier to the good life in any and all forms of supernaturalism. When Arnold writes of Christianity, he means its ethics and its poetry, which is exactly what true Christianity does not mean. Christianity must find nothing but heresy in the famous prophecy in which he holds that the spurious "fact" of religion has failed and that poetry will be the religion of the future.

Perhaps Robbins has fitted Arnold so snugly into the conflicts of his times that he does not allow him to breathe freely. No doubt Arnold was sorry, even at times despondent, at the passing of the "old," but he spoke out with vigor in favor of the "new." He accepted the humanist position:

Sits there no judge in Heaven, our sin to see?
More strictly than the inward judge obey.

And Arnold's affirmation of the humanist's world is stronger than all his doubtful estimates of the middle position and its conflicts:

Is it so small a thing
To have enjoyed the sun,
To have lived light in the spring,
To have loved, to have thought, to have done;
To have advanced true friends, and beat down baffling foes.

S. K. WINTER

Eyrbyggja saga. Translated from the Old Icelandic by PAUL SCHACH. Introduction and verse translations by LEE M. HOLLANDER. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press and the American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1959. Pp. xx + 140. \$4.25.

The *Eyrbyggja saga* distinguishes itself from most other Icelandic sagas by the nature of its subject matter. Instead of treating of the history of one line of descendants, it deals more schematically with all the more important inhabitants of an area, the Snæfellsnes Peninsula of western Iceland. It also deals in greater detail with the customs and manners of life of the people than any other saga. As such, it lacks the dramatic unity found in the best of the sagas, and for this reason has not become either as well known or as popular as many others. This is extremely unfortunate because, different as it may be, the *Eyrbyggja saga* is one of the most rewarding pieces of reading in Old Icelandic. Not only does it offer more information about the people and life of the period, but it also contains many interesting episodes and characters. Written sometime early in the thirteenth century, it is also in general more historically and factually reliable than most of the sagas. Consequently, the appearance of this new translation is an event of major importance in Old Icelandic scholarship.

The only previous translation in English was that of Morris and Magnússon in 1892 which, though excellent in many ways, is rendered hopelessly outdated by its antiquarian style. Fortunately, most modern saga translators (including Paul Schach) have realized that the sagas were written in the popular idiom of the day which demands translation into modern style. As a result, this new translation of *Eyrbyggja saga* is not only accurate, reflecting the careful scholarship of the translator, but also is a pleasure to read. Only occasionally does a touch of stiffness creep into the dialogue. There is, however, an unfortunate tendency to weaken the force of the Icelandic mode of expression, which at times becomes a bit coarse; e.g., "and make love to the old thing" (p. 22) is an unnecessarily euphemistic translation of the original "ok klappa um kerlingar nárann" which takes all of the flavor and strength out of the remark. A strictly literal translation here, such as "and pat the old girl's groin," would have preserved the original spirit better and surely offended no one. Such humorous vulgarisms are too much a vital part of Icelandic style to be expurgated in this manner.

Lee Hollander's translations of the skaldic verses are done, as are all his previous translations of Old Icelandic poetry, in a quaintness of style and degree of complexity that suitably sets them off from the straightforward style of the prose. They are, of course, a bit difficult to read, but they are supposed to be.

It is traditional to criticize translators for their treatment of place names. This will not be done here, however, despite the fact that occasional bones could be picked. The translators have stated in the preface that they choose to be inconsistent in this matter, and there can be no quarrel with this principle. The objections which could be raised over individual examples are approximately the same as those of Philip Mitchell in his review of the Bayerschmidt and Hollander translation of *Njáls saga*, and reference is made to his comments (cf. *MLQ*, XVII [1956], 80-81).

Regarding the transliteration of both place and personal names, however, a serious objection must be raised. Languages which lack interdental spirants have transliteration problems in connection with Icelandic þ and ð, but there is no reason why this should cause any trouble in English. It is traditional to transliterate þ as *th* in English, but equally traditional to transliterate ð as *d*.

This tradition, inherited from the scholarly tradition in languages not as fortunate in their inventory of consonants as English, should be abandoned. There is no earthly reason why, for example, Icelandic Óðinn should be transliterated Odin in English. The logical transliteration is Othin, and every speaker of English, upon seeing the word, will pronounce the intervocalic spirant correctly (by analogy with father, mother, etc.). Admittedly, the form looks a bit strange, but this is only because it opposes the tradition. The same applies to the spirant in other positions. Personal names in the *Eyrbyggja saga* such as Aud, Geirrid, Gudlaug, Thurid, Thórd, Gudný, Gunnfrid, Thormód godi, are all doomed to mispronunciation as they stand. Replacement of the *d* with *th* automatically invokes the proper pronunciation: Auth, Geirrið, Guthlaug, Thurith, Thórh, Guthný, Gunnfrith, Thormóth gothi. Even if the *th* were pronounced voiceless instead of voiced, the result would be closer to the original than *d*. If necessary, a rule could be given in the section on the pronunciation of names which would eliminate this possibility. There are many examples of the same thing in place names, but it is not necessary to go into them in detail. The same principle applies. It should be made clear that this is not a feature of transliteration peculiar to this translation, and this criticism is not aimed specifically at the translators; but it would have been invigorating if they had shown some initiative in breaking this senseless tradition.

The notes which accompany the translation are generally good, but the lay reader, uninitiated into the vagaries of Icelandic directional terminology, will probably only be confused by the footnote on page 126. Footnoted is the sentence "They rowed south along the Strands and then north across the Húnaflói Fjord" and the note reads "Actually, east." Perhaps a brief explanation of the principles of directional orientation would have made this cryptic comment understandable. A reference to Einar Haugen's article, "The Semantics of Icelandic Orientation" (*Word*, December, 1957) would have offered the reader at least a little hope.

KENNETH G. CHAPMAN

University of California, Los Angeles

Miscellanea Litteraria in commemorationem primi decenniî instituti edita. Edited by H. SPARNAAY and W. A. P. SMIT. Groningen: J. B. Wolters, Studia litteraria rheno-traiectina, IV, 1959. Pp. 184.

This volume, prepared as a commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Institute of Comparative Literature at the University of Utrecht, consists, as might be expected, of a number of disparate studies whose connection lies in the fact that they all, in some way, treat of literature in comparative fashion. It is interesting to see what the term means to the various authors. Some treat of literary classification, some of what used to be called "influence," some of the use of common motifs and material. There is no comparison of individual works from the point of view of form, aesthetics, or literary value. I shall confine my attention to the articles on medieval literature, but I would like to note in passing the convincing denial of the "Generationsprinzip" in literary history which H. P. H. Teesing makes in his well-documented essay, "Die Magie der Zahlen."

The essays on medieval literary topics show that for the majority of authors the term "comparative literature" still means "Stoff- und Motivgeschichte." A. van der Lee, in "Einiges zu den stofflichen Grundlagen der Walthersage," and

H. Sparnaay, in "Der Enkel des Königs Armenios und die Gregorsage," are both concerned with making available material which parallels works well known in European literature. Sparnaay uses the story of Johannes, son of Armenios, king of Tarsus, who raped his own sister while drunk. The adventures of the child of this union show close resemblances to those in the Gregorius legend, but there are also important differences. The method of procedure is to differentiate the Gregorius legend from the mass of materials which contain its main feature—incestuous birth of the hero—by showing what combination of motifs it contains. It can then be compared with stories with similar combinations, particularly the Eastern story of Dārāb from the collection called *Schah-nāmah* of the eleventh century and the story of Gwi from the *Mabinogion*. Sparnaay is able to demonstrate, with as much certainty as is ever possible in studies of this sort, that the story of Gwi was influenced by that of Dārāb and so produced the Gawain group and Gregorius legends, which last was again influenced by the Dārāb material. The careful method used makes this study convincing.

The Waltharius article is much less persuasive. The author renews the thesis that there is a close connection between the Latin *Waltharius* and the Polish story of Walterus, Graf von Tynecz, of which the earliest form is to be found in the Chronicle of Bogupalus, which recounts the history of Poland up to 1272. The first part of the Polish account does resemble the Latin poem, but the subsequent adventures of Walterus, and especially the crude sexual adventures of his wife, have no counterpart in the *Waltharius* and are utterly out of harmony with it. With the general conclusion, that the "Urwaltharius" and the Polish story belonged to the same "Stoffbereich," it is impossible to disagree. But many of the arguments which are used in an attempt to show a still closer relationship are based on dubious reasoning. Once again we are told that certain features are "un-Germanic"—Hagen's behavior, Gunther's character, Hiltigunde's weakness—and that this fact may demonstrate that the original material was not of German origin. This kind of judgment will not stand, for there is insufficient early material available to allow us to form an accurate opinion of what was or was not "Germanic," if indeed such clear definitions can ever be made.

The author sees in Gunther's demanding of Hiltigunde as well as the treasure (*Waltharius*, vv. 601 ff.) an indication that he had "originally" been Waltharius' rival in love. He compares the *Thidreks saga* and the Biterolf story. The evidence is slight indeed, for it is not Gunther who makes the demand for the girl, but his messenger Camalo. Gunther's actual instructions to his ambassador are not given. Even if we allow that Camalo was echoing his master's opinions, it would hardly be unusual for a medieval prince, bent on robbing a stranger, to demand all his possessions, including his woman. Not every action by the hero of a poem has to be explained as a manifestation of a theme from an earlier source. It is questionable how much use there is in a constant pursuit of minor motifs, many of them so common as to be almost universal, and in the attempt to find an "Urform" of the *Waltharius* story. There is still much work to be done on the *Waltharius*, but most of it lies in the field of style and structure.

I must confess to being puzzled by "Drei Kontrafakturen zu Carmina Burana 79, 85, 157," by J. A. Huisman, whose work on poetical form I much admire. There is no question of *contrafactura* on a melody here. The parallels are sought entirely in the structure. Huisman himself defines his position as follows: "Sehr beweiskräftig für direkte Abhängigkeit sind wörtliche Übereinstimmungen, gleiche Reime, oder inhaltliche Parallelen, wenn sie genau an derselben Stelle, d.h. in derselben Strophe, demselben Vers, oder gar in derselben Hebung in beiden Gedichten vorkommen" (Huisman's italics). No one would quarrel with

this, if the parallels are striking enough not to be accidental. The strophic form of the pairs C.B. 79 and 158 is the same, in itself nothing remarkable. The "parallels" consist of the following: "inquam" in strophe v, line 3, of C.B. 79, "inquit" in v. 3 of 158; "mater" in vi, 4, of each, and one or two other resemblances even less convincing.

Much of Huisman's criticism is highly subjective. The first poem is "anmutig in Ausdruck und Aufbau," the second "zeigt eine, wiewohl nicht ganz ungeschickt, so doch weit tiefer stehende Sprachhandlung"; "cum balante" (158, ii, 5) is "überflüssig," and "non in Maio, paulo ante" (158, v, 2) is "unbeholffen." My personal opinion is that C.B. 158 has a good deal of humor and that its expression is often finely pointed, but no "feeling" on the subject can determine whether one poem is a *contrafactura* of another. By Huisman's own standards the parallels are not present. The neat anticlimax which he sees at the end of C.B. 79 escapes me. I agree with Schumann that the poem is incomplete, and the attempt to show that C.B. 158 is a *contrafactura* of it does not convince me to the contrary.

The arguments in support of the view that C.B. 130 is a *contrafactura* of C.B. 85 seem to me to be even weaker than those already used. I can find no more than a general similarity of theme between C.B. 157 ("Lucis orto sidere") and the French *pastourelle* "L'autrier quant je chevauchoye." The Latin poem seems incomplete, while the French has a neat ending in which the girl refuses the reward she had promised for the recovery of the ewe from the clutches of the wolf. In any case, the strophic form is so different and the verbal parallels so slight that one could say at most that the French poem was inspired by the Latin. Even this I strongly doubt.

The other essays in the collection are: H. H. Braches, "Magisches in der Struktur des germanischen Zauberspruches" (I can find nothing new in this article); J. C. Brandt Corstius, "Historie, Roman en Historische Roman"; C. de Deugd, "Art for Art's Sake and Form and Matter"; L. Ph. Rank, "Petro-nianum"; W. A. P. Smit, "Opitz als Vertaler van Nederlandse sonnetten"; J. W. Steenbeek, "Van het kind, dat Jezus te eten gaf"; C. A. Zaalberg, "Tweemaal Frankrijk-Nederland (Baudelaire en de alexandrijnen in 'Experimenten' and Bergson en 'De Weg van het Licht')."

W. T. H. JACKSON

Columbia University

Ludwig Tieck, "Der Heilige von Dresden": *Aus der Frühzeit der deutschen Novelle*. By MARIANNE THALMANN. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte der germanischen Völker, Neue Folge 3 (127), 1960. Pp. vi + 194. DM 24.00.

In the preface to her book on Tieck, Marianne Thalmann tells us that she does not intend to provide a biography, in the usual sense of the word, but rather to confine herself to an analysis of the romanticist's novels. Biographical elements or factors will be brought to the attention of the reader only when they contribute to a fuller understanding of the novels of a certain period in the author's life. A study of this nature is most welcome, since many authors who write about the Tieck of the years 1820 to 1840 do not even discuss his novels. Apparently, these had come to be regarded as an expression of a shallow rationalism or, at best, as products of a phase of romanticism that had passed and, therefore, no longer had any meaning or pertinence for their time.

Miss Thalmann has divided the novels into series or groups under such headings as "Der Novellenkern," "Glaube und Aberglaube," "Der unwissend Gläubige," and "Die Erzählform." In the opinion of the reviewer, these chapters constitute the core of the book. From their arrangement it is evident that her treatment revolves around a motivating force or idea and that the chronology of their appearance is not strictly adhered to.

It is customary to regard the novels of Tieck's early period, "Die Straussfedern," as of minor importance. To a large degree this attitude may perhaps be justified; but Tieck himself always insisted that they revealed characteristics which remained part and parcel of much of his later work. He had early recognized the import of the miraculous and the unnatural and their interplay with the usual, the natural, and even the comical, in a world filled with human folly.

The novels Tieck wrote when he was in his forties still show something of the spirit of comedy which marked those of his early period; humor and lightheartedness are never completely absent. Tieck shows life in its transitions from reality and seriousness to jests and merriment, and he is prone to introduce the miraculous. Miss Thalmann points out that the purpose of the novels is not necessarily to describe the conflict between the individual and society, but rather to clarify basic human relationships by means of symbols and ideas. The turning point of the action, therefore, aims at drawing the reader's attention to those unexpected and mysterious events by which the action is held together.

The novels Tieck wrote when he was in his fifties are characterized by a decidedly religious undertone and frequently deal with questions of ethics. The scene of these later novels shifts away from the country aristocracy of Brandenburg, whose life, in so far as it was governed by tradition and convention, had social rank and distinction, to the cultured and intellectual elite of Dresden, whose life acquires its meaning from such intangibles as the invisible, the miraculous, and even faith, which becomes a creative force in the lives of individuals. Tieck's religious convictions do not stem from theories and dogmas, but from a positive relationship to life and reality. In the tangible forms he recognized the invisible as visible mystery.

Miss Thalmann devotes considerable space to a discussion of "Der Aufruhr in den Cevennen." Tieck has here set forth more clearly than in any other work his conception of history, which, in his view, is not merely a record of past events, but a revelation of their hidden meanings which shows how the thinking and very existence of the human being of a given period is formed. History is a dimension of time, and the present is seen by Tieck in perspective with the past.

Students of Tieck will be grateful to Miss Thalmann for this thorough and profound study of his novels, based as it is on a fine appreciation of their artistic qualities and on careful research.

THEODORE GEISSENDOERFER

University of Illinois

The Brazilian Othello of Machado de Assis: A Study of Dom Casmurro. By HELEN CALDWELL. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Perspectives in Criticism No. 6, 1960. Pp. vii + 194. \$3.50.

Readers of *Dom Casmurro* (either in the original or in the English translation by Helen Caldwell) will be fascinated by the translator's brilliant interpretation of this novel, generally considered Machado's masterpiece.

Machado de Assis borrowed extensively from Shakespeare, whom he ardently

admired. The Othello story, for example, appears in twenty-eight of his tales, plays, and articles. In *Dom Casmurro*, the protagonist and narrator, Bento Santiago—a recluse living in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro—describes his tale as that of Othello. But for Santiago there is an important difference: his Desdemona (Capitú) was guilty, and so skillfully does he plead his case that for nearly three generations the critics, almost without exception, have been convinced of the lady's guilt.

Challenging this conviction, Miss Caldwell has "reopened the case," and her penetrating inquiry into this enigmatic novel has led to many enlightening discoveries. She has found, for example, that its germ lies in the author's first novel, *Resurreição* (1872), whose theme is doubt/self-doubt which excites distrust in others. In *Dom Casmurro*, the narrative centers upon Santiago's suspicions, which, according to Miss Caldwell, are born of monstrous, unjustifiable jealousy. Just as Othello sought to exonerate himself by deluding his spectators, so the conscience-stricken Santiago seeks self-delusion and escape from the torment of self-accusation by attempting to convince his readers of his innocence. Thus, and only thus, can he allay Goethe's "restless shades," whom he apostrophizes in one of the opening chapters. Equally interesting is Miss Caldwell's conclusion that "the aim of the fictional author of *Dom Casmurro* and that of the real author are diametrically opposed. Machado would persuade us of the beauty of love. Santiago converts us to self-love."

Miss Caldwell's interpretation of the symbolism which pervades the novel does much to clarify some of its rather obscure passages. Of particular interest to the reviewer is the chapter entitled "What's in a Name," in which the significance of the characters' names is considered. The author points out that the name Santiago, for example, well illustrates its bearer's dual nature: "he is part saint (Sant), part Iago—the good or saintly and the Iago qualities at war with each other for his soul." Here, as throughout the book, is evidence of careful study combined with keen perception and a delightfully rich imagination.

Another example of Miss Caldwell's approach may be found in the discussion of the character change wrought in the protagonist—a metamorphosis in which all the good traits of the youthful Bento degenerate into the bad of the obdurate Casmurro (the nickname, meaning obstinate, stubborn, given him in later life): "Othello's jealousy turned him into a Moor; Bento's turned him into a 'casmurro.' For, I believe, Machado de Assis punned on this word: The English word 'Moor' and the middle syllable of 'casmurro' have practically the same sound."

This study merits the attention of all who are interested in Machado, the most distinguished of Brazilian writers. To the readers of *Dom Casmurro*, it will prove to be of value for its insights into the work's complexities. Whether they agree at once with the "verdict," they will surely find the book provocative of thought, and, enlightened by its new perspectives, they may be prompted to reconsider the perplexing "case" of "one that loved not wisely but too well."

CLOTILDE WILSON

University of Washington

The Writings of Eduardo Mallea. By JOHN H. R. POLT. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Publications in Modern Philology, Vol. 54, 1959. Pp. 132, \$2.50.

John H. R. Polt presents in this volume a most comprehensive study of

Eduardo Mallea's literary career. He analyzes systematically the development of Mallea's work up to the date of completion of his own research. The study is divided into six chapters, to which Polt has added copious notes and a well-chosen bibliography. Special mention should be made of Chapters II, III, IV, and V, in which the author has endeavored to elucidate with maximum precision what Mallea understands by the "visible Argentina" and the "invisible Argentina." Mallea the essayist and Mallea the novelist are presented as expressing one set of identical views. In Chapter V, he analyzes Mallea's characters as incarnations of their creator's ideas and mouthpieces for his message. Polt's task has not been an easy one, because Mallea's writings are not always free from ambiguity. The novelist-essayist charges his pages with a pathetic energy, so to speak, and he seems to enjoy expressing the emotion of his ideas more than drawing their rigorous profile.

In his conclusion, Polt says: "Mallea makes a continual effort to express ideas which, lying outside the realm of rational exposition, become objects of intuitive cognition" (p. 102). For this reason, Mallea is forced to employ parables and myths. This is doubtless true; but it is also true that every poet—and here we use the word "poet" in its broadest sense—usually does the same thing in greater or lesser degree and with a greater or lesser degree of subtlety and clarity. This latter quality, let us insist, is not found often enough in Mallea. John Polt has grappled with his subject resolutely and intelligently. His book is the most complete and the most penetrating criticism now available on this Argentinean writer.

HUGO RODRÍGUEZ-ALCALÁ

University of Washington

Rabelais par lui-même. By MANUEL DE DIEGUEZ. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, Collection "Écrivains de Toujours," 1960. Pp. 188. N.F. 4.40.

While the main trend of Rabelaisian criticism is concerned with his thought and religion, or with attempting to correlate each episode of his work with some fact of reality, it is reassuring to see the appearance of this critical work which does not lose sight of the aesthetic value of Rabelais' writings.

The introductory chapter draws a parallel between the Renaissance and the twentieth century with the emphasis on materialism and man outgrowing his universe. The second chapter presents a cautious biography of Rabelais in which the word "mystère" unfortunately appears too often. The author then devotes one chapter to each of the five books. He endeavors to show how Rabelais detaches himself from the "chroniques gargantuines" as he succeeds in founding his own verbal universe which transcends reality. Rabelais did not choose the legend of the giants for the popularity of this theme, but because he identified himself with his characters and needed a gigantic setting in which his verbal energy could flow.

According to the author, Rabelais' surge of verbal exuberance in the prologue of the *Third Book* gives way to Panurge's quests. These should no longer be considered only in the historical setting of the *Querelle des Femmes*, but can also be interpreted as forerunners of modern psychiatry—Rabelais gives a remarkably Freudian interpretation of Panurge's dreams. An original note is struck by the author when he contends that the praise of the "Pantagruélion" ends the book because Rabelais, at intervals, feels the need for an outburst of verve and lyricism, the hymn to progress being quite secondary. The approach

to the *Fourth Book* is also from the linguistic viewpoint: to the creation of new words from Hebrew, Greek, and Latin are to be added the sensory and sonorous qualities of words which can be found in the episodes of the frozen words and the storm.

Rabelais' use of language evolves to a new dimension in the sharp satire at the beginning of the *Fifth Book*, where the allegory in the episodes of *L'Isle Sonante* is very thin. The author must admit, however, that "à partir de là, il semble que l'obsession du mot tourne mal pour Rabelais" (p. 114). In spite of this remark, the authenticity of the rest of the book is not doubted; as a matter of fact, it is readily accepted on the premise that modern criticism does so too. This is quite oversimplified; the question still remains open.

In concluding, the critic stresses the fact that the value of Rabelais' works lies in his style: "La matière du monde se fera matière verbale—cette transmutation est le signe fondamental de la victoire de l'esprit" (p. 125). Interpreting Rabelais as a rationalist, a Catholic, a Protestant, or a Marxist, as Lefranc, Gilson, Febvre, Screech, and Lefebvre have done, takes us back to Sainte-Beuve's warning: "Je m'imagine que, quand on essaie de le tirer ainsi à soi, Rabelais se laisse faire et qu'il y va, mais pour en rire. Il doit s'étonner cette fois d'être devenu sous forme de légende, un apôtre, un saint, que dis-je? un Christ d'Evangile futur."

With *Rabelais par lui-même*, a new road has been opened; we hope that it will be taken by others.

MARCEL TETEL

Duke University

Œuvres complémentaires de Gérard de Nerval. Vol. I: La Vie des lettres.

Textes réunis et présentés par JEAN RICHER. Paris: M. J. Minard, Lettres Modernes, 1959. Pp. xviii + 331.

The texts of Nerval reproduced in this volume are classed in two groups: I, "Sur les poètes allemands"; II, "Critiques, portraits, préfaces." These are preceded by a four-page section entitled "Vers les œuvres complètes de Gérard de Nerval" and by a preface bearing the title "Nerval critique littéraire." Jean Richer remarks that the new collection, the first volume of which is here presented, proposes to gather together all that could not have been published in the two volumes of the works of Nerval in the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edition.

In his study of Nerval as literary critic, Jean Richer recalls that Nerval became interested in the study of German literature because his mother had been buried in Silesia. In one of his letters to his father, he said: "C'est toi qui m'avais appris cette langue. . . ." One must remark, however, with Richer, that Nerval's concern with the introduction of German romanticism into France resulted quite naturally from the striking correspondence between his own work and that of contemporary German writers. One is also impressed by the fact that German influence in France at that time was very great.

Among the major writers who informed Nerval about German letters and German sensibility, Richer cites Mme de Staël, Émile Deschamps, and Charles Nodier. He also points out the influence of Eckstein and E.-N. de Bock on Nerval. The latter must have known the studies and the translations made by such literary figures as Loève-Weimars, Xavier Marmier, and Blaze de Bury. Nerval's study on Heine was, indeed, partly the work of Théophile Gautier. In

fact, such procedures are characteristic of Nerval's literary productions: "il y avait parfois en Gérard un polygraphe, au sens le plus médiocre du terme."

A long quotation from Mme de Staël, the fact that Nerval "ait toujours tenu compte des traductions des poètes allemands antérieures aux siennes propres," and other indexes confirm what has often been said: Nerval did not know the German language well, nor was he very familiar with German literature; frequently he repeated what he found in textbooks or in works on the subject he wanted to treat. He read a great deal, but he was not what we would call a scholar. He even quoted long passages which he claimed he had translated, whereas actually he had copied them almost word for word from a previous translation by someone else. I have shown this to be the case in two instances: in Nerval's study of the German poets and in his study of the French poets of the sixteenth century.

While modern critics have said that in Nerval's work there is no plagiarism, while they speak of inspiration, actually Nerval reproduced the exact wording of others. For example, Nerval mentioned "M. Schlegel," but, until I found the precise passage to which he alluded, no one seemed to know which of the Schlegel brothers he designated. Thus, Charles Dédéyan (*Gérard de Nerval et l'Allemagne* [Paris, 1957-58], p. 277) writes: "Quel est ici l'inspirateur de Nerval, sinon Schlegel, qu'il a—on s'en souvient—lu a dix-huit ans, dans la traduction sans doute de Mme de Necker de Saussure. Il s'en inspire dans ses *Poètes du XVI^e siècle* . . ." (cf. pp. 34-35).

Dédéyan must be credited with seeing the relationship which exists between Nerval's study of the German poets and his study of the French poets of the sixteenth century. Indeed, the two works were first published in the same year (1830); but, as is well known, Mme Necker de Saussure translated the *Cours de littérature dramatique* by A.-W. Schlegel in 1814. In 1829 Friedrich Schlegel died, and that same year W. Duckett published his translation of F. Schlegel's *Histoire de la littérature ancienne et moderne*. It was F. Schlegel's *Histoire* that Nerval used, both for his work on the German poets and that on the French poets of the sixteenth century (see M. Françon, ed., *Saulsaye*, by Maurice Scève [Cambridge, 1959], pp. 187-90).

Jean Richer, in his preface, does not mention F. Schlegel; but on pages 316 (n. 4) and 324 (n. 61), he quotes the passages of Duckett's translation which provided the inspiration for Nerval's study of the French poets of the sixteenth century. Nothing, however, is said about the influence of F. Schlegel on Nerval's study of the German poets. (Let us point out that Richer's volume was "achevé d'imprimer le 5 juin 1959," whereas I published my note on F. Schlegel and Nerval in the April, 1959, number of *MLR*. At that time, I had not yet discovered the influence of F. Schlegel on Nerval's work on the German poets.)

Jean Richer, who published Nerval's study of the French poets, says: "Nous prenons comme texte de base celui de *L'Artiste* . . ."; yet, on page 320 (n. 57), he states: "*Le Mercure* comporte un passage qui ne se trouve ni dans 1830 ni dans *L'Artiste*: *A ce comble de ridicule* . . ." But this passage can be read in the *Choix*, although the clause "et que nous ayons employé le latin pour les inscriptions de nos monuments" is not to be found in 1830; and the note in the *Choix* gives us the remark "en mots de Cicéron," which is absent from the text of *Le Mercure* (contrary to what one is led to believe by Richer's note). Richer does not give the source of Nerval's quotation of P.-L. Courier (see my reproduction of the text of *Le Mercure* [Cambridge, 1959], appendix).

We welcome the publication of this first volume of Jean Richer's study. The few and slight errors or omissions which we have mentioned can in no way

detract from this interesting volume. We hope it will soon be followed by others in this same series.

MARCEL FRANÇON

Harvard University

Camus. By GERMAINE BRÉE. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1959. Pp. x + 275. \$5.00.

Germaine Brée's important study of Albert Camus encourages the hope that increasing attention will be given the literary qualities of his work. One feels that her approach must have been gratifying to a man whose commitment to art was probably of more lasting significance than his grapplings with philosophy. There have been, of course, many attempts in the past to come to grips with Camus' talent. Sartre himself was among the first, demonstrating in the now famous *Explication de l'Étranger*, as indeed in many other writings, that, although he sometimes seems unsympathetic to the poetic temperament, he still is capable of penetrating insight into the mysterious mechanics of style. I think it is fair to say, however, that literary questions have hitherto mainly been treated in articles (most of the important ones appear in Germaine Brée's bibliography; one that does not is Louis Rossi's in *Kenyon Review* of Summer, 1958). This is, then, the first extended treatment of Camus as a writer that has appeared between the covers of a book. Indeed, those who are familiar with Miss Brée's works on Proust and Gide can only regret that her *Camus* does not have quite the amplitude and concentrated density of those earlier studies.

It was inevitable that some philosophic comment should penetrate even into a work with an essentially literary approach. And so Miss Brée takes an early stand on a much debated question, declaring (p. 8) that "nothing could be more erroneous" than to consider Camus an "existentialist" writer. I confess I am inclined to side with Henri Peyre, who, in the recent *Yale French Studies* issue on Camus (No. 25), takes the position that "Camus should be regarded as an Existentialist in all but a very few respects." Surely an unbridgeable gap separated him from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, as well as from the more acrobatic breed of existentialists whose leap into faith he declined to follow. But neither his rejection of Christianity's hope of posthumous salvation nor the highly publicized break with the atheistic Paris school suffices to negate the existentialist quality of those works, from *Caligula* to *La Peste*, which, though early, were those that made him famous.

I should be sorry, however, to make this a major point of contention. One of the great virtues of Germaine Brée's book is precisely that it leads us away from this sort of question, from which some rest is welcome, to concentrate upon the form of Camus' work, its intense lyricism, and the evolution within it of the great themes of death, exile, guilt, the tension of men's relations with each other, and the tension between them and the natural world—themes that pervade all he has written, illuminating suddenly with their sad, pale beauty even the most prosaic corners of his work. For, although Camus will undoubtedly always merit a place among the great French literary moralists, his portrayal of the anguish of estrangement and the many sensual moments in his prose belong more to the order of poetry than to that of intellectual discourse. His *engagement*, which was real, took the course of art rather than of polemics. If we wish to see him apart from the existentialist quarrelings, we might best view him in quest of a beauty that is not incompatible with human suffering,

in one of his earliest works, *Noces*, and in one of the latest, *L'Exil et le royaume*.

Germaine Brée is at her best in dealing with structure, and she reveals in a series of chapters grouped by genres both the recurrence and the development of the key elements of Camus' conceptual universe. I am sorry that she did not choose to confront directly the language of Camus, his vocabulary, the rhythms, the images. But, in a book in which every quotation is translated into English, it would have been difficult indeed to deal with the problems of style. Her access to the notebooks, manuscripts, and unpublished writings, as well as conversations, and the benefit of a careful reading by Camus have certainly both extended and stabilized this history of Camus' artistic life. Written as it was to catch him in mid-career, or even as he was launched in a fresh theatrical career, it is now our richest account of a complete life, sealed by an absurd death, as close as anyone has got, and probably will get for some time, to a truly definitive work.

RAYMOND GIRAUD

Stanford University

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The *Modern Language Quarterly* is pleased to print the following announcement of a newcomer to the hard-pressed rank of learned journals and to share the feeling of relief at the prospect of another outlet for the teeming products of scholarly virility.

In the autumn of 1961, *Studies in Romanticism*, a new quarterly journal sponsored by the Graduate School, Boston University, will begin publication. As its title indicates, the journal will be devoted to the study of all aspects and manifestations of the Romantic Movement.

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The subscription price is \$4.00 per year; subscriptions should be sent to David Bonnell Green, Editor, *Studies in Romanticism*, 236 Bay State Road, Boston 15, Massachusetts.

The Department of English at the Rice Institute announces the publication of *SEL—Studies in English Literature: 1500-1900*. Each issue will be devoted to historical and critical studies in one of four fields, joined with an analytical review of the year's most significant scholarship in each period. Manuscripts should be submitted to Carroll Camden, Editor, The Rice Institute, Houston, Texas. First issue: January 1961.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

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- Archive of Recorded Poetry and Literature: A Checklist. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, General Reference and Bibliography Division, Reference Department, 1961. Pp. 132.
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- Downer, Alan. *Recent American Drama*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pamphlets on American Writers, No. 7, 1961. Pp. 46. \$0.65.
- Nevius, Blake. *Edith Wharton: A Study of Her Fiction*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, second printing (first paperbound edition), 1961. Pp. xi + 271. \$1.50.
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
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
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